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INTRODUCTION 
 
A wide range of startling discoveries in the last decades of the twentieth century gave birth to a 
revolutionary new science, devoted to the exploration of the strange but ubiquitous effects of 
“organized chaos.” Chaos theory challenges traditional thought by undermining the classical 
conception of hard linear determinism, replacing it with an unstable species of nonlinear 
dynamics.
1
 In the early 1980s, personal computers made it possible to discover the hidden beauty 
of fractal geometry, made evident simply by running recursive algorithms on complex numbers. 
Within physical contexts, chaotic effects have been discovered within the orbital paths of planets 
and galaxies, the currents of oceans and atmosphere, the contours of landmasses, Earth’s 
magnetic field, which fluctuates in response to the flow of Earth’s iron magma core, the clouds 
of Jupiter, certain chemical reactions, and the sporadic dripping of a water faucet. Yet the 
influence of chaos is scarcely confined to inanimate matter, but thrives in the shape, growth and 
function of plants and biological systems. The structures of brain, heart, lungs and intestines 
reflect the recursive architecture of fractal geometry. Even more, chaos plays an integral role in 
outcomes of animal consciousness. Not only are aggregate features of animal populations 
chaotic, a feature causally interlocked with other chaotic parameters of environment, such as 
food chain and weather, but even some of the most individualistic animal behavior, such as the 
pecking of a bird, for instance, have been statistically demonstrated as chaotic, when compared 
to the behavior of wider populations, such as flock, herd, school, etc. As for humans, 
                                                 
1
 “The most passionate advocates of the new science go so far as to say that twentieth-century science will be 
remembered for just three things: relativity, quantum mechanics, and chaos. Chaos, they contend, has become the 
centuries’ third great revolution in the physical sciences. Like the first two revolutions, chaos cuts away at the tenets 
of Newton’s physics. As one physicist put it: ‘Relativity eliminated the Newtonian illusion of absolute space and 
time; quantum theory eliminated the Newtonian dream of a controllable measurement process; and chaos eliminates 
the Laplacian fantasy of deterministic predictability.’ Of the three, the revolution in chaos applies to the universe we 
see and touch, to objects at human scale.” James Gleick, Chaos: The Making of a New Science (New York: Penguin, 
1987), 5–6.  
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neuroscience has demonstrated that human brainwave activity, mood swings and many 
additional features of the mind are governed by chaos theory, as are certain aspects of human 
personality and behavior. Further still, chaosticians have concluded that the collective output of 
human behavior produces chaotic results in the stock market and other economic indexes, 
indexes previously described as random.  
 Once the various areas of chaos research are set alongside one another, chaos theory is seen 
as supplanting or, in some sense, infringing into the modal categories of necessity, determinism, 
free will and contingency. With such extreme diversity, chaos theory has generated tremendous 
interest, coming to be considered by many as constituting a universal science. One is naturally 
led by the wide-ranging effects of chaos to consider what phenomena in nature, if any, might be 
demonstrated as non-chaotic. But how is chaos theory to be interpreted? After its bewildering yet 
beautiful features are contemplated, what does it all mean? This question is problematic in that 
the meaning of chaos might not be ascertainable until its scope is first clarified. It may be that 
chaos theory ultimately falls back into the lap of the determinist, though with a different brand of 
determinism than before. Or else it may be that chaos theory implies such a strange admixture of 
determinism and indeterminism, of necessity and contingency as to dissolve the familiar 
understanding of these concepts. In this event, traditional categories of modality would be 
regarded as naïve, presenting the challenge as to how these fundamental terms should be re-
conceptualized.  
A chief interest of the present study is the tremendous reach of chaos theory, as exhibited 
throughout fractal geometry, physical sciences, psychology, and probability. The spirit of this 
study is to carry forward in the advocacy of chaos theory, probing the extent to which its borders 
might be extended, and inquiring into what it lacks from constituting a universal science. The 
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present discussion considers how chaos theory might become positioned to subsume modal 
categories of necessity, determinism, free will and contingency. The strategy is to: (1) propose a 
theory of transfinite probability as a science of contingency, (2) propose a theory of 
hypercomplex-transfinite (HT) numbers as a science of necessity, (3) demonstrate that these two 
theories are isomorphic to one another, and (4) produce an algebraic synthesis of these theories 
by means of HT number theory and HT modality, thereby producing a synthesis of necessity and 
contingency. Because the logical structure of the Mandelbrot fractal is the same as the logical 
structure of HT number theory, chaos theory has the same logical power as HT theory, and can 
thus be interpreted as deeply involved in the synthesis accomplished through HT modality. The 
conclusion to be drawn is that, if chaos theory reaches so widely as to provide for the embrace of 
the polar extremes of necessity and contingency, then recognition must be given to the dialectical 
synthesis, and thus erasure, of these modal categories.  
Chapters 1–3 present the background and context for the philosophical concerns motivating 
the present study. Chapter 1 describes the classical dichotomy of Being vs. Nonbeing, and then 
describes how Neoplatonists of the via negativa envision a synthesis of these modal opposites. 
Chapter 2 describes the twentieth century crisis in mathematical foundations, the field of study 
most widely regarded as the locus classicus of logical necessity. Chapter 3 describes modal 
problems in broad outline, giving special emphasis to questions of contingency. Chapter 4 
proposes a theory of transfinite probability, contrasting it with the standard mathematical theory 
of classical probability. Chapter 5 proposes a unified theory of hypercomplex-transfinite (HT) 
numbers. This system gives expression to an HT ramified zigzag theory. Chapter 6 shows that, 
not only does HT ramified zigzag solve the set theoretic paradoxes and Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem, but it effects a synthesis of HT numbers and transfinite probability within the rubric of 
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HT modality, thus accomplishing the fundamental objective of the present study. Chapter 7 
reflects on how the material proposed in chapters 4–6 relates to the issues discussed in chapters 
1–3, and reorients questions of modality in terms of the philosophical-mathematical program 
proposed here. Interestingly, HT theory implies that P = NP. As generally conceived, the present 
discussion can be understood as offering a Hegelian response to Kant’s antinomies, and also as 
offering a Neoplatonist synthesis of Being and Nonbeing. The distinctive quality of the present 
study is the pursuit of these philosophical objectives in terms of the philosophy of mathematics.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BEING, NONBEING AND CONTRARIETY 
 
The chief concern of the Parmenidean tradition is to identify and defend an absolutist conception 
of being or substance, both of which translate the Greek word ousia. This metaphysical program 
has been attempted in a number of various ways. Aristotle is an exemplary member of this 
tradition. He believed that absolute being is to be found within empirical reality. Although his 
views on this were subject to revision, his initial claim was that particular physical objects, such 
as a horse or a man, are what he referred to as primary substances. According to this theory, 
primary substances are absolute in the Parmenidean sense because they do not have contraries, as 
is also true of secondary substances, such as species of primary substances. Aristotle wrote:  
Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them. For 
what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing 
contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to 
animal.
2
  
 
An individual man is a primary substance for Aristotle because there is no such thing as an anti-
man that, when brought near to man, makes him cease to be or disappear. In this sense, a primary 
substance has no opposite or contrary. But although primary substances have no contraries, they 
are able to receive contraries. For instance, a man is able to receive contraries of health or 
sickness, or of tallness or shortness. Additionally, primary substances can be abstracted from so 
as to produce a concept or form. This form is spoken of as the species of the primary substance, 
                                                 
2
 Aristotle, Categories 5, 3b24–28; Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1: 7.  
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such as the species of horse or the species of man, what Aristotle refers to as secondary 
substances. Insofar as scientific knowledge seeks to understand general or universal 
characteristics and not particular individuals, it studies forms or species. But for Aristotle, the 
forms of these secondary substances are always grounded in and derived from primary 
substances.  
 Based on this discussion, it can be understood that, like Plato, Aristotle believed in forms, 
though Aristotle understood forms as empirical rather than transcendent. But despite their 
differences, the common feature of the Parmenidean tradition is to identify a specific feature of 
reality that is claimed to be absolute, and then to deny that that absolute can be subject to 
contrariety. Should contrariety prevail on what is regarded as being or substance, then 
Heraclitean flux would erode the Parmenidean absolute. Nonbeing poses a special concern 
within this context because it poses the threat of being construed as a contrary to being. Thus 
providing an account of nonbeing such that it offers no contrariety to being has been a 
fundamental concern of the Parmenidean tradition. When Parmenides denied nonbeing, his claim 
was primarily logical. When Aristotle denied nonbeing, his claim was primarily empirical. When 
Plato denied or otherwise contemplated nonbeing, the issue was primarily metaphysical. But 
despite these various claims, absolutist sanctions against contrariety have suffered remarkable 
defeat. This drama has played out in logic, mathematics, the empirical sciences, and 
metaphysics. The objective of the discussion in this chapter is to consider the degree to which 
contrariety and nonbeing threaten or repudiate the Parmenidean tradition, particularly within the 
context of Plato’s classical theory of forms. The chief interest is to explain how the problem of 
contrariety became especially acute within Platonism, causing the emergence of the via negativa 
from the via positiva.  
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Platonism and the Classical Conception of Being  
Although Plato constantly revised his theory of forms, at least three basic claims represent 
what can be described as his classical theory of forms. These claims can be identified as the 
ontological thesis, the metaphysical thesis and the epistemological thesis.  
1. Ontological thesis: Forms or ideals exist as transcendent absolutes, constituting the 
essence and substance (or ultimate being) of reality. They are intelligible, discrete 
realities that always exist, never coming into being or passing away. As such, they 
have the highest rank of existence among all existing things. Their existence is fully 
actual and objective, independent of the human mind.  
2. Metaphysical thesis: Although the forms are transcendent and separate unto 
themselves within the divine realm, they are the archetypes or prototypes that give 
form to physical reality. Either the forms exert a presence within physical reality, or 
else physical reality copies or shares in the forms (the specific relation is not clear). 
The forms superintend the physical world, such that the physical, changing, lesser 
reality is governed by the higher, intelligible, absolute reality.  
3. Epistemological thesis: True and ultimate knowledge pertains only to the forms. That 
is, knowledge is achieved by the pure, rationalistic activity of the mind as it grasps 
the intelligible essence of the forms, which is eternal and absolute. True and stable 
knowledge does not pertain to empirical observations of the senses which observe 
transient physical images.  
In the following passage from the Phaedo, Socrates describes the forms of Beauty, the Great 
and the Good. His view of causality is that empirical reality copies various forms: big things are 
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made big by the form of the Big, small things are made small by the form of the Small, etc. Here 
he claims that beautiful things are made beautiful by the form of Beauty.  
I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and 
all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the 
cause as a result…. I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful 
itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I 
say so with everything…. I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, 
that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or 
however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I 
will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things 
are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself 
or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the 
safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through Beauty that 
beautiful things are made beautiful.
3
  
 
In the following passage in Symposium, Socrates quotes Diotima as she instructed him on 
Love and Beauty in his youth. This passage describes the same theory of causality as above, 
again with reference to the form of Beauty. Socrates quotes Diotima speaking to him as follows:   
You see, the man who has been thus far guided in matters of love, who has 
beheld beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal 
of loving. All of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful 
in its nature. That, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors: First, it always 
is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is 
not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at 
another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another, nor 
is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some 
people and ugly for others…. It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, 
or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, it is 
always one in form; and all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way 
that when those other things come to be or pass away, this does not become the 
least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change. This is what it is to go aright, or 
be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake 
of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs.
4
  
 
As in the Phaedo passage, Socrates speaks of the form of Beauty as having magisterial 
autonomy, “itself by itself with itself.” But in the present passage, he places much greater 
                                                 
3
 Plato, Phaedo 100b–e; John M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1997).  
 
4
 Plato, Symposium 210e–211c.   
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emphasis on the absolute existence and universal character of the form. As seen here, the 
influence or scope of a form is not qualified, as if only in heaven or in earth or in some other 
thing, but “always one in form,” with unqualified attribution.  
Augustine is often described as synthesizing Platonism with Christianity. The Judeo-
Christian tradition describes God as unchanging in the same way as Plato described the forms (“I 
the Lord change not,” and “Yesterday and today the same, and forever”). In terms of onto-
theology (that is, a theology grounded in Absolute Being), Augustine described God as having 
absolute Being and sovereignty over the physical world in the same way as Plato described the 
forms as transcending the world of flux.  
Augustine claims that even condemned souls maintain their own just rank within the 
hierarchical order of beings created by God. This order extends through intermediate steps from 
one degree of praise to the next, such that no level of existence should be missing from the 
others. As Augustine writes:  
For even though our souls are decayed with sin, they are better and more sublime 
than they would be if they were transformed into visible light. And you see that 
even souls that are addicted to the bodily senses give God great praise for the 
grandeur of light. Therefore, don’t let the fact that sinful souls are condemned 
lead you to say in your heart that it would be better if they did not exist. For they 
are condemned only in comparison with what they would have been if they had 
refused to sin. Nonetheless, God their Creator deserves the most noble praise that 
human beings can offer him, not only because he places them in a just order when 
they sin, but also because he created them in such a way that even the filth of sin 
could in no way make them inferior to corporeal light, for which he is nonetheless 
praised.  
 If you saw that the earth had been made but not the heavens, then you would 
have a legitimate complaint, for you could say that the earth ought to have been 
made like the heavens that you can imagine. But since you see that the pattern to 
which you wanted the earth to conform has indeed been made (but is called “the 
heavens” and not “the earth”), I’m sure that you would not begrudge the fact that 
the inferior thing has also been made, and that the earth exists, since you are not 
deprived of the better thing. And there is so great a variety of parts in the earth 
that we cannot conceive of any earthly form that God has not created…. By 
intermediate steps one passes gradually from the most fertile and pleasant land to 
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the briniest and most barren, so that you would not dream of disparaging any of 
them except in comparison with a better. Thus you ascend through every degree 
of praise, so that even when you come to the very best land, you would not want it 
to exist without the others. And how great a distance there is between the whole 
earth and the heavens! God has numbered them all.  
 
Furthermore, Augustine claims that the human soul is naturally connected to the divine 
reasons on which it depends, allowing it to infer through right reason certain things that must 
exist, though not able to infer all things that do exist.  
Therefore, it is possible for something to exist in the universe that you do not 
conceive with your reason, but it is not possible for something that you conceive 
by right reason not to exist. For you cannot conceive anything better in creation 
that has slipped the mind of the Creator. Indeed, the human soul is naturally 
connected with the divine reasons on which it depends….  If, therefore, it knows 
by right reason that God ought to have made something, let it believe that God has 
in fact done so, even if it does not see the thing among those that God has made.  
 
Augustine says that unhappiness can be avoided simply by cherishing one’s will to exist, for 
the will to exist moves one closer to him who exists in the highest degree.  
So if you will to escape from unhappiness, cherish your will to exist. For if you 
will more and more to exist, you will approach him who exists in the highest 
degree. And give thanks that you exist now, for even though you are inferior to 
those who are happy, you are superior to things that do not have even the will to 
be happy – and many such things are praised even by those who are unhappy…. 
Nonetheless, all things that exist deserve praise simply in virtue of the fact that 
they exist, for they are good simply in virtue of the fact that they exist.  
 
Augustine admonishes others to love things which exist eternally, rather than temporal things 
that are set on the road toward nonexistence.  
The more you love existence, the more you will desire eternal life, and so the 
more you will long to be refashioned so that your affections are no longer 
temporal, branded upon you by the love of temporal things that are nothing before 
they exist, and then, once they do exist, flee from existence until they exist no 
more. How can you expect such things to endure, when for them to begin to exist 
is to set out on the road to nonexistence? … Someone who loves existence 
approves of such things insofar as they exist and loves that which always exists. If 
once he used to waiver in the love of temporal things, he now grows firm in the 
love of the eternal. Once he wallowed in the love of fleeting things, but he will 
stand steadfast in the love of what is permanent. Then he will obtain the very 
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existence that he willed when he was afraid not to exist but could not stand 
upright because he was entangled in the love of fleeting things…. Your will to 
exist is like a first step. “If you go on from there to set your sights more and more 
on existence, you will rise to him who exists in the highest degree.
5
  
 
Augustine claims that it is absurd to say one would rather not exist than to be unhappy, for 
not to exist is nothing, and so no one can be right in choosing not to exist. “How can we concur 
with one who is choosing nothing? We desire peace, and this has the character of being.” 
Augustine concludes, “Therefore, just as no one can desire not to exist, no one ought to be 
ungrateful to the goodness of the Creator for the fact that he exists.”6  
A related question to this discussion is that, if all existence traces to God, then is not God the 
author of evil? Augustine’s interlocutor Evodius asks how we perform evil acts, apart from 
learning of evil. Augustine responds by saying:  
Perhaps because they turn away from learning and become strangers to it. But 
whether that is the correct explanation or not, one thing is certainly clear: since 
learning is good, and the word ‘learning’ is correctly applied only when we come 
to know something, we simply cannot come to know evil things. If we could, then 
they would be part of learning, and so learning would not be a good thing. But it 
is a good thing, as you said yourself. Therefore, we do not come to know evil 
things, and there is no point in your asking from whom we learn to do evil things. 
Or else we do come to know them, but only as things to be avoided, not as things 
to be done. It follows that doing evil is nothing but turning away from learning…. 
So someone who wants to know the cause of our learning something really wants 
to know the cause of our doing good. So let’s have no more of your wanting to 
hunt down this mysterious evil teacher. If he is evil, he is no teacher; and if he is a 
teacher, he is not evil.
7
  
 
In denying the possibility of an evil teacher, Augustine is defending a Parmenidean view of both 
Being and Truth, such that neither has a contrary, as if there should be an anti-Being or an anti-
Truth. Augustine had converted to Christianity from Manichaeism, and so was vigilant not to 
                                                 
5
 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), 
Book 3, Chap. 5.  
 
6
 Ibid., Book 3, Chap. 8.  
 
7
 Ibid., Book 1, Chap. 1.  
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claim that Good and Evil were coequal contraries. Augustine and others of the Parmenidean 
tradition thus describe evil as merely a privation or absence of Good. According to Manichaeism, 
a belief that flourished in the fourth century AD, there are two equal and yet opposing gods, one 
the god of Good and the other the god of Evil. But inasmuch as these gods are equal, they have 
the same metaphysical standing as the other, and thus there is no real basis by which one is 
superior or inferior to the other. More specifically, Mani, the founder of Manichaeism, offered 
the formulation that each of these rival gods constitutes a separate substance, thus conceiving of 
being in terms of contrariety.  This contrariety was regarded not only as a theological heresy 
from within monotheistic religions but also a metaphysical heresy from within Parmenidean 
metaphysics.  
Although not a Platonist, Descartes considered the relations of being and nonbeing and of 
truth and falsehood in similar fashion as did Plato and Augustine. Descartes considered his 
faculty of judging to be fallible because humans are situated midway between “the supreme 
being” and “non-being,” and thus concluded that “error as such is not something real that 
depends upon God, but rather is merely a defect.”  As he explains:  
On looking for the cause of these errors, I find that I possess not only a real and 
positive idea of God, or a being who is supremely perfect, but also what may be 
described as a negative idea of nothingness, or of that which is farthest removed 
from all perfection. I realize that I am, as it were, something intermediate between 
God and nothingness, or between supreme being and non-being: my nature is 
such that in so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is nothing in me to 
enable me to go wrong or lead me astray; but in so far as I participate in 
nothingness or non-being, that is, in so far as I am not myself the supreme being 
and am lacking in countless respects, it is no wonder that I make mistakes. I 
understand, then, that error as such is not something real which depends on God, 
but merely a defect. Hence my going wrong does not require me  to have a faculty 
specially bestowed on me by God; it simply happens as a result of the fact that the 
faculty of true judgement which I have from God is in my case not infinite.  
13 
 
But this is still not entirely satisfactory. For error is not a pure negation, but 
rather a privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in me.
8
  
 
Descartes rejects the view that error or falsehood is real, as if truth were opposed by pure 
negation which depends on God for its existence, as if divine concurrence could be given to what 
is opposed to truth. For Descartes, false reason might agree with what is, but right reason can 
never oppose absolute truth. The falsity that denies truth is not something that has being, but 
merely what is a privation of something else that has being. This construction of nonbeing is the 
classic understanding of the Parmenidean tradition, whether with respect to the nonbeing of 
falsehood or the nonbeing of evil. Within the Parmenidean tradition, neither falsehood nor evil 
possess their own nature, for such natures would constitute substances that present contrariety to 
truth and goodness. Contrariety such as this is thought heretical and impossible by those who 
follow Parmenides.   
 
Critique of the Classical Theory of Being  
The Greek mathematician Thales proved the following theorem. Consider a circle with 
diameter AB, center C and point D on the circle. Theorem: The triangle ABD is a right triangle. 
This theorem offers a basis for universal, necessary knowledge, giving knowledge of any 
possible triangle considered, though only one triangle is considered. Plato’s view highlights the 
fact that the theorem does not pertain to a particular depiction, for any depiction inevitably 
deviates from a perfect triangle. The theorem pertains rather to geometrical objects that are 
grasped only through the mind.  Therefore, let the triangle of this theorem be identified as Plato’s 
form of triangle.  
                                                 
8
 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2:38.  
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But the above discussion produces an inconsistency for classical Platonism. A triangle must 
be scalene, isosceles, or equilateral. The Platonic form of the theorem must be equally applicable 
to all of these possibilities, for the theorem is true for any triangle whatsoever. But yet a Platonic 
form is to have not only the definitional “essence” of what it is to be something, but must also 
have the actual substance or being of the universal archetype. But the triangle of Thales’ theorem 
cannot be delimited as strictly scalene, isosceles and equilateral at the same time, since it must be 
a universal that covers all possible cases. Thus the Platonic form of the present discussion cannot 
be sustained due to a fundamental modal distinction; the form cannot satisfy the demands of 
actuality and possibility simultaneously, and thus the classical theory of forms is shown to be 
naïve. Forms cannot be said to exist for any mathematical entity whatsoever without 
qualification. It was seemingly with this problem in mind that Plato revised his theory in 
Republic so as to describe forms in hierarchal relationships to one another, allowing for some 
forms to be nested within other forms. The form of a triangle, it seems, does not exist absolutely 
unto itself but is built up from other forms. A scalene triangle, for example, can be built up by 
the forms of three, line and unequal. An isosceles triangle can be built up by the forms of one, 
unequal, two, equal and line, etc. But such interdependency of the forms drastically alters the 
theory of forms from which they were formerly described as autonomous and absolute. 
Heraclitean flux is threatening the Parmenidean character of the forms.  
The sort of problem described in the preceding discussion gives rise to distinctions of 
realism, conceptualism and nominalism. Because many believe that Platonic realism reflects an 
excessive metaphysical outlook, much of western thought has opted to defend the more modest 
views of conceptualism and nominalism. Hume and Kant were leading proponents of 
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conceptualism within modern philosophy. But here too, the Parmenidean tradition of no 
contrariety continues to exert a profound influence.  
Kant is a leading proponent of conceptualism. In espousing the Parmenidean logic of 
rejecting contrariety, he insists that there can be no antithetic within pure reason.  
It is grievous, indeed, and disheartening, that there should be any such thing as an 
antithetic of pure reason, and that reason, which is the highest tribunal for all 
conflicts, should thus be at variance with itself.
9
  
 
But further, Kant spells out the specific conditions for which he deemed such an antithetic 
impossible. He writes, “There would indeed be a real conflict, if pure reason had anything to say 
on the negative side which amounted to a positive ground for its negative contentions.”10 But 
after rejecting any possibility for such a conflict, he concludes: 
There is thus no real antithetic of pure reason…. This is a comforting 
consideration, and affords reason fresh courage; for upon what could it rely, if, 
while it alone is called upon to remove all errors, it should yet be at variance with 
itself, and without hope of peace and quiet possession.… There is, therefore, 
properly speaking, no polemic in the field of pure reason.
11 
 
 
Yet Kant also diagnoses human reason as involved in speculations that illegitimately exceed 
the proper limits of reason, and as thus falling into various errors which need correction. As he 
writes:  
The root of these disturbances, which lies deep in the nature of human reason, 
must be removed. But how can we do so, unless we give it freedom, nay, 
nourishment, to send out shoots so that it may discover itself to our eyes, and that 
it may then be entirely destroyed? We must, therefore, bethink ourselves of 
objections which have never yet occurred to any opponent, and indeed lend him 
our weapons, and grant him the most favourable position which he could possibly 
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desire. We have nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for; namely, that we 
may gain for ourselves a possession which can never again be contested.
12
  
 
On Kant’s view, mathematics is especially immune from antithetic. As he writes: “In 
mathematics this subreption is impossible; and it is there, therefore, that apagogical proofs have 
their true place.”13 This is to say that an apogogical or indirect proof in mathematics can never 
result in an antithetic or contrariety.  
On Kant’s view, logic and mathematics never allow antithetic whatsoever, although science 
can temporarily fall into a state of contrariety, and even perhaps of contradiction, but only due to 
the uncertain nature of competing hypotheses. In the end, however, the ultimate and ideal state of 
the physical sciences is such as to be immune from opposition or polemic. Like the physical 
sciences, philosophy exhibits antithetic within its impure state, and so Kant’s admonition is to 
nourish philosophical polemics so that the offending errors can be fully exposed, only then to be 
“entirely destroyed,” leaving uncontested truth as a permanent possession. In the end, he insists 
that all the employments of pure reason are free from antithetic or contrariety. This indicates that 
Kant subscribes to the Parmenidean conception of absolute Being, whether conceived of in 
metaphysical, empirical or mathematical terms.  
The long struggle to prove Euclid’s fifth postulate as a theorem, rather than to assume it, 
ultimately was resolved through means of an apogogical or indirect proof. Because the axiom 
could not be proven true by direct methods, mathematicians began to assume that it was false, so 
as to then derive a contradiction. Yet just as the fifth postulate resisted direct proof, it also 
resisted proof by contradiction. To the amazement of those involved, it eventually became clear 
that Euclid’s fifth postulate gives rise to an antithetic – it can be either true or false, and a 
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consistent geometry results either case. Significantly, this example provides an instantiation of 
the specific conditions which Kant claimed to be impossible. Not only is there a simple antithetic 
with respect to the fifth postulate, but non-Euclidean geometries are able to provide a positive 
ground for their negative claim which is antithetic or contrary to Euclidean geometry.  
 The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries is a much discussed topic. But consider 
whether the discovery actually presents a contradiction. (The preceding discussion of “antithetic” 
is quite different from an antinomy or contradiction. “Antithetic,” as used by Kant, refers merely 
to contrariety or opposition.) The critical point to understand here is that contradictions occur in 
the context of particular assumptions, and thus when a contradiction is discovered, consideration 
is given as to which assumption (or assumptions) is to be blamed and thereupon abandoned. So 
then, are Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries mutually contradictory? Yes, but only insofar 
as mathematical truth is thought to be absolute. Once belief is abandoned that mathematical 
truths can have no contraries, an assumption aptly described as the Parmenidean-Kantian 
assumption, then the contradiction disappears. Now rather than speaking of one absolute and 
universal body of mathematical truths, opposing models and systems have come to be recognized 
throughout mathematics, each having their own truths and counter-truths. Truth, rather than 
being absolute and universal, is now interpreted as delimited to particular contexts. But of course 
such findings are not limited to mathematics. Niels Bohr emphasized the interplay of truth and 
counter-truth within quantum physics, particularly with respect to the uncertainty principle. As 
he famously stated: “The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. The opposite of a 
profound truth may well be another profound truth.” Kant’s prohibitions against antithetic are 
thus no longer recognized within mathematics or the physical sciences.
14
  
                                                 
14
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show that his prohibition against mathematical and scientific contrariety is incorrect.  
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As touching on the debate of realism, conceptualism and nominalism, the negative effects 
described here equally challenge absolutist views of realism and conceptualism, though the 
question arises as to how these implications might affect non-absolutists of the via negativa. It 
thus remains to consider the question of contrariety within the metaphysics of Neoplatonism.  
 
The Via Negativa, Nonbeing and Contrariety  
Plato’s classical theory of forms underwent constant revision. But after the revisions 
culminate in the via negativa in the later dialogues, it seems in retrospect that the sweep of 
revisions was moving in that direction even from the early dialogues (though note that it is a  
minority view that the dialogues culminate in the via negativa). The most rudimentary version of 
the classical theory of forms seems to be found in Symposium, and then the theory is slightly 
revised in moving to the Phaedo.
15
 In Symposium, the form of Beauty is described in terms of 
ultimate autonomy, “itself by itself with itself.” The scope of the form is universal and without 
qualification. In the Phaedo, the form of Beauty is still described in terms of autonomy (“itself 
by itself”), though the autonomy of other forms is less than absolute. Such is the case with the 
Big and Small, or more particularly the Odd and the Even, where neither is fully independent of 
the other; rather, each element of the pair stands in a correlative relation with its complement (its 
opposite). The Phaedo stresses that forms are always the same and are not subject to change.  
The theory of forms undergoes significant changes in Republic Book 6. The Analogy of the 
Divided Line describes forms as standing in the same place as mere hypotheses, the difference 
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based on their mode of presentations in moving up or down the divided line. Just as shadows and 
reflections gain intelligibility when seen in relation to their corresponding physical objects, so 
physical objects are mere shadows that are explained in terms of mathematical precision. The 
progression in moving from physical objects to mathematical clarity is the critical step up the 
divided line from the visible to the intelligible. But the mathematical intelligibility gained herein 
is one based merely on hypotheses, and thus the analogy of shadowy images continues to hold 
force even within the intelligible realm. Just as physical objects lack clarity with respect to 
mathematics, so too mathematical hypotheses lack intelligibility with respect to a secure 
mathematical foundation. It is the view of Plato (and so too of many modern mathematicians), 
that mathematical hypotheses lack intelligibility in the absence of an unhypothetical first 
principle. Thus the many and varied claims of mathematical hypotheses are positioned high on 
the divided line with respect to visible objects, but low with respect to the unhypothetical first 
principle, which stands supreme atop the divided line. Hypotheses had been part of the upward 
force that pulls the soul upward from the visible realm into the intelligible, but once the soul 
apprehends what is intelligible, hypotheses become a hindrance to the ascent toward the 
intelligible by taking on the character of shadowy images. According to Plato, a hypothesis is a 
concocted reality a mathematician might contrive as a mere thought experiment. Plato claims 
that the pursuit for intelligibility must press beyond the hypothetical to what is fundamentally 
unhypothetical. He claims further that this final step must be made without the aid of hypotheses 
at all, and thus, insofar as hypotheses pertain in some important sense to what is visible, the final 
ascent of reason takes place within a realm that is wholly invisible and purely intelligible. 
According to the logic of the divided line, the unhypothetical first principle stands in the same 
relation to hypotheses as hypotheses relate to physical objects, which in turn is the same relation 
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in which physical objects relate to images (such as shadows and reflections). The path upward 
proceeds from hypothesis to hypothesis, without any knowledge of why the hypotheses are as 
they are, until the unhypothetical fir principle is attained. At the top of the divided line, the 
power of dialectic operates purely within the realm of the intelligible, without any benefit of 
hypotheses or visible objects whatsoever. Once the “unhypothetical first principle of everything” 
is grasped, Plato says the path of reason reverses itself, now looking down on the path just 
ascended. Upon taking the downward path, what was formerly hypothetical is now understood in 
light of the unhypothetical as determinate forms. Thus the path downward proceeds “to a 
conclusion without making use of anything visible at all,” that is, no hypotheses or physical 
objects, “but moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms” (Republic 511b).  
The Analogy of the Divided Line offers a remarkable presentation of forms. Although 
intended to be fully determinate and necessary, forms first appear in Republic Book 6 in the 
guise of contingent hypotheses. The intelligibility of a form is not autonomous from within the 
form itself, but is completely heteronomous with respect to the unhypothetical first principle. 
Except for the intelligibility conferred on a form by the unhypothetical first principle, a form is 
otherwise indistinguishable from a mere hypothesis. This is a radical departure from a form as 
classically conceived, existing “itself by itself with itself.” Additionally, because forms are 
arranged according to nested hierarchies, the range and effect of the forms are delimited, just as 
certain hypotheses are valid only within contexts of other supporting hypotheses. This 
interdependence diminishes the absolute quality of forms even further. As presented in Republic, 
the theory of forms is very much a work in progress, though it has already been revised beyond 
the point of Symposium or Phaedo.  
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Before continuing on to consider how Plato revises the theory of forms further in 
Parmenides and Sophist, it will be helpful to consider a similar theory of being and nonbeing as 
offered by Augustine. Like Plato, Augustine’s writings reflect a significant amount of 
development with respect to the classical theory of being. Augustine’s earlier uncritical writings 
on the subject are expressed in On Free Choice of the Will, but his more developed critical views 
are apparent in Confessions. Within this latter context, Augustine conceived of God in 
Parmenidean terms as described in the theory of divine simplicity. This theory expresses the 
view that God is a perfect absolute being who is ontologically self-sufficient, not having proper 
parts that are, in some sense, logically prior to the divine being. The theory of divine simplicity 
holds that God is immaterial, immutable, timeless, impassible and independent. Augustine, 
Anselm, Aquinas, Maimonides and other monotheists embraced the theory, though Muslim 
theologians tended to reject it. The God of divine simplicity has more affiliation with Aristotle’s 
Unmoved Mover and “Nous nousing Nous” rather than answering to the description of a God 
who is a loving, compassionate father. According to this theory, God relates to his internal 
attributes necessarily but to external objects contingently. But if God’s substance is necessary 
and yet God is also the creator of Adam contingently, then how is the act of creating contingent 
things to be understood as a necessary or intrinsic attribute of God? This is the modal divide 
through which Augustine was trying to relate to God in Confessions. Based on the context of 
divine simplicity, Augustine developed the view that God stands eternally, but humanity is 
broken up in time. Augustine interprets time as tending toward nonbeing, which places time in 
sharp distinction from eternity. Augustine writes as follows:  
But the two times, past and future, how can they be, since the past is no more and 
the future is not yet? On the other hand, if the present were always present and 
never flowed away into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity. But if the 
present is only time, because it flows away into the past, how can we say that it 
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is? For it is only because it will cease to be. Thus we can affirm that time is only 
in that it tends toward not-being.
16
  
 
Based on the predicament of having his life grounded in not-being, Augustine wrote, “My life is 
but a scattering,” and then added, “I am divided up in time, whose order I do not know, and my 
thoughts and the deepest places of my soul are torn with every kind of tumult.”17  
Here in Confessions, the distinction between time and eternity implies that humanity is 
radically separated from God. Augustine describes all humanity as divided up and scattered in 
the nonbeing of time, so as (except for divine grace) to be metaphysically cut off from God.
18
 In 
On Free Choice of the Will, humanity is separated from God only through intermediate steps of 
being, according to which humans have a lesser and derived status of being, though one which 
nonetheless is completely connected with God, who exists in the highest degree. The relation of 
humanity to God in On Free Choice of the Will is autological. This autological relation is the 
defining positive relation of the via positiva. In Confessions, the relation of humanity to God is 
heterological. This heterological relation is the defining negative relation of the via negativa.  
The via negativa is strikingly evident within Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist. The 
Parmenides is perhaps the most puzzling and controversial dialogue in all of Plato. The problem 
centers on why Plato is attacking – or even ruining – his own theory. The controversy seems to 
result from the intent of many interpreters to resist the tremendous criticism directed against the 
theory, as if the appropriate response is to somehow retreat back to the classical naive theory, 
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whereas Plato’s intent seems to be to push ahead toward critically revising the theory. Because of 
the difficulty of interpreting this dialogue, the following discussion will analyze the text closely 
in certain key respects. The view advanced here is that the dramatic narrative and logical 
argument of the dialogue converge so as to reach the same conclusion. This conclusion is 
extremely clear within the dramatic context, though it is tremendously obscure in logical terms 
and in departing from and repudiating essential features of the classical theory.  
The dialogue depicts Parmenides (about 65) and Zeno (about 40) visiting Athens, where 
they engage in discussion with the young Socrates (about 20). The dialogue begins with Zeno 
reading aloud from his book, and then Socrates responding to and critiquing what Zeno has said. 
Socrates then presents the classical theory of forms (as described in Plato’s middle dialogues), 
whereupon Parmenides subjects the theory to a number of criticisms. The first part of the 
dialogue closes with Parmenides and Socrates discussing how the theory of forms might remain 
viable. The second part of the dialogue consists of Parmenides presenting eight deductions. It is 
clear that these deductions destabilize Platonic forms, but beyond that the nature of the 
deductions or how to offer an appropriate response to them is highly contested.  
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates partially critiques Zeno’s claim that things cannot 
be many, for if they were many they would be both like and unlike, which is impossible, 
“because unlike things can’t be like or like things unlike.” In partially rejecting this claim, 
Socrates asserts that contrariety is possible for sensible things but not for intelligible forms. As 
he says to Zeno:  
 But tell me this: don’t you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of 
likeness, and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is? Don’t you 
and I and the other things we call ‘many’ get a share of those two entities? And 
don’t things that get a share of likeness come to be like in that way and to the 
extent that they get a share, whereas things that get a share of unlikeness come to 
be unlike, and things that get a share of both come to be both? And even if all 
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things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are 
both like and unlike themselves, what’s astonishing about that? (Parmenides 
129a) 
 
Then in five successive statements, Socrates considers a thesis that he believes would be 
astonishing, if true. Such repetition as this by Plato is not superfluous, but, much rather, it is this 
astonishing claim that seems to prefigure the essential point of the deductions. This thesis is that 
forms are subject to contrariety. As Socrates says in the first instance, “If someone showed that 
the likes themselves come to be unlike or the unlikes like – that, I think, would be a marvel” 
(129b). Second, “But if he should demonstrate this thing itself, what one is, to be many, or, 
conversely, the many to be one – at this I’ll be astonished” (129b). Third, “And it’s the same 
with all the others: if he could show that the kinds and forms themselves have in themselves 
these opposite properties, that would call for astonishment” (129c). And then in the clearest 
passage, in which the contrariety of forms is mentioned a fourth and fifth time, Socrates states:  
But if someone first distinguishes as separate the forms, themselves by 
themselves, of the things I was talking about a moment ago – for example, 
likeness and unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and motion, and everything 
of that sort – and then shows that in themselves they can mix together and 
separate, I for my part,” he said, “would be utterly amazed, Zeno. I think these 
issues have been handled with great vigor in your book, but I would, as I say, be 
much more impressed if someone were able to display that this same difficulty 
which you and Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also 
similarly entwined in multifarious ways in the forms themselves – in things that 
are grasped by reasoning. (129d–130a)  
 
After Socrates finishes speaking with Zeno, Parmenides asks him, “Is there a form, itself by 
itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?” Socrates answered yes 
(130b). But this question makes clear that, in addition to the contrariety of forms, the present 
discussion is also emphasizing a form as “itself by itself.” This is the third time this language has 
been used in the dialogue. This language is often construed as stressing the separate nature of 
forms from the sensible objects for which they are archetypes, which is certainly valid. However, 
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this language also emphasizes the nature of a form as autonomous unto itself. But if the 
astonishing conclusion arises that forms have contraries, then the equally astonishing conclusion 
would result that forms stand in heteronomous relation to other forms, rather than as autonomous 
and absolute. Thus in advancing the astonishing claim that forms are subject to contrariety, 
Parmenides is also critiquing the autonomy of the forms as standing unto themselves. Critiquing 
the autonomy of forms is a necessary step in showing them to have contrariety. Parmenides 
refers to the autonomy of a form as being “marked off” unto itself.  
After discussing a number of objections to the theory of forms, Parmenides once again calls 
attention to the autonomous nature of forms: “And yet, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “the forms 
inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides – if there are those characters or 
things, and a person is to mark off each form as ‘something itself’ (135a). Parmenides makes 
clear that the existence of a form and its solitary character as marked off “by itself” are two 
different things. But he also makes clear that his intention is not to ruin the theory, even though it 
stands in opposition to his own. As he states:  
If someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just brought up and 
others of the same sort, won't allow that there are forms for things and won't mark 
off a form for each one, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he 
doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same. In 
this way he will destroy the power of dialectic entirely.  (135b–c)  
 
After Socrates concedes to Parmenides that he has no strategy by which to repair the theory of 
forms, Parmenides says, “Socrates, that's because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, 
and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon,” he said, “before you have been 
properly trained” (135c). Parmenides states that he was impressed by the way Socrates 
responded to Zeno’s reading. He states:  
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You didn't allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering 
between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that 
one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms. (135e)  
 
As enumerated here, this is the sixth time the dialogue has referred to the contrariety of forms. 
Socrates responds to Parmenides by saying, “ I did that because I think that here, among visible 
things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you 
please” (135e).  
Parmenides then explains to Socrates his method of training, which is necessary in order “to 
achieve a full view of the truth.” He says one must consider a hypothesis not only in terms of its 
affirmation but also its negation; and further, a hypothesis must be considered not only in terms 
of its internal consequences, but also for its external consequences, both how these external 
consequences relate to what is hypothesized itself, and to how the various consequences relate 
among themselves. This method consists of a bivalent alternative considered on three levels, 
yielding a schema of 2
3
 categories of analysis. This is the logical basis of the eight deductions. 
After describing how this method applies generally to the many or the like, Parmenides states as 
follows:  
And the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and 
destruction, and to being itself and not-being. And, in a word, concerning 
whatever you might ever hypothesize as being or as not being or as having any 
other property, you must examine the consequences for the thing you hypothesize 
in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever you select, 
and in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn, 
you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to 
whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize 
you hypothesize as being or as not being. (136a–c)  
 
Socrates says the task Parmenides describes seems scarcely manageable, but that he does not 
yet fully understand it, and so he asks Parmenides to go through the exercise for him.  
Parmenides and Zeno both say that this is a big assignment (namely, working through the eight 
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deductions), and Zeno says it will not be easy for Parmenides, advanced in age, to accomplish. 
Parmenides says the task is strenuous and causes him anxiety, but that he will undertake it for the 
sake of his hearers. Note that Socrates had said earlier it was easy for him to answer Zeno in 
showing that sensible objects are contrary to one another, but that he would be impressed and 
astonished if someone could show that this contrariety applies to forms. What Socrates did was 
easy, but Plato’s readers are to understand that what Parmenides is setting out to accomplish in 
the eight deductions is strenuous, hard and astonishing.  
In discussing the one and many, the like and unlike, motion and rest, generation and 
corruption, past, present and future time, being and nonbeing, Parmenides is critiquing within the 
deductions the very forms that are of fundamental importance to Plato’s theory. In urging that a 
particular hypothesis be analyzed as to its consequences on “the others,” Parmenides is 
proposing that forms be analyzed in the deductions by means of other forms. This syntactical 
analysis of forms envisions the same sort of logical grammar as found within Aristotle’s 
categories or even in Kant’s categories, though Plato never succeeds in completing the sort of 
logical system he imagines. But then in a remarkable turn of events, Parmenides offers to subject 
himself and his own theory to the same criticism as the theory of forms: “Is it all right with you if 
I begin with myself and my own hypothesis? Shall I hypothesize about the one itself and 
consider what the consequences must be if it is one or if it is not one” (137b)? Parmenides claims 
that absolute being is monistic. Plato claims that absolute being is pluralistic, at least insofar as 
his classical theory describes each of the forms as absolute. Thus in the eight deductions, Plato is 
not only subjecting his own theory to criticism, but he portrays Parmenides as doing the same 
thing. The effect is to suggest that the two opposing theories of the absolute are themselves 
contraries of one another.  
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The logical structure of the eight deductions takes the following scheme. The antecedent of 
each of the first four is: “if the one is;” the consequents are as follows:  
(D1) then the one is not F and not con-F (in relation to itself and in relation to the others).  
(D2) then the one is F and con-F (in relation to itself and in relation to the others).  
(D3) then the others are F and con-F (in relation to themselves and in relation to the one). 
(D4) then the others are not F and not con-F (in relation to themselves and in relation to the one). 
The remaining four deductions each begins with the antecedent: “if the one is not;” the 
consequents are as follows:  
(D5) then the one is F and con-F (in relation to itself and in relation to the others). 
(D6) then the one is not F and not con-F (in relation to itself and in relation to the others). 
(D7) then the others are F and con-F (in relation to themselves and in relation to the one). 
(D8) then the others are not F and not con-F (in relation to themselves and in relation to the one).  
 According to most interpreters, D1 and D2 taken together entail that the one is 
contradictory, and thus does not exist. Similarly, the same conclusion follows for D3 and D4 
when taken together. Although note that D1–D4 all claim individually that the one does exist. 
Contrary to this, D5 and D6 taken together entail that the one does exist, as also D7 and D8 when 
taken together. Although note that D5–D8 all claim individually that the one does not exist. 
 What is to be made of this nested series of contradictions? Most interpreters regard the eight 
deductions as implying local contradictions and also a master contradiction. The predominant 
view is that there is no constructive way forward. As described thus far, the effect is Pyrrhonian, 
in that the deductions, equally valid as taken in isolation, work together to mutually block one 
another from making headway. On this view, this is the end of Plato’s rationalism and the 
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beginning of his mysticism. But it seems clear that more can be said than this. What about the 
claim advanced within the dialogue that forms are to be treated as contraries?  
Samuel C. Rickless argues that the “radical purity” of forms (“RP” is the assumption that no 
form can have contrary properties) is a background assumption of D1 and D4. D1 and D2 entail 
together that the one cannot exist, though this entailment is predicated on the assumption of RP. 
But since D5 and D6 entail that the one exists, then RP must be rejected. According to Rickless, 
rather than entailing a grand contradiction, the deductions entail both that the one exists and that 
RP is false.
19
 But how is this possible? This interpretation directly repudiates Plato’s classical 
theory. If forms can be treated as contraries, as Rickless proposes, that would be astonishing. 
And yet that is precisely the astonishment that the drama of the dialogue has prefigured. But yet 
something is missing. How can the theory of forms be transformed by contrariety merely by 
saying so? The theory must clearly be reworked and redeveloped in technical detail.  
 In order to transform the theory of forms so that it admits of contrariety, some sort of 
theoretical basis needs to be supplied that does not belong to the classical theory. Toward this 
end, note that Plato provides a supplementary discussion to the first two deductions. In this 
appendix, he describes the forms as acting at “a definite time,” but yet he also speaks of their 
separating and combining as if occurring outside or beyond time, in what Plato calls the 
“instant,” which is said to be “in no time at all.” To frame this discussion within a contemporary 
context, it is as if Plato is attempting to resolve the contradictions of the deductions by 
construing them in terms of a superposed cat-state within quantum mechanics, as if the logic of 
superposition can be interpreted by means of imaginary time. Plato writes as follows:  
Let's speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it – being 
both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time – must it not, 
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because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, 
sometimes not partake of being? So it partakes at one time, and doesn’t partake at 
another; for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of the same 
thing. Isn’t there, then, a definite time when it gets a share of being and when it 
parts from it? Or how can it at one time have and at another time not have the 
same thing, if it never gets and releases it? The one, as it seems, when it gets and 
releases being, comes to be and ceases to be. And since it is one and many and 
comes to be and ceases to be, doesn’t its being many cease to be whenever it 
comes to be one, and doesn’t its being one cease to be whenever it comes to be 
many? Whenever it comes to be one and many, must it not separate and combine? 
Furthermore, whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like 
and unlike? And whenever it comes to be greater and less and equal, must it not 
increase and decrease and be made equal? And whenever, being in motion, it 
comes to a rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it must itself, 
presumably, be in no time at all. For it does not change while it is at rest or in 
motion, or while it is in time. Is there, then, this queer thing in which it might be, 
just when it changes? The instant. The instant seems to signify something such 
that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing doesn’t change 
from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, 
this queer creature, the instant, lurks between motion and rest – being in no time 
at all – and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting 
thing changes to moving. And the one, if in fact it both rests and moves, could 
change to each state – for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it 
changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just 
then it would be neither in motion nor at rest.  
Is it so with the other changes too? Whenever the one changes from being to 
ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to coming-to-be, isn’t it then between certain 
states of motion and rest? And then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be 
nor ceases to be? Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one 
to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates 
nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is 
neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or unlike. And when it goes from 
small to large and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor large nor equal; 
nor would it be increasing or decreasing or being made equal. The one, if it is, 
could undergo all that. (155e–157b, abridged)  
 
 This passage appears to provide the theoretical basis necessary to resolve the contradictory 
nature of the eight deductions, and also to satisfy the dramatic prefiguring within the dialogue 
that Parmenides is to astonish Socrates by demonstrating the contrariety of the forms.
20
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reading, Parmenides has saved the forms, and has thereby preserved the power of dialectic and of 
reasoning itself. But in order to do so, he had to reject the claim of Plato’s classical theory that 
forms are autonomous and absolute. In Parmenides’ view as expressed here, Socrates was in 
error by marking off the forms “too soon” as unto themselves. The correct view, according to the 
revision of the theory, is to regard forms as heteronomous contraries, existing unto one another 
rather than unto themselves.  
The contrariety of forms described here recalls the reciprocal nature of odd and even and of 
big and small in Phaedo, though the effect here is stunningly different. The pairing of odd and 
even in Phaedo suggests a lack of autonomy for each individual form, but yet the pair offers 
heteronomous support to each other to make up for the autonomy that was individually lost. 
Then in Republic, forms are stripped of their autonomy even more fully, but then made whole by 
the extrinsic guarantee of the unhypothetical first principle. So now in Parmenides, forms are 
paired off with their contraries, though without the stabilizing guarantee of the unhypothetical 
first principle. This contrariety renders the forms extremely unstable, and so, if not absolute, it is 
unclear why they can behave as forms at all. Heraclitean flux is poised to destroy the 
Parmenidean absolute.  
 The reading of the Parmenides advanced here makes it closely parallel to the problem in 
Republic. In moving up the analogy of the divided line, Plato advances from the visible to the 
intelligible. According to the classical theory, visible things are subject to contrariety whereas 
intelligible forms are not. The intelligible portion of the divided line ideally consists of forms, 
though Plato says mathematicians deal much more with mere hypotheses than with forms, and 
that the logical import of the forms on mathematics cannot be determined apart from the 
unhypothetical first principle, which is unknown. The mere hypotheses in the divided line are 
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akin to the conflicting hypotheses in the eight deductions. The interpretation advanced here 
within the deductions can thus be extended to the divided line, allowing the contrariety of 
mathematical hypotheses in the divided line to be construed within terms of imaginary time, as 
provided for in the deductions. That is, Plato proposes a logical theory of imaginary time in 
Parmenides that becomes a mathematical theory of imaginary time when applied to Republic. In 
this combined theory of forms it becomes possible to extend the analogy of the divided line so as 
to claim that intelligible forms are subjected to contrariety in imaginary time, just as visible 
things are subjected to contrariety in real time. If then an unhypothetical first principle can be 
found that explains the contrariety of forms, it would solve the combined problem of both 
Republic and Parmenides. As cast within the drama of the Parmenides, the unhypothetical first 
principle of Republic has become the shared philosophical aspiration of both Parmenides and 
Plato, thus collapsing the distinctions of their respective theories. Parmenides adds logical 
support to Republic, while Republic adds mathematical support to Parmenides. The one of 
Parmenides can now be conceptualized as the unhypothetical first principle of Republic.  
In this revised critical theory, the Parmenidean one or unhypothetical first principle is the 
supreme form above all others. Should all forms give way to contrariety but the one, then even 
so the Parmenidean absolute is not lost. It seems that Plato’s ultimate philosophical program 
involves the willingness to subject all forms to contrariety, except the form of the Good, which 
he is intent on describing in immediate association with the unhypothetical first principle. In this 
scenario, the revised critical theory would continue to resist the Manichaean heresy.  
 Plato’s Sophist seems to belong midway between Republic and Parmenides. The Sophist 
describes a discussion between Socrates, the Eleatic visitor, Theodorus, Theaetetus, and the 
young Socrates (namesake of the philosopher Socrates). Socrates asked the Eleatic visitor about 
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the difference between statesmen, philosophers and sophists. His interest was to determine 
whether their natures are separate or combined. The conversation then gravitated to the sophist. 
After providing six different accounts of the sophist, the visitor’s descriptions were still 
incomplete. In making his seventh attempt, the visitor realized that the proclivity of the sophist to 
say what is not as if it is makes it especially difficult to specify his true character. But the visitor 
is intent on hunting down his prey: “the beast is complex and can’t be caught with one hand,” he 
says. The drama of the dialogue involves the escalating concessions the visitor must make to his 
Eleatic philosophy in order to track down the sophist, and then the various implications that 
follow. If the visitor can offer an accurate account of deceit, falsehood and nonbeing, then he 
will be able to describe the sophist in exact detail.  
The Eleatic visitor explains to the young Theaetetus that giving an adequate account of 
falsehood is problematic. He states:  
This is a very difficult investigation we’re engaged in. This appearing, and this 
seeming but not being, and this saying things but not true things––all these issues 
are full of confusion, just as they always have been. It’s extremely hard, 
Theaetetus, to say what form of speech we should use to say that there really is 
such a thing as false saying or believing, and moreover to utter this without being 
caught in a verbal confusion…. This form of speech of ours involves the rash 
assumption that that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn’t come into 
being. But when we were boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us from 
start to finish, speaking in both prose and poetic rhythms, that Never shall this 
force itself on us, that that which is not may be. (236d–237a)   
 
The visitor then asks, “Do we dare to utter the sound that which in no way is?” Or if we say that 
which is not, what can that name be applied to? What would be indicated to someone who 
wanted to find out about it? Or is there a something that these words can be applied to? His 
conclusion is, “This much is obvious to us, that that which is not can’t be applied to any of those 
which are” (237b–c).  
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The visitor then expresses concern as to the grammatical distinction between that which is 
not and those things which are not, as if nonbeing should be differentiated by number. According 
to the strict doctrine of the Eleatic school, it is not correct to attach that which is to that which is 
not. The visitor says, “Do you understand, then, that it’s impossible to say, speak, or think that 
which is not itself correctly by itself. It’s unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and unformulable 
in speech (238b–c).” But then in complete candor, the visitor turns his logic against himself: 
My good young friend, don’t you notice on the basis of the things we said that 
that which is not even confuses the person who’s refuting it in just this way, that 
whenever someone tries to refute it, he’s forced to say mutually contrary things 
about it? … I was the one who made the statement that that which is not should 
not share either in one or in plurality. But even so I’ve continued after all that to 
speak of it as one, since I say that which is not. … And again a little earlier I said 
that it is unutterable, unsayable, and inexpressible in speech. … So in trying to 
attach being to it wasn’t I saying things that were the contrary of what I’d said 
before? … And in attaching that which, wasn’t I speaking of it as one? … And 
also in speaking of it as something inexpressible in speech, unsayable, and 
unutterable, I was speaking of it as one thing. … Then what would somebody say 
about me? He’d find that the refutation of that which is not has been defeating me 
for a long time. (238d–239b)  
 
 The visitor then asks Theaetetus to say something correct about nothing without attaching 
being, one, or plurality to it. Theaetetus acknowledges he cannot do so. But this concession 
leaves the sophist beyond the grammatical reach of the visitor. The visitor thus says, “Until we 
meet someone who can do it let’s say that the sophist has stopped at nothing. He’s escaped down 
into inaccessible confusion” (239c).  
 After further discussion, the visitor asks Theaetetus if they should abandon their hunt for the 
sophist. Theaetetus says no. The visitor then asks Theaetetus not to think him a patricide; “We’re 
going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, and insist by brute 
force both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that which is somehow is not” 
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(241d). The visitor states further, “We’ll be trying to refute what Parmenides said––if we can do 
it” (242b).  
 The visitor then describes different metaphysical outlooks of Greek mythology. Some myths 
say everything is derived from a primordial triad in which the original beings were sometimes at 
war with each other and sometimes friendly, so as to marry and have offspring. Other myths say 
that everything comes from a primordial dyad. The Eleatic myth claims that everything comes 
from one. But then the visitor describes a hybrid view:   
Later on, some Ionian and Sicilian muses both had the idea that it was safer to 
weave the two views together. They say that that which is is both many and one, 
and is bound by both hatred and friendship. According to the terser of these 
views, in being taken apart they’re brought together. The more relaxed muses, 
though, allow things to be free from that condition sometimes. They say that all 
that there is alternates, and that sometimes it’s one and friendly under Aphrodite’s 
influence, but at other times it’s many and at war with itself because of some kind 
of strife. It’s hard to say whether any one of these thinkers has told us the truth or 
not, and it wouldn’t be appropriate for us to be critical of such renowned and 
venerable men. (242c–243a) (The two muses/men referred to here are Heraclitus 
and Empedocles.)   
 
The visitor says he has always been clear on what is meant by is not, though now he is 
confused by it, and so too, he has always thought himself clear on what is, but may now be 
confused on that as well. “But maybe we’re in the same state [of confusion] about both” (243c).  
The visitor and Theaetetus thus discuss the question of being as applied to the metaphysics of 
primordial dyads such as hot and cold.  
The visitor suggests the question of being is like a battle between gods and giants. One 
group drags everything down to earth from divine intelligibility, and then despises anyone who 
speaks of being apart from a body. The visitor describes the other group as defending their 
position “from somewhere up out of sight,” and insist that “true being is certain nonbodily forms 
that can be thought about.” The visitor adds, “They take the bodies of the other group, and also 
36 
 
what they call the truth, and they break them up verbally into little bits and call them a process of 
coming-to-be instead of being.” The visitor concludes by saying, “There’s a never-ending battle 
going on constantly between them about this issue” (246a–c).  
 The visitor and Theaetetus then critique the traditional view of being as described in Plato’s 
classical theory (and as frequently taken up in the doctrine of divine simplicity in medieval 
thought). The visitor says:  
But for heaven’s sake, are we going to be convinced that it’s true that change, life, 
soul, and intelligence are not present in that which wholly is, and that it neither 
lives nor thinks, but stays changeless, solemn and holy, without any 
understanding? (248e–249a)  
 
The visitor and Theaetetus then agree that that which wholly is must have attributes of 
intelligence, life, soul and change. The visitor states, “Then both that which changes and also 
change have to be admitted as being” (249b). They then try to describe their view in the same 
way they had been seeking descriptions of primordial metaphysics (250a). They agree that 
change and rest are completely contrary to each other, and agree that both equally are and that 
each equally is. So they agree that that which is is a third thing beyond change and rest; that it is 
not both of them together but something beyond them. “Therefore by its own nature that which is 
doesn’t either rest or change.” Yet if something does not change, how can it not be resting? And 
if something is not resting, how can it not be changing? The discussion thus seems to have led to 
an impossible conclusion (250c–d). The visitor recalls that they were initially confused as to 
what is meant by what is not, but now they are in just as much confusion about that which is. The 
visitor concludes:  
Then we’ve now given a complete statement of our confusion. But there’s now 
hope, precisely because both that which is and that which is not are involved in 
equal confusion. That is, in so far as one of them is clarified, either brightly or 
dimly, the other will be too. (250e–251a)  
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 The visitor then asks Theaetetus to consider the question of blending. To what degree do 
things have the capacity of associating or blending with others? They consider three options. The 
first is that there is no blending at all. In that case, change and rest will not have any share in 
being. As the visitor says, “It seems that agreeing to that destroys everything right away, both for 
the people who make everything change, for the ones who make everything an unchanging unit, 
and for the ones who say that beings are forms that always stay the same and in the same state. 
All of these people apply being. Some do it when they say that things really are changing, and 
others do it when they say that tings really are at rest.” (252a)  
The second option is to allow everything to blend with everything else.  
Also there are people who put everything together at one time and divide them at 
another. Some put them together into one and divide them into indefinitely many, 
and others divide them into a finite number of elements and put them back 
together out of them. None of these people, regardless of whether they take this to 
happen in stages or continuously,  would be saying anything if there isn’t any 
blending. (252b)  
 
Theaetetus objects to this second alternative on the following ground: “Because if change and 
rest belonged to each other then change would be completely at rest and conversely rest itself 
would be changing.” The visitor agrees, stating, “But I suppose it’s ruled out by very strict 
necessity that change should be at rest and that rest should change” (252b). Having eliminated 
the first two alternatives, they agree on the third: “So the third option is the only one left…. 
Certainly one of the following things has to be the case: either everything is willing to blend, or 
nothing is, or some things are and some are not” (252d–e). The visitor then states:  
Since some things will blend and some won’t, they’ll be a good deal like letters of 
the alphabet. Some of them fit together with each other and some don’t…. More 
than other letters the vowels run through all of them like a bond, linking them 
together, so that without a vowel no one of the others can fit with another (253a).  
 
The visitor concludes the discussion on blending by saying:  
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Well then, we’ve agreed that kinds mix with each other in the same way. So if 
someone’s going to show us correctly which kinds harmonize with which and 
which kinds exclude each other, doesn’t he have to have some kind of knowledge 
as he proceeds through the discussion? And in addition doesn’t he have to know 
whether there are any kinds that run through all of them and link them together to 
make them capable of blending, and also, when there are divisions, whether 
certain kinds running through wholes are always the cause of the division? (253b–
c)  
 
Theaetetus responds, “Of course that requires knowledge––probably just about the most 
important kind. The visitor is surprised to ask, “Maybe we’ve found the philosopher even though 
we were looking for the sophist” (253c)? The discussion began by considering how the sophist 
mixes statements and appearances of being with nonbeing. But now it is the philosopher who is 
interested in how various kinds mix with others.  
 The dialogue then achieves a critical development in the following passages. The visitor 
states:  
We’ll find that the philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for 
him. He’s hard to see clearly too, but not in the same way as the sophist…. The 
sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he’s had practice 
dealing with, and he’s hard to see because the place is so dark.… But the 
philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form, being. He isn’t at all 
easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people’s souls can’t 
bear to look at what’s divine. (254a–b)  
 
Shortly after, the visitor and Theaetetus gain awareness of the being of “that which is not––
which we were looking for because of the sophist” (258b). The visitor then considers the that 
which is not as follows:  
Then does it have just as much being as any of the others, as you said it did? 
Should we work up the courage now to say that that which is not definitely is 
something that has its own nature? Should we say that just as the large was large, 
the beautiful was beautiful, the not large was not large, and the not beautiful was 
not beautiful, in the same way that which is not also was and is not being, and is 
one form among the many that are? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts 
about that? (258b–c)  
 
With the agreement of Theaetetus, the visitor concludes as follows:  
39 
 
You know our disbelief in Parmenides has gone even farther than his 
prohibition…. We’ve pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something 
even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about….Because he says, 
remember, Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may be…. But 
we’ve not only shown that those which are not are. We’ve also caused what turns 
out to be the form of that which is not to appear. Since we showed that the nature 
of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared 
to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of 
the different that’s set over against that which is. (258c–e)   
 
The visitor states that speech is one of the things that are and that to be deprived of speech 
would be to be deprived of philosophy. The visitor then considers whether nonbeing blends with 
belief and speech, which is clearly the case, due to the existence of false belief and false speech. 
The visitor then says, “When we’ve seen that clearly we can show that falsity is, and when we’ve 
shown that we can tie the sophist up in it, if we can keep hold of him” (261a).  
 Now that the dialogue has presented an account of the form of nonbeing, an important twist 
has occurred within the narrative. The Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus have been on the hunt 
throughout the dialogue to ascertain the exact character of the sophist, who mixes falsehood with 
truth, appearance with reality, and nonbeing with being. Their initial endeavor was hindered 
because of the visitor’s commitment to his Eleatic persuasion; the visitor was attempting to 
describe falsehood and nonbeing while he himself remained tethered to the form of being. Thus 
anything the visitor could express grammatically about nonbeing was shallow and superficial, 
whereas the sophist was exploiting the vagaries of nonbeing at depth. So, in service of learning 
the truth about the sophist, the visitor abandoned his Eleatic strictures in order to reach the realm 
of the sophist’s inaccessible confusion. But once willing to engage the question of nonbeing and 
to grant the existence of the form of nonbeing itself, whom does the visitor find first except the 
philosopher? It turns out that, like the sophist, the philosopher too is interested in mixing various 
kinds together. And now, in order to discover and exhibit the falsehood of the sophist, the 
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visitor’s philosophical intent is to blend truth with falsehood, reality with appearance, and being 
with nonbeing. Within the precincts of the form of nonbeing, the philosopher is now taking up 
the tools and engaging in the very expertise of the sophist. The visitor and Theaetetus have 
believed throughout their discussion that philosophers and sophists are entirely unlike. Yet 
contrary to their intent, their inquiry has now shown them to be alike. More specifically, the 
philosopher and sophist are opposites that are alike. As stated by Pogo, “We have met the enemy 
and he is us.”  
 The polar opposition between philosophers and sophists is stated most obviously in the 
passage where they are described as hard to see (254a–b). Sophists are hard to see because they 
skulk about in the darkness of nonbeing and falsehood. Philosophers are hard to see because they 
approach the dazzling radiance of being and truth. Philosophers are lovers of wisdom, which 
they acknowledge not to possess, while sophists are teachers of wisdom, which they assuredly 
claim to possess. Sophists have mass appeal and thus exert significant influence in the polis. 
Philosophers do not have mass appeal, and thus do not exert influence in the polis. The influence 
of the sophist and the lack of influence of the philosopher both accrue to the injury of the polis. If 
the features of the philosopher and sophist could somehow be combined, allowing the positive 
features of both to emerge, then this unification would prove a great benefit to society. To this 
end, Plato wishes to show that philosopher and sophist are not merely polar opposites, as to 
remain separate, but dialectical opposites, as to be combined. Plato thus wishes to suggest that, in 
their most salient features, philosophers and sophists are both like and unlike. They are 
systematically opposite with respect to being and nonbeing, truth and falsehood, light and 
darkness. Based on this systematic opposition which separates them, Plato hopes to find some 
sort of dialectical synthesis by which they can be combined.  
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 Just as the Sophist presents philosophers and sophists as dialectical opposites, so too the 
dialogue asserts the same opposition applies to being and nonbeing. The dialectical opposition of 
being and nonbeing is evident in the first instance in that the form of being is a source of light 
and truth to the philosopher, whereas the form of nonbeing is the source of darkness and 
falsehood to the sophist. In the analogy of the divided line, the visible and intelligible are not 
only contraries of one another but they comprise a dialectical system. Physical objects are visible 
but not intelligible, while forms are intelligible but not visible. Physical objects require forms to 
fulfill their lack of intelligibility, though forms have no such need of physical objects. Forms and 
physical objects are systematically like and unlike, making each the complement of the other. 
This dialectical opposition is advanced in Republic as representing the totality of perceptible 
things, whether visible or intelligible. However, the analogy of the divided line is remarkable in 
that Plato presents it as bearing only on epistemological concerns, making no reference to 
ontology. This is a strange omission. The ascent up the divided line is driven solely by the desire 
for greater intelligibility, there being no mention of increasing levels of existence. But as 
reflecting the architectonic plan Plato employs between one dialogue and another, the 
ontological dimension that is missing from Republic is supplied by Sophist. Physical objects in 
Republic lack intelligibility because, as explained in Sophist, they are closely associated with the 
form of nonbeing. Likewise, forms in Republic have a great deal of intelligibility because, as 
explained in Sophist, they are closely associated with the form of being. Republic provides a 
dramatic representation of the divided line by means of the allegory of the cave. Sophist provides 
a dramatic representation of the dialectic of being and nonbeing by means of the opposition 
between philosopher and sophist.  
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 But if the dialectical synthesis of philosopher and sophist is intended to provide effective 
political leaders for the polis, what is the significance of the dialectical synthesis of being and 
nonbeing? From the dialectical point of view, this synthesis is the metaphysical basis for the 
world of becoming and change. That which comes to be does so because it has a share in being 
and in nonbeing. Likewise, that which changes has a share both in that which is and that which is 
not.  
In order to develop the contrariety of being and nonbeing in Sophist, Plato had to clarify 
some basic grammatical misunderstandings on the part of Parmenides and the Eleatic school. 
Plato made explicit that predication is not limited to the mere identity of the subject, as thought 
by Parmenides, as if the predicate can express only what is autological to the subject. In 
opposition to Parmenides, Plato asserted that the predicate can express what is heterological to 
the subject. Thus it is not a contradiction to say that one has being and many have being, but the 
many have a being that the one has not. The pseudo-contradictions that worried the Eleatic 
school depended on interpreting predicates as absolute and without qualification. The preeminent 
stature of Parmenides does not owe to his view of logical grammar but to his prioritization of the 
absolute. If the absolute is not conveyed in Parmenidean grammar, then much of western 
philosophy has sought to find the Parmenidean absolute elsewhere. It is perfectly grammatical, 
then, to express not in relation to things that are.  
 Beyond clarifying the relation of subject and predicate, Plato also developed the schema of 
genus and species, which he describes in terms of his theory of division and collection, found in 
some of his later dialogues (such as Sophist, Parmenides, Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus). 
Not only do different species exist within the genus but the genus itself has its own existence. 
The difference between being and nonbeing can thus be described as different species or modes 
43 
 
within the genus of existence itself. Expressed more commonly, being and nonbeing are different 
modalities within the genus of modality. The contrariety of being and nonbeing becomes evident 
once they are analyzed as having common membership within the same genus or kind.  
 First, being and nonbeing are like in that they are both species of the genus of 
modality. But they are unlike in that being is the positive species and nonbeing 
the negative. Stated differently, being is autological to the genus and nonbeing is 
heterological to it.  
 Second, the visitor and Theaetetus deny the claim that everything in nature blends 
with everything else. On their limited initial view, some things in nature blend 
and others do not, and those things that blend do so according to their genus or 
kind.  
 Third, the modal blending of being and nonbeing is possible even within the 
narrow limitations agreed upon by the visitor and Theaetetus. This blending is 
made possible because being and nonbeing belong to the same genus, but also in 
that they are opposite to one another within that genus. According to the logic of 
the dialogue, being and nonbeing are like, in that they belong to the same kind, 
but unlike in that one is positive and the other negative. The opposition of being 
and nonbeing within the same kind makes them suitable for blending, and thus the 
basis for becoming and change.  
 Fourth, the modal blending of being and nonbeing implies that they are contraries 
of one another. Because the Sophist describes being and nonbeing as forms, this 
dialogue advances the claim that contrariety exists among the forms, and thus the 
forms are not strictly autonomous, selfsame and absolute.  
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The contrariety of being and nonbeing within Sophist prefigures the contrariety of forms as 
presented in Parmenides. The Sophist thus stands in relation to the Parmenides in the same 
relation as the One to the Many. This is a provocative image in that the problem of the One and 
the Many is a fundamental issue in these dialogues. For this and other reasons (discussed below), 
the logical progression between the dialogues seems to move from Sophist to Parmenides. (In 
terms of Socrates’ age, the chronology of the dialogues advances from Parmenides to Sophist.)  
 Beyond the grammatical clarification of subject and predicate and the development of the 
relation of genus and species, there are two great philosophical theses advanced in Plato’s 
Sophist. First, an account is given of the form of nonbeing, such that it is claimed to have its own 
existence and nature, having the same rank as such forms as the beautiful and the large. Second, 
the form of being and the form of nonbeing are shown to exist within the same scheme of 
contrariety as asserted of forms more generally in Plato’s Parmenides, including the forms of 
being and nonbeing themselves.  
In the discussion above, it was claimed that the theory of forms needed innovation if the 
Parmenides is to revise the theory to allow for the contrariety of forms. The discussion there 
pointed out the significance of Plato’s description of the contrariety of forms as set within a 
context of “in no time at all.” The account advanced here in Sophist give support to such a 
construction, since the existence of the genus transcends the existence of the various species 
within the genus. The genus maintains a stable existence, even though the species within the 
genus may be subject to contrariety. Relative to the species, the genus can be described as “in no 
time at all, though the species experience contrariety in real time.”21 Plato is clearly envisioning 
a common solution to the problem of the contrariety of forms in both Sophist and Parmenides, 
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 Indeed, some or all of the species could go extinct as a result of any manner of contrariety, though the genus 
could still be said to exist, though as an empty or null genus.  
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though the solution is expressed differently within the two dialogues. The account of genus in 
Sophist is more conceptual in that it is framed as part of a logical hierarchy. The account of “in 
no time at all” in Parmenides is more dynamical in that it superintends actual physical processes. 
In combining these two descriptions, the expression emerges of a “genus” that exists “in no time 
at all.” This combined construction provides theoretical justification to the claim that forms can 
exist in a mutual state of contrariety while maintaining a hierarchal state of constant existence. 
This is the achievement of the Sophist and Parmenides as taken together.  
 Even further, this dual solution of Sophist and Parmenides with respect to imaginary time is 
also a precise instantiation of the hierarchal relation of forms as described in Republic. The 
theory of imaginary time in Parmenides has already been extended to Republic, and the 
preceding paragraph showed that a synthesis can be achieved between the epistemology of 
Republic with the ontology of Sophist. It thus becomes possible to take these three dialogues 
together as advancing a combined revision of the theory of forms; Sophist offers a theory of 
subject-predicate, Parmenides offers a theory of logic, Republic offers a theory of mathematics, 
and Sophist offers a theory of modality. Parmenides offers a theory of imaginary time that can be 
directly extended to Sophist and Republic. All of these theories are expressed in relation to 
forms. In Plato’s estimation, these theories are not only mutually consistent but interwoven 
within his systematic revision of the theory of forms.  
 As an aside, it is significant to note that the historical figure Parmenides as described by the 
Eleatic visitor in Sophist is extremely different from the character Parmenides as depicted in 
Parmenides. The representation in Sophist is much closer to what is known of him from other 
sources, and so the eponymous character of the Parmenides was probably an invention of Plato, 
after Plato had presented him more faithfully in Sophist. As attested both in other sources and in 
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Sophist, Parmenides did not allow the assertion of that which is not. If the Eleatic visitor 
committed patricide in Sophist by admitting of that which is not, then the Parmenides of 
Parmenides committed suicide by allowing the same admission.  
A fundamental concern of Plato’s Sophist is to establish the analogy between the contrariety 
of being and nonbeing and the contrariety of philosopher and sophist. However, the contrariety 
of being and nonbeing is explicitly denied by the Eleatic visitor, and so this point requires special 
attention. Upon close reading of Sophist, the visitor seems to be unaware of wider considerations 
that bear on the discussion which are of deep significance to Socrates and Plato. The visitor 
states, “It seems that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary to that 
which is, but only something different from it” (257b). The visitor then makes the same point in 
greater detail:   
Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we’ve made to appear and now 
dare to say is, is the contrary of that which is. We’ve said good-bye long ago to 
any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or 
not an account can be given of it. With regard to that which is not, which we’ve 
said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake––or else, 
so long as he can’t do  that, he should say just what we say. (258e–259a).  
 
The Eleatic visitor is clearly saying what is at odds with the present analysis. What is the 
meaning of this? Does Plato intend the Eleatic visitor to speak for him, or does he intend his 
readers to critique and see past the visitor’s limitations? As the visitor says here, “Let someone 
refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake.”  
 Why does the Eleatic visitor fail to reach the same conclusion as the present discussion? The 
primary reason is that the visitor fails to recognize the sophist as like himself, thereby failing to 
recognize the contrariety between philosopher and sophist. For the visitor, the sophist is wholly 
other – a strange alien to be hunted down like a wild beast. But when the visitor has to begin to 
adopt the methods of the sophist in order to track him down, he fails to recognize that, in mixing 
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being with nonbeing, he is practicing the very expertise of the sophist. Plato develops this 
analogy in detail, not only to apply to the philosopher and sophist generally but even more 
specifically to the visitor himself and the sophist. The visitor describes the angler as one who 
hunts for fish, and then says: “Well then, let’s use that model to try and find the sophist, and see 
what he is” (221c). The visitor describes the sophist as one who hunts other people (as paying 
customers). The visitor and Theaetetus then agree that the sophist has an expertise in hunting, 
like the angler. But Theaetetus seeks clarification on the sophist’s expertise in hunting. The 
visitor answers, “For heaven’s sake, don’t we recognize that the one man belongs to the same 
kind as the other?” Theaetetus asks, “Which men?” “The angler and the sophist.” “In what 
way?” The visitor answers, “To me they both clearly appear to be hunters.” Theaetetus asks, 
“We said which kind of hunting the angler does. What kind does the sophist do” (221d–e)? The 
visitor can draw analogies as to how the sophist is like a hunter and he can specify the different 
kinds of hunting that differentiate the angler from the sophist, but he cannot see how the analogy 
extends to himself to show that he is hunting the sophist. When Theaetetus asks “which men” are 
alike, the visitor sees the likeness between the angler and the sophist. But he might just as well 
have recognized himself as like the sophist. Certain things are readily apparent “to me,” he says. 
But the visitor’s perspective is egocentric. His analogies show him what others are like, yet he 
fails to recognize himself within the same analogies. He failed to recognize the likeness he 
shared with the sophist either with respect to hunting or with respect to mixing being and 
nonbeing. Because the visitor is unable to recognize the sophist as his dialectical opposite, he 
fails to recognize the contrariety between philosophers and sophists. And because he fails to 
recognize this contrariety, he also fails to recognize the contrariety between being and nonbeing.  
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 But in addition to his ethical failure to recognize the sophist as like himself, the visitor also 
followed a logical path of egocentrism. He argued for the existence of the form of nonbeing by 
saying, “that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different 
that’s set over against that which is” (258e). Although the visitor argued for the ontological 
independence of the form of nonbeing, his theoretical justification for the form subjugated it as 
merely “different” from that which is. He never considered, for instance, that being is different 
from nonbeing, nor did he consider the sense in which being and nonbeing are the same. For this 
reason, he failed to allow the forms of being and nonbeing to encounter one another in mutual 
likeness and difference as dialectical opposites. The visitor was willing to adapt his logical 
outlook in order to catch hold of the sophist, but he failed to develop his logic adequately so as to 
understand the reciprocal relation he shared with the sophist. The visitor said, “The beast is 
complex and can’t be caught with one hand” (226a). Yet he failed to gain an evenhanded 
understanding of the sophist. Accordingly, his development of logic falls short of the dialectical 
logic envisioned by Plato in which the relation of philosopher and sophist and of being and 
nonbeing is expressed in terms of contrariety. In this regard, Plato presents the visitor as an 
exemplar of the via positiva, pushing this tradition as far as possible in the direction of the 
negative while remaining short of the via negativa. The theoretical justification for the form of 
nonbeing as offered by the visitor is not to be confused with the theoretical justification given by 
Parmenides in the eight deductions. The visitor described the form of nonbeing as a half-truth. 
The complete truth, as suggested by Plato, involves blending opposites through a logic of 
contrariety.  
 The visitor discusses with Theaetetus the problem of failing to recognize how certain forms 
relate to others. One should not think that the same form is different in separate cases, or fail to 
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recognize that different forms belong to one another because they are combined under a common 
form. As he says:  
Aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kinds 
and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the 
same? … So if a person can do that, he’ll be capable of adequately discriminating 
a single form spread out all through a lot of other things, each of which stands 
separate from the others. In addition he can discriminate forms that are different 
from each other but are included within a single form that’s outside them, or a 
single form that’s connected as a unit throughout many wholes, or many forms 
that are completely separate from others. That’s what it is to know how to 
discriminate by kinds how things can associate and how they can’t…. And you’ll 
assign this dialectical activity only to someone who has a pure and just love of 
wisdom. (253d–e)  
 
The visitor claims that the ability to discriminate forms properly depends on a pure and just love 
of wisdom. Plato is demonstrating to his careful reader that the visitor’s antipathy for the sophist 
has clouded his ability to reason properly. Plato intends the visitor to be a case study who shows 
the truth more than stating it, and who also states the truth more than attaining to it. Without 
realizing it, the visitor accurately describes the conditions of his own failure.  
The sophist is not the only person who mixes reality with appearance. At the beginning of 
the Sophist, gods are described as disguising themselves as humans. In the discussion there, 
Socrates quotes from Homer in alluding to a passage where Odysseus disguised himself in order 
to observe the deeds of just and unjust people. The difficulty of distinguishing gods, 
philosophers, statesmen and sophists is the topic at the beginning of the dialogue. As Socrates 
says:  
Certainly the genuine philosophers who “haunt our cities”––by contrast to the 
fake ones––take on all sorts of different appearances just because of other 
people’s ignorance…. Some people think they’re worthless and others think 
they’re worth everything in the world. Sometimes they take on the appearance of 
statesmen, and sometimes of sophists. Sometimes, too, they might give the 
impression that they’re completely insane. (217c–d)  
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It is not only the sophist, but gods, heroes and philosophers who take on different appearances, 
as if the that which is not should conceal the that which is. But for Socrates, these changing 
appearances reflect the blended essences of the individuals involved – that is, the essences of 
different types of individuals do not cut clean. On this account, the mixing of being and nonbeing 
is not nearly so nefarious as what the visitor supposes.  
When Theodorus first brought the Eleatic visitor to visit with Socrates and others, Socrates 
asks Theodorus the following:  
Did they (those from Elea) think that sophists, statesmen, and philosophers make 
up one kind of thing or two? Or did they divide them up into three kinds 
corresponding to the three names and attach one name to each of them? (217a)  
 
Socrates believes that, in one way or another, the natures of statesmen, philosophers and sophists 
are somehow blended. In this and a number of other dialogues, Socrates believes the nature of 
the philosopher is not autonomous and autological, and so he continually seeks to find reciprocal 
and complementary (heterological) counterparts from within others. The unity of opposites 
between the philosopher and the sophist that emerges from the discussion between the Eleatic 
visitor and Theaetetus did not come as a surprise to Socrates, but was the very sort of explanation 
for which he posed the question at the beginning of the dialogue. The next step for Socrates is to 
consider how the combined nature of the philosopher and sophist might blend with the nature of 
the statesman.  
The Eleatic visitor believes that some things blend and others do not. Most assuredly, he 
believes that forms do not blend. But in addition to forms, the visitor is convinced that his nature 
does not blend with the nature of the sophist. Given the view of Empedocles that nature 
combines and separates according to love and strife, Plato regards the visitor’s alienation from 
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the sophist as eristic, making the visitor’s judgment impure and thus obscuring his ability to 
reason properly about the forms.  
 In considering the blending natures of statesmen, philosophers and sophists, Plato is 
considering the problem of how the philosopher is to gain influence within the polis. This 
aspiration does not reflect personal ambition on the part of the philosopher but the desire for wise 
and just governance for society. One of Plato’s primary objectives is to ascertain what mixture is 
necessary among individuals and society in order to sustain a just polis. The synthesis of 
philosopher and sophist is simply a means toward achieving a synthesis of the philosopher and 
statesman. The fact that Socrates was condemned to death in his public trial shows what little 
political standing he had in the assembly. Similarly, Athens suffered defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War largely due to the infamous influence of Alcibiades, the chief advocate for the disastrous 
naval expedition to Sicily. From Plato’s point of view, if Socrates and Alcibiades had developed 
a more constructive relationship (than what is described in Symposium and Alcibiades), then 
perhaps both Socrates and Athens might have been saved. But if a suitable dialectical 
relationship could not be achieved between Socrates and Alcibiades, then what other blends 
might be more efficacious? Plato’s first rudimentary effort in this regard was the philosopher-
king of Republic, a theory based on the myth of metals. Plato continued to pursue this objective 
through Sophist, Statesman and Laws, among other dialogues. But beyond the limited concern of 
political theory, the question of metaphysical, cosmological, psychological, epistemological, 
political and ethical blending is one that runs throughout the Platonic corpus. The rational basis 
for considering the question of blending is the dialectical unity of opposites. The blending of 
opposites is thus part of Plato’s large-scale program, and so the attempted blending of 
philosopher and sophist and of being and nonbeing in Sophist is in no way incidental or 
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peripheral to Plato’s overall project. (However, it seems that Plato’s attempted blending of 
philosopher-king and of philosopher-sophist-statesman were more philosophical exercises than 
real proposals. The sophist had dropped out of Plato’s conception of the philosopher ruler in 
Laws, though the blending of light and darkness remained.)  
Once Plato’s philosophical program as described here is applied to the theory of forms, it 
becomes evident that there is far too much contrariety than what can be sustained from within the 
classical theory. Consequently, the classical theory must be abandoned, though Plato leaves it on 
display for those who do not see the need to move beyond it. Accordingly, to follow Plato into 
his revised critical theory of forms is to follow him into contrariety, negation and the via 
negativa. At the heart of this revised theory is the theory of contrariety and modality as found in 
Republic, Sophist and Parmenides. This revised critical theory is the basis of the study that 
follows.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CRISIS IN MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Upon completion of the second volume of his magnum opus in 1902, Gottlob Frege believed he 
had successfully reduced the theorems of arithmetic to first-order logic. But upon sending the 
volume to the printer, he received a letter from Bertrand Russell, congratulating him on his first 
volume, but also conveying the now famous Russell paradox. Frege was quick to realize the 
calamitous nature of this logical contradiction and immediately prepared an appendix for the 
second volume in which he announced the downfall of his theory. He began the appendix as 
follows:  
A scientist can hardly meet with anything more undesirable than to have the 
foundations give way just as the work is finished.  In this position I was put by a 
letter from Mr. Bertrand Russell, as the work was nearly through the press. 
 
Frege stated in the appendix that the consequence of the Russell paradox was not merely the ruin 
of his own theory but the seeming insurmountable difficulty it presents to any logical foundation 
whatsoever. In Frege’s assessment, the paradox ran deep. In a letter to his wife, Russell 
described Frege’s response by saying, “Arithmetic totters.” And so began the crisis in 
mathematical foundations.  
Frege and Russell founded the logicist school of mathematics. This tradition believed that 
mathematics generally and set theory specifically can be reduced to pure logic. After the onset of 
the set theoretic paradoxes, this view was cast into significant doubt. In The Principles of 
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Mathematics, Russell believed that “the contradiction” (his term for the Russell paradox) was 
caused by allowing a set or class to be a member of itself. He proposed a type theory that 
distinguished a set from its members. He wrote, “It is the distinction of logical types that is the 
key to the whole mystery.”22 Before the book was printed, however, he added Appendix B, 
which presented a different version of the theory, one that was inconsistent with the first. The 
appendix only “tentatively” asserts the second version of the theory, stating “it requires, in all 
probability, to be transformed into some subtler shape before it can answer all difficulties.” By 
1905 Russell had abandoned type theory, proposing three different theories: (1) the zigzag 
theory, (2) the limitation of size theory, and (3) the no-classes theory. He advanced these three 
without adopting any one of them. Then, in a brief note of February, 1906, he indicated he felt 
“hardly any doubt that the no-classes theory affords the complete solution of all the difficulties.” 
Nonetheless, by 1908 in Principia Mathematica he had returned to the theory of types. Russell’s 
theoretical inconstancy during this time period was an accurate reflection of his statement of 
1904, “Everything now is chaos.”23  
 In the early years of the foundational crisis, Frege and Russell believed in the universal 
applicability of logic. As described in the axiom of comprehension: for any definite property p, 
there exists a set P for which p is the defining property. On this view, the logical import of the 
universal quantifier is unbounded. This view contrasts sharply with algebraic logicists who, 
following DeMorgan, understand logical implication in terms of a “universe of discourse” in 
which algebraic operations are valid within certain limited sets, depending on where these sets 
exist in the cumulative hierarchy. In turning to his theory of types, Russell abandoned his earlier 
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 Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), §104.  
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 Russell, “ZN” unpublished manuscript,  (Hamilton, Canada: McMaster University Archives), folio 760. The 
title page is missing from these worksheets; “FN” might have meant “Fundamental Notions.”  Russell wrote on fol. 
762, “If this fails, arithmetic totters.”   
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view of the universal scope of propositions. His revised type theory refers to a “range of 
significance” such that propositions are valid only within limited ranges, though Russell 
continued to treat sets of numbers as having universal scope.  
Frege eventually abandoned belief that arithmetic can be reduced to logic. He concluded that 
any adequate foundation for arithmetic would have to be obtained through geometry. Similarly, 
Whitehead and Russell abandoned hope for the logical perfectibility of set theory. They wrote in 
1925:  
Infallibility is never attainable, and therefore some element of doubt should 
always attach to every axiom and to all its consequences.  In formal logic, the 
element of doubt is less than in most sciences, but it is not absent, as appears from 
the fact that the paradoxes followed from premises which were not previously 
known to require limitations.
24
 
 
Russell wrote candidly of the disillusionment he suffered as a result of the unresolved crisis in 
mathematical foundations. He is often quoted as follows:  
I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith.  I 
thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere.  
But I discovered that many mathematical demonstrations, which my teachers 
expected me to accept, were full of fallacies, and that, if certainty were indeed 
discoverable in mathematics, it would be in a new field of mathematics, with 
more solid foundations than those that had hitherto been thought secure.  But as 
the work proceeded, I was continually reminded of the fable about the elephant 
and the tortoise.  Having constructed an elephant upon which the mathematical 
world could rest, I found the elephant tottering, and proceeded to construct a 
tortoise to keep the elephant from falling.  But the tortoise was no more secure 
than the elephant, and after some twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the 
conclusion that there was nothing more that I could do in the way of making 
mathematical knowledge indubitable.
25
 
 
L.E.J. Brouwer was the founder of the intuitionist or constructivist school of thought.  In 
1908 he wrote The Untrustworthiness of the Principles of Logic in which he argued that the 
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56 
 
validity of mathematical logic is confined to finite terms and cannot be extended to infinite sets. 
Russell’s paradox was predicated on the concept of universality, and so Brouwer regarded 
infinity and universality as the basis of the contradiction. Brouwer claimed that the law of the 
excluded middle cannot be sustained in infinite contexts, and that it was for this reason that logic 
had failed or become untrustworthy within the foundational crisis. He advanced the highly 
restrictive claim that mathematics must be limited to considerations of strict finite construction, 
never allowing an inference that cannot be completely grasped by finite human intuition. 
Because Brouwer’s proposals were inadequate to reconstruct much of commonly accepted 
mathematics, his view remained a minority opinion, though his critique has been regarded as an 
important part of the foundational debate.  
Errett Bishop, a member of the constructivist school, expresses the outlook of 
constructivism in the following quotation:  
Mathematics belongs to man, not to God. We are not interested in properties of 
the positive integers that have no descriptive meaning for finite man. When a man 
proves a positive integer to exist, he should show how to find it. If God has 
mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself.
26
  
 
 David Hilbert founded what became known as the formalist school of mathematics. Giving 
an address in 1925, he described his program by saying, “The goal of my theory is to establish 
once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods.
27” In the same speech, he complained of 
mathematical foundations as follows:  
Admittedly, the present state of affairs where we run up against the paradoxes 
is intolerable.  Just think, the definitions and deductive methods which everyone 
learns, teaches and uses in mathematics, the paragon of truth and certitude, lead to 
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absurdities! If mathematical thinking is defective, where are we to find truth and 
certitude?
28
  
 
Hilbert sought to construct an absolute proof theory that would secure the legitimacy of 
mathematical reasoning that had been called into question. Mathematical proofs could do no 
better than achieve relative consistency, i.e., demonstrating a system consistent only insofar as 
another system is thought consistent. Hilbert realized that at some point, a mathematical system 
needed to step forward to provide a final basis of absolute consistency on which could hang the 
whole of mathematics. Otherwise, all mathematical proofs relied on a vicious circle of borrowed 
credibility. Unless this liability were corrected, mathematical reasoning could constitute nothing 
more than one big assumption. So what Hilbert wanted was an unhypothetical first principle that 
would guarantee all mathematical knowledge in rigorous terms.  
 Where would Hilbert turn to find the basis for an ultimate absolute within mathematics? In 
The Foundations of Geometry he had proved that Euclidean geometry is consistent if the real 
numbers are consistent. Thus his search for the final authority in mathematics led him to number 
theory, which he called “that purest and simplest offspring of the human mind.” He proposed to 
demonstrate that, without appeal to any external evidence, number theory could prove its own 
validity. (If the proof relied on external argumentation, it would not be absolute, but relative.) 
Hilbert’s concern to prove the absolute consistency of number theory extended to infinite as well 
as finite sets. Hilbert was an admirer of Cantor and so emphatically stated, “No one will drive us 
from the paradise which Cantor has created for us.”29 He even went so far as to say:  
What we have twice experienced, once with the paradoxes of the infinitesimal 
calculus and once with the paradoxes of set theory, will not be experienced a third 
time, nor ever again.
30
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 Hilbert formulated four questions that constituted what has come to be known as “Hilbert’s 
program.” If all four questions could be proved in the affirmative, then number theory would 
have demonstrated its own veracity. Kurt Gödel definitively answered Hilbert’s questions, 
though not in the way Hilbert expected. The success of Hilbert’s program depended on each of 
his four yes-or-no questions being answered in the affirmative. Gödel resolved Hilbert’s fourth 
question in the affirmative in his doctoral dissertation of 1929, but proved subsequently that the 
first three questions were answered in the negative, thus destroying Hilbert’s program. What is 
more, Gödel stunned the mathematical community with what are known as his two 
incompleteness theorems of 1930 and 1931.  
 Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem proved that any system of number theory must 
necessarily be incomplete. The proof is essentially a mathematical variation of the liar paradox.  
Gödel adapted the Liar within terms of first-order logic so as to say, “This statement is not a 
theorem.” Gödel showed that this statement is expressible as a well-formed formula of first-order 
logic and that, further, it necessarily attaches to any logical system sufficient to generate a 
number theory. Thus no theory of number can shake free of this so-called “Gödel statement.” If 
the Gödel statement were proved as a theorem it would imply a self-contradiction, since the 
statement says that it cannot be proven. But conversely, if the statement is left unproven, as it 
must be, then it is clearly true in saying that it is not a theorem, and thus it represents a true 
statement that cannot be proven. And thus, if every number theory has a truth that cannot be 
proven, then every number theory is therein incomplete. That is, there is a semantic truth for 
every number system that cannot be proven syntactically.  
 Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem is often referred to as his “great theorem,” and it is 
this latter proof that directly demolished Hilbert’s program. To understand this theorem, consider 
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the following: A witness in court swears to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth. Though this oath does not guarantee a witness will tell the truth, it is considered 
meaningful for an honest person to take such an oath. Honesty should be willing to commend 
itself, and so a truthful person should be willing to make a self-declaration of truthfulness. In the 
same way, Hilbert believed that number theory ought to be able to make a self-declaration of its 
own truthfulness, or consistency. Because number theory was believed by everyone to be 
consistent, Hilbert proposed that its autonomous self-declaration of consistency would not only 
be meaningful, but would provide the breakthrough necessary for an absolute consistency proof. 
Not only did Gödel show this impossible, but true to the paradoxical nature of the Liar and his 
first incompleteness theorem, he demonstrated that if number theory were to prove its own 
consistency, it would thereby force its own inconsistency! It was this remarkable paradox that 
destroyed Hilbert’s program. As Hermann Weyl emphatically stated, “No Hilbert will be able to 
assure us of consistency forever.”31  
 Gödel’s incompleteness theorems hit against two different targets, one internal and the 
other external. Internally, his theorems apply to first-order logic itself. Externally, they apply to 
number theory. What is more, these theorems apply to all branches of mathematics having at 
least the same power as elementary arithmetic. Even as Hilbert’s program offered the hope of 
extending a single logical guarantee throughout the whole of mathematics, even so Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems disseminate incompleteness and doubt. Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem proves that mathematical logic and number theory are incomplete. His second 
incompleteness theorem proves that first-order logic and number theory cannot prove their own 
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consistency. Not only is mathematics unable to testify to the whole truth (first incompleteness 
theorem), it is not known to speak nothing but the truth (second incompleteness theorem).  
 Gödel’s work has had a major influence on the development of mathematical thought. Many 
fundamental beliefs have had to be reexamined because of it, such as the doctrine of decidability. 
This notion meant that, in the final analysis, there were no gaps or hidden truths in mathematics, 
but that every well-formed mathematical question was fully accessible to investigation, leading 
to a conclusive answer, whether true or false. Hilbert articulated this belief as follows: 
As an example of the way in which fundamental questions can be treated I would 
like to choose the thesis that every mathematical problem can be solved.  We are 
all convinced of that.  After all, one of the things that attract us most when we 
apply ourselves to a mathematical problem is precisely that within us we always 
hear the call: here is the problem, search for the solution; you can find it by pure 
thought, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus [we shall not know].
32
  
 
After Gödel’s incompleteness proofs were first published, additional general conditions of 
Gödelian incompleteness have become familiar, such as non-computability, partial decidability, 
and undecidability.   
 W. V. Quine wrote in 1961, with reference to the discovery of the Russell paradox, “I 
remarked earlier that the discovery of antinomy is a crisis in the evolution of thought. In general 
set theory the crisis began sixty years ago and is not yet over.” Quine goes on to speak of 
Gödel’s theorems as follows:    
Gödel’s discovery is not an antinomy but a veridical paradox.  That there can 
be no sound and complete deductive systematization of elementary number 
theory, much less of pure mathematics generally, is true.  It is decidedly 
paradoxical, in the sense that it upsets crucial preconceptions.  We used to think 
that mathematical truth consisted in provability. 
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Like any veridical paradox, this is one we can get used to, thereby gradually 
sapping its quality of paradox.  But this one takes some sapping.  And 
mathematical logicians are at it, most assiduously.
33
  
 
Descartes had likened the teachings of philosophy to “towering and magnificent palaces 
with no better foundation than sand and mud,” and believed they could be bolstered by the 
foundations of mathematics, which he described as “strong and secure.”34 But mathematical 
foundations of the twentieth century turned out very different from what Descartes had imagined. 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory emerged as the most widely adopted foundational account, but what 
philosophical tradition does ZF support? It turns out that ZF was developed with more of a view 
of avoiding paradoxes than of defending any philosophical program. As Davis and Hersh write:  
The work on this program played a major role in the development of logic.  But it 
was a failure in terms of its original intention.  By the time set theory had been 
patched up to exclude the paradoxes, it was a complicated structure which one 
could hardly identify with logic in the philosophical sense of ‘the rules for correct 
reasoning.’  So it became untenable to argue that mathematics is nothing but 
logic—that mathematics is one vast tautology.35 
 
Davis and Hersh comment further on the philosophical implications of the foundational 
crisis as follows:  
Foundationalism, i.e., attempts to establish a basis for mathematical 
indubitability, has dominated the philosophy of mathematics in the twentieth 
century. . . . Formalism, intuitionism and logicism, each left its trace in the form 
of a certain mathematical research program that ultimately made its own 
contribution to the body of mathematics itself.  As philosophical programs, as 
attempts to establish a secure foundation for mathematical knowledge, all have 
run their course and petered out or dried up.  Yet there remains, as a residue, an 
unstated consensus that the philosophy of mathematics is research on the 
foundations of mathematics.
36
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 Morris Kline makes this same point even stronger. He describes the quest for an 
infallible body of reasoning as a grand illusion. He writes:  
The current predicament of mathematics is that there is not one but many 
mathematics and that for numerous reasons each fails to satisfy the members of 
the opposing schools.  It is now apparent that the concept of a universally 
accepted infallible body of reasoning—the majestic mathematics of 1800 and the 
pride of man—is a grand illusion.  Uncertainty and doubt concerning the future of 
mathematics have replaced the certainties and complacency of the past.  The 
disagreements about the foundations of the “most certain” science are both 
surprising and, to put it mildly, disconcerting.  The present state of mathematics is 
a mockery of the hitherto deep-rooted and widely reputed truth and logical 
perfection of mathematics.
37
   
 
Imre Lakatos proposed a “philosophy of dubitability” in which he radically departed from 
the traditional understanding of mathematics, which he called “Euclidianism.” His view of 
“quasi-empiricism” argued that the deductive methods used in mathematical discovery are 
intrinsically conjectural and fallible, inevitably giving place to uncertainty. He argued that 
mathematics is far too complex to be formally deduced from a priori axioms. Like the natural 
sciences, they must be inductively formulated through informal and a posteriori criticisms. In 
attempting to deductively construct their systems, mathematicians inevitably find themselves 
adding “first principles” after the fact, which purportedly should have been declared from the 
start. These “foundational” elements, however, could never have been anticipated until their 
consequences had come to imply their prior existence. The need for this midcourse adjustment 
can never be overcome in mathematics because it is a discipline faced with the potential of 
infinite growth. This effect, Lakatos insists, represents a crushing blow to deductivism, which 
claims to set forth all its axioms from the start. Despite the loss of predictability and certitude, he 
argued mathematicians must allow for induction, gathering their needed axioms along the way. 
He disparaged mathematicians who allow themselves to fall into inductivism without 
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acknowledging it: “It is intriguing how mathematical logicians who are so squeamish about 
rigour, and who set out to achieve absolute certainty, can slip into the morass of inductivism.”38 
 Lakatos wrote: “For more than 2000 years there has been an argument between dogmatists 
and sceptics. In this great debate, mathematics has been the proud fortress of dogmatism…. A 
challenge is now overdue.” He showed how mathematical proofs fail to be irrefutable by 
becoming an ordeal of examples and counter-examples in which uncertainty gives way to 
certainty and then again to uncertainty. In his most famous work, Proofs and Refutations, he 
wrote: “ mathematics does not grow through a monotonous increase of the number of indubitably 
established theorems, but through the incessant improvement of guesses by speculation and 
criticism, by the logic of proofs and refutations.” He argues the growth of mathematics “cannot 
be properly understood without understanding the method of proofs and refutations, without 
adopting a fallibilist approach.”39 
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 Quine is also an advocate for an empirical understanding of logic and mathematics. On his 
view, foundations are more of an afterthought. He writes:  
Foundation ceases to be the apt metaphor; it is as if a frail foundation were 
supported by suspension from a sturdy superstructure. . . . We may look upon set 
theory, or its notation, as just a conveniently restricted vocabulary in which to 
formulate a general axiom system for classical mathematics—let the sets fall 
where they may.
40
 
 
The quest for mathematical foundations attempts to determine whether or not mathematics is 
a fully objective science, such as reflecting necessary truths, or else whether it might only 
embody expressions of human language and creativity. Herman Weyl offers a striking statement 
as to this latter possibility. He writes:  
The question of the foundations and the ultimate meaning of mathematics remains 
open; we do not know in what direction it will find its final solution or even 
whether a final objective answer can be expected at all. “Mathematizing” may 
well be a creative activity of man, like language or music, of primary originality, 
whose historical decisions defy complete objective rationalization.
41
  
 
 Morris Kline describes the migration from the view of mathematics as metaphysical 
reality to the view of mathematics as human creation:  
Creations of the early 19th century, strange geometries and strange algebras, 
forced mathematicians, reluctantly and grudgingly, to realize that mathematics 
proper and the mathematical laws of science were not truths.  They found, for 
example, that several differing geometries fit spatial experience equally well.  All 
could not be truths.  Apparently mathematical design was not inherent in nature, 
or if it was, man’s mathematics was not necessarily the account of that design.  
The key to reality had been lost.
42
  
 
William James advocated the emerging view of mathematics as human language. He wrote:   
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When the first mathematical, logical and natural uniformities, the first laws, were 
discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and simplification 
that resulted, that they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically the 
eternal thoughts of the Almighty.  His mind also thundered and reverberated in 
syllogisms.  He also thought in conic sections, squares and roots and ratios, and 
geometrized like Euclid.  He made Kepler’s laws for the planets to follow; he 
made velocity increase proportionally to the time in falling bodies; he made the 
law of the sines for light to obey when refracted; he established the classes, 
orders, families and genera of plants and animals, and fixed the distances between 
them.  He thought the archetypes of all things, and devised their variations; and 
when we rediscover any one of these his wondrous institutions, we seize his mind 
in its very literal intention.  
But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that 
most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.  The laws themselves, 
moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so many 
rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that investigators 
have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of 
reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful.  Their 
great use is to summarize old facts and to lead to new ones.  They are only a man-
made language, a conceptual shorthand, as someone calls them, in which we write 
our reports of nature; and languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of 
expression and many dialects. 
The human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from scientific logic.
43
   
 
 Mathematicians increasingly became freed up from constraints of mathematics as truth, and 
were thus free to produce mathematics as art.  Pure mathematicians reveled in the desire to push 
back the frontiers of the bizarre and counter-intuitive. G. H. Hardy epitomized this spirit by 
writing in 1940:  
I have never done anything ‘useful.’  No discovery of mine has made, or is likely 
to make, directly or indirectly, for good or ill, the least difference to the amenity 
of the world.  . .  Judged by all practical standards, the value of my mathematical 
life is nil; and outside mathematics it is trivial anyhow.  I have just one chance of 
escaping a verdict of complete triviality, that I may be judged to have created 
something worth creating.  And that I have created something is undeniable:  the 
question is about its value.  The case for my life . . . is this:  that I have added 
something to knowledge, and helped others to add more; and that these 
somethings have a value which differs in degree only, and not in kind, from that 
of the creations of the great mathematicians, or of any of the other artists, great or 
small, who have left some kind of memorial behind them.
44
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 Contemporary mathematicians are of a split mind as to how real they believe mathematics to 
be. On the one hand they acknowledge the traditional imperative of grounding mathematics in 
some sort of objective context, and yet on the other they view themselves as creating 
mathematics as art in such a way as to resist or even defy absolutist treatment. The following 
statement of Nicholas Bourbaki (a collective pen name for an influential group of 
mathematicians during the 1950s and 60s) is often quoted as an example of the ambivalence 
mathematicians have on the subject.  
On foundations we believe in the reality of mathematics, but of course when 
philosophers attack us with their paradoxes we rush to hide behind formalism and 
say, “Mathematics is just a combination of meaningless symbols,” and then we 
bring out Chapters 1 and 2 on set theory.  Finally we are left in peace to go back 
to our mathematics and do it as we have always done, with the feeling that each 
mathematician has that he is working with something real.  This sensation is 
probably an illusion, but is very convenient.  That is Bourbaki’s attitude toward 
foundations.
45
  
 
Bertrand Russell described a conversation he had with Ludwig Wittgenstein, during the time 
he was helping Wittgenstein publish Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Russell was disturbed by 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of any totalizing or universalizing claims of logic. Russell relates how 
he took out a sheet of paper and put three blobs of ink on it. “I besought him to admit that, since 
there were these three blobs, there must be at least three things in the world; but he refused 
resolutely.” Russell explained Wittgenstein’s refusal by adding, “He would admit that there were 
three blobs on the page, because that was a finite assertion, but he would not admit that anything 
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at all could be said about the world as a whole.”46 The set theoretic paradoxes all involve, in one 
respect or another, reference to the universal set, or at least an unqualified appeal to “all sets.” 
This universal conception is at the heart of the Russell paradox, the Cantor paradox, and the 
Burali-Forti paradox. Russell was intent on preserving the universal application of logic (as 
allowed for by the axiom of comprehension), even though he eventually granted the possibility 
that logical propositions might not be consistent in universal contexts, though he always insisted 
that numbers should be so. His diagnosis of the paradoxes was that they were all self-referential, 
and he hoped to avoid the paradoxes by eliminating this self-reference. But Wittgenstein’s view 
was that the paradoxes were too large. As he wrote, “The limits of my language mean the limits 
of my world.” 47  
What conclusions are to be drawn regarding the crisis in mathematical foundations? William 
James described the false ideal of mathematical and scientific perfection by saying that human 
arbitrariness has driven out divine necessity. As he and a number of other critics would have it, 
mathematics is nothing more than an extension of human language. As Wittgenstein wrote on a 
number of occasions, “Mathematics is a motley.” But just as advocates have gone too far in 
describing mathematics as overly absolute and indubitable, so too detractors have gone too far in 
deriding it in deflationary terms. Galileo claimed that the book of nature is written in the 
language of mathematics. Although this language is clearly given to more freedom of expression 
than many had thought, cosmologists have nonetheless determined that the age of the universe is 
about 13.798 billion years old. Mathematics seems to conform to nature with too great a 
precision than to be thought arbitrary on a human level. The problem is that mathematics has too 
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much contrariety to belong in Platonic heaven, and yet is too objective and unimaginably 
complex to be likened to human arbitrariness. How real, then, is mathematics?  
The discovery of fractal geometry within number systems presents a stunning counterpoint 
to those who have measured the integrity of mathematical logic on a linear scale. Because chaos 
theory is ubiquitous throughout nature, it may be that the crisis in mathematical foundations 
results from linear logic attempting to capture what is significantly alien to it. The present study 
proposes that the logic of chaos theory be adapted and applied toward the development of a 
nonlinear mathematical foundation. Such a foundation should allow for varying regimes of 
contrariety to coexist within a non-absolutist superstructure. That is to say, the present study 
advances the claim that the nature of mathematics may belong neither to divine necessity nor to 
human arbitrariness but, like all else of nature, to the mystifying reality of organized chaos. 
Mathematical foundations grounded in chaos theory would possess sufficient objectivity and 
beauty to counter the claim that mathematics is nothing but a motley artifact of social 
construction. So too, such foundations would render the mathematical superstructure unstable in 
such a way as to make it seem to totter from within the narrow scope of linear foundations. This 
proposal would make mathematical reality akin to the rest of nature, and would serve to advance 
chaos theory as a universal science.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONTINGENCY, POSSIBILITY AND CHAOS 
 
Two of the most important schools of thought in probability theory are those of frequentists and 
Bayesians. The frequentist view is a physicalist or objective account that interprets probability as 
the relative frequency of outcomes measured or abstracted over long or infinite trials, especially 
on random outcomes, such as games of chance. The randomness in these cases results from the 
physical nature of the games or systems that produce neutral or fair results. A differing 
physicalist account is the propensity view that analyzes empirical outcomes of scientific interest 
where the outcomes exert a particular propensity, whether random or not (cf. Karl Popper). The 
Bayesian view considers the degree of confidence a person may have in a given circumstance, 
focusing only on the data at hand. This is a subjectivist account that deals more with 
propositional logic than repeated random outcomes. There are four main interpretations of 
Bayesian probability: (1) the classical Bayesian interpretation (Laplace); (2) the subjectivist 
interpretation (de Finetti and Savage); (3) the epistemic or inductive interpretation (Ramsey and 
Cox); and (4) the logical interpretation (Keynes and Carnap).  
Leonard Savage, a leading Bayesian, wrote in 1954 that the foundations of statistics rest in 
turn on the foundations of probability, which as he described, are “as controversial a subject as 
one could name.” He went on to write: 
It is unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. But, as 
to what probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there has seldom 
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been such complete disagreement and breakdown of communication since the 
Tower of Babel…. There must be dozens of different interpretations of 
probability defended by living authorities, and some authorities hold that several 
different interpretations may be useful, that is, that the concept of probability may 
have different meaningful senses in different contexts.
48
  
 
Yet the divisions within probability theory have certainly proliferated since the time 
Savage made this statement. According to Jim Berger and I.J. Good, a combinatorial 
analysis of recognized Bayesian views produces an upper limit of 47,632 different 
positions. However, as Savage indicated, probability can be interpreted as having 
different senses at the same time, and so it does not follow that frequentist and Bayesian 
thought contradict each other but only that they analyze probabilities differently.  
In 1964, Paul Cootner wrote The Random Character of Stock Market Prices. Cootner 
interpreted stock market data as conforming randomly to the standard bell curve. This idea was 
popularized by Burton Malkiel in his 1973 book, A Random Walk Down Wall Street. Malkiel 
simulated stock market data by adjusting a hypothetical stock up or down each day by half a 
point based on flipping a coin. Malkiel then presented his simulated data to a stock analyst, who 
urged him to buy the stock in question. Malkiel concluded that, because a stock market analyst 
was unable to differentiate a random simulated stock from real stock market data, the stock 
market can be interpreted as random. Martin Weber, Andrew Lo and Craig MacKinlay have all 
argued against the random walk interpretation, claiming that detectable trends within the data 
allow for a modicum of predictability. Lo and MacKinlay wrote A Non-Random Walk Down 
Wall Street in 2002.  
 Benoit Mandelbrot wrote “A Multifractal Walk Down Wall Street” in 1999. He writes, “The 
geometry that describes the shape of coastlines and the patterns of galaxies also elucidates how 
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stock prices soar and plummet.”49 Mandelbrot criticizes the classical financial models used 
throughout the twentieth century. He cites two main premises of standard portfolio theory with 
which he disagrees: that market events are independent of each other, and that the distribution of 
market activities conform to the standard bell curve. Mandelbrot argues that when the entire 
range of market behavior is taken into account, it is the multifractal and not bell curve that best 
describes market behavior. While he grants that standard portfolio theory is accurate about 
ninety-five percent of the time, it fails to address the precipitous extremes of sudden market 
volatility. Just because the weather might be moderate ninety-five percent of the time, a mariner 
would never ignore the possibility of a typhoon. Unlike models based on the bell curve, chaos 
theory pertains to both the regularities and irregularities of the market. Though multifractals “do 
not purport to predict the future with certainty,” Mandelbrot writes, “they do create a more 
realistic picture of market risks.” As he explains in greater detail:  
The mathematics underlying portfolio theory handles extreme situations with 
benign neglect: it regards large market shifts as too unlikely to matter or as 
impossible to take into account. . . . Typhoons are, in effect, defined out of 
existence. . . . According to portfolio theory, the probability of these large 
fluctuations would be a few millionths of a millionth of a millionth of a millionth.  
(The fluctuations are greater than 10 standard deviations.)  But in fact, one 
observes spikes on a regular basis—as often as every month—and their 
probability amounts to a few hundredths.  Granted, the bell curve is often 
described as normal—or, more precisely, as the normal distribution.  But should 
financial markets then be described as abnormal? Of course not—they are what 
they are, and it is portfolio theory that is flawed.
50
  
 
The principle of “self-affinity” is the means by which the stock market is seen as 
chaotic. As Mandelbrot explains:  
A fractal is a geometric shape that can be separated into parts, each of which 
is a reduced-scale version of the whole.  In finance, this concept is not a rootless 
abstraction but a theoretical reformulation of a down-to-earth bit of market 
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folklore—namely, that movements of a stock or currency all look alike when a 
market chart is enlarged or reduced so that it fits the same time and price scale.  
An observer then cannot tell which of the data concern prices that change from 
week to week, day to day or hour to hour.  This quality defines the charts as 
fractal curves and makes available many powerful tools of mathematical and 
computer analysis.
51
  
 
 The issue between the random walk interpretation and the multifractal walk 
interpretation as concerning economic data seems to hang on the difference between a 
frequentist abstract interpretation versus that of a propensity interpretation, the latter 
being attuned to differentiate between data that is driven by real world pressures and data 
that is purely random. This point is particularly relevant in that Paul Cootner’s work of 
1964, which stressed the random nature of the stock market, was significantly influenced 
by Louis Bachelier’s book of 1900, The Theory of Speculation. Cootner read Bachelier 
as promoting a random interpretation of economic data, though Bachelier’s interpretation 
was actually modeled in terms of the stochastic dynamics of Brownian motion.  
 A major concern of the present study is to suggest that the foundational crisis of probability 
theory might be resolved by ongoing developments of chaos theory. If probability theorists have mistakenly 
described as random that which is described more accurately as chaotic, then there can be little wonder that 
they have met with so much controversy. The random walk probabilist who forces the bell curve on 
multifractal data is in much the same situation as the pre-Keplerian astronomer who wearily sought in the 
circle what belonged to the ellipse. But insofar as understanding of planetary motion has been revised from 
the circle to the ellipse, and then from the ellipse to a relativistic version of the ellipse, and then again from 
a relativistic version to a version both relativistic and chaotic, the question arises for empirical scientists 
generally as to how variegated and subtle is the path of discovery that leads from one distorted view of 
reality to another, until finally giving place to chaos. It is a striking fact that empirical scientists are now 
looking at realms previously considered as inhabited by randomness and are now finding evidence of 
chaos. As chaos theory continues to supplant the place of randomness, the question arises as to whether the 
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purely random actually exists in nature, or whether it is a figment of the imagination. It may be that the 
concept of the purely random relates to chaos theory in the same way that Newtonian physics relates to 
relativity.  
But to press beyond differentiating randomness and chaos theory, what can be said about the logical 
foundations of probability theory directly, without specific interest as to the determinacy or randomness of 
the events under investigation? Of primary significance here is Hume’s critique of causation and induction. 
Because Hume’s critique and Kant’s response to it are central to the present study, it will be described here 
in some detail. Central to Hume’s critique is the distinction known as Hume’s Fork. This fork classifies all 
the endeavors of human reason as either part of “relations of ideas” or “matters of fact.” Relations of ideas 
are necessary formal truths which bear on such issues as mathematics, though do not say anything about the 
real world. Matters of fact relate to reasoning concerning the empirical world, which can be known (at least 
in part) inferentially through cause and effect. Hume claimed that these categories exhaust all human 
reasoning and are mutually exclusive of one another.  
 In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume critiques causality and induction 
in Section IV, Part II. He begins by asking two questions that summarize the discussion from 
Part I, and then a third question that introduces the problem to be considered in Part II. First, 
what is the nature of all our reasoning concerning matters of fact? Answer: the relation of cause 
and effect. Second, what is the foundation of our reasoning concerning cause and effect? 
Answer: experience. Third, what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? The 
negative answer given here is that such reasoning lacks rational justification. (Hume’s positive 
answer is given in Section V.)  
 Experience teaches that certain types of causes have always been followed by certain types 
of effects, and thus the expectation is acquired that, for future events, these same causes will be 
followed by the same effects. But Hume argues that these propositions of experience and 
expectation cannot be bound to each other with logical certainty. He explains that Nature hides 
her secrets from us so that we are never allowed to see the hidden forces at work in natural 
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processes. Thus when we see a set of appearances in the future that matches a set of appearances 
in the past, we have no way of knowing rationally that the underlying dynamics continue to be at 
work in the different situations. Despite the lack of logical connection between experience and 
expectations, we commonly act as if these two are connected. Hume writes, “Now this is a 
process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation.” Hume’s intent 
is to deny that this foundation can be demonstrated with logical certainty. Thus Hume’s Fork is 
defended inasmuch that contingent matters of fact cannot be analyzed in terms of logical 
necessity.  
 Hume realizes that many individuals will believe that he is underestimating the 
reasonableness of expectation, and so he writes, “But if you insist that the inference is made by a 
chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning.” (By “reasoning” Hume means an 
account that is logically certain.) He grants that inasmuch as his line of questioning is yet new, it 
may be doubtful whether an initial failure would actually imply that the specified result does not 
exist. “For this reason, he writes, “it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task; and 
enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can 
afford such an argument.” In order to encompass all these branches of human reason, Hume 
reasserts the primacy of his division between relations of ideas and matters of fact, holding that 
they exhaust all the branches of human reason.  
 Hume explains that the expectation of future events cannot be united to past experience 
through logical demonstration since there is no logical certainty that the future will resemble the 
past. He writes: “That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it 
implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like 
those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects.” Since then 
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the desired assumption does not belong among the relations of ideas, perhaps it is a matter of 
fact. Hume then states that all matters of fact or of real existence are known through the relation 
of cause and effect; that this relation is itself known entirely through experience; and that “all our 
experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the 
past.” He thus concludes: “To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable 
arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that 
for granted, which is the very point in question.” In explicit terms, it seems from past experience 
and from experimental sciences that the claim “the future will resemble the past” has always 
been correct. But this observation from experience cannot be used to prove the general 
conclusion that “the future will always resemble the past” without begging the question. Thus 
inductive reasoning about matters of fact or real existence cannot be rationally justified.  
 Hume’s purpose is certainly not to advocate a reckless abandon in regard to the operations 
of nature, for as he insists, “none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority 
of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life….” But, as he continues, this fact does 
not supplant the philosophical curiosity to “examine the principle of human nature, which gives 
this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which 
nature has placed among different objects.” As a thoroughgoing empiricist Hume is seeking to 
foil high rationalism in its attempt to provide a deductive account of necessary causal 
connections. This is his target when he states, “I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such 
reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on 
me.” Then, turning against his fellow empiricists Hume reasserts that no amount of experience 
can infer logical connection between sensible qualities that are conjoined with what is taken to 
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be their secret hidden powers. Hume concludes that philosophical reason cannot improve on 
what nature teaches by experience to stupid peasants, infants and brute beasts.  
 Hume’s critique invites comparison to the science of induction as described within the 
formal probability calculus.
52
 Hume claims that the future cannot be known to resemble the past 
with logical certainty, unless one argues in a circle. Yet the calculus of classical probability 
assumes the axiom of total probability, thereby assuming the homogeneity of all past, present 
and future events to be considered. How does this calculus compare to Hume’s critique? Insofar 
as the probability calculus is entirely formal, Hume would not find it objectionable, but would 
classify it within the relations of ideas. But does not this calculus pertain to real world 
phenomena? This is the difference between frequentist and propensity theories. Frequentists 
describe probabilities merely in terms of relative frequencies, though propensity theory describes 
probabilities in terms of underlying causes. There is a complicated set of considerations here. 
The present discussion seeks to argue both for and against Hume, and likewise for frequentist 
and propensity theories. (Critiquing and engaging Bayesian probability is more complicated, and 
so will not be undertaken here.)  
 The discussion of transfinite probability proposed below in chapter 4 is expressed in terms 
completely favorable to frequentist thought. To this extent, the present discussion is affirming of 
frequentism. But insofar as transfinite probability rejects the axiom of unitary total probability, 
the present discussion rejects the modern probability calculus held in common by classical 
expressions of frequentist, propensity and Bayesian thought (although any of these theories can 
be expressed in unclassical terms). However, the rejection of unitary total probability is 
consistent with Hume’s insistence that the future cannot be known (in logical terms) to resemble 
the past.  
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But there is an interesting twist here. Hume claims that Nature hides her secrets, so that 
empirical investigation is never allowed to witness Nature’s hidden powers of causality. But for 
Hume, this claim must be taken as a matter of fact (since relations of ideas have no relevance for 
the real world), and so the claim must be taken as contingent. In that case, it is possible that 
Nature might at one time disclose secrets formerly kept hidden. If Hume’s future does not 
necessarily resemble his past, then a secret power of Nature’s constancy hidden in his past and 
present might become revealed in his future. Such a power of Nature’s constancy might have 
been discovered in the last two decades of the twentieth century by chaos theory. In arguing that 
Nature keeps her powers hidden, Hume realized he must enumerate the various branches of 
learning, showing that Nature’s secrets are not disclosed by any of the empirical sciences. But 
Hume’s future knows of sciences he knew not of. Because the effects of chaos are so ubiquitous 
and consistent throughout nature, the hypothesis has become possible that chaos theory is now 
revealing an intimation of Nature’s former secrets. This revelation might indicate that Nature’s 
secret of cause and effect operates consistently and uniformly through chaos theory. If this 
hypothesis can be adopted as a working hypothesis or even confirmed theoretically (perhaps 
within a quasi-empirical context), then a principle of induction would result such that the future 
could be regarded as resembling the past.  
 There is another implication here for Hume. The empirical discovery of the new science of 
chaos theory offers a uniform and consistent presentation of cause and effect as exemplified in 
fractal geometry, both in terms of number theory and of random or near-random data pertaining 
to the stock market. Chaos theory thus seems to be so ubiquitous as to subsume fundamental 
categories of modality, including necessity, determinism, free will and contingency. But such a 
broad modal reach implies the collapse of Hume’s Fork and Hume’s modal theory. Hume claims 
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relations of ideas and matters of fact are mutually exclusive of each other, this exclusivity owing 
to the extreme difference between necessity and contingency. Hume grants that mathematics and 
number theory are necessary truths reflective of relations of ideas. But insofar as chaos theory is 
regarded as inclusive of both necessary and contingent realities, it spans and thereby unifies a 
modal divide that Hume thought to be absolute and insurmountable.  
 The claim was made above that, in denying the axiom of total probability, the present study 
is consistent with Hume’s critique of induction that the future cannot be known to resemble the 
past. But then because of the ubiquitous effects of chaos theory, the proposal was advance that 
chaos theory might reveal the secrets of nature regarding cause and effect, thereby giving support 
to the inductive belief in the resemblance of past and future. In taking these two claims together, 
the present study agrees with Hume analytically that the future cannot be known to resemble the 
past, but yet offers support to the claim that such resemblance might be inferred synthetically. As 
based on other proposals offered within the present study, such a synthetic judgment would be a 
posteriori and would not be absolute.  
 Not only Hume, but the vast majority of western philosophy has regarded the modal divide 
between necessity and contingency as absolute and insurmountable. Kant’s fourth antinomy 
engages this modality in an interesting manner. The antinomy considers whether the universe 
was created by a necessary being or whether it emerged contingently as a matter of chance. Kant 
believed that these opposing views are equally valid, and that this controversy arises because the 
question seeks to transcend the limits of possible experience. Kant claimed that speculative 
questions such as this (and also the question of determinism vs. free will) fall out of bounds of 
the proper scope of reason, and thus his antinomies are intended to chasten reason so as to 
conform to the critical metaphysics of his transcendental idealism. But because chaos theory has 
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now been discovered to apply to number algorithms and probabilistic data, then empirical 
evidence now suggests that chaos applies equally well to both necessary and contingent realities. 
If there is an absolute and insurmountable divide between necessity and contingency, then this 
divide is unknown to chaos theory. The metaphysical polar opposites of Kant’s fourth antinomy 
are thus subsumed within the modal expanse of chaos.  
 For Kant, the antinomies chasten
53
 reason by delimiting the scope of reason, though not its 
absolutist character. On his view, if absolute knowledge is not possible with universal scope, 
then absolute knowledge must remain possible in describing the necessary conditions of possible 
experience. Contrary to Kant, Neoplatonists of the via negativa frame the antinomies quite 
differently, interpreting them as reflecting the need for transcendental synthesis. From this point 
of view, Kant’s antinomies do not result from the quantitative mistake of extending reason 
beyond its proper limits but from the qualitative mistake of treating reason as absolute. From 
such a perspective, members of the via negativa are in a position to offer a Hegelian response to 
Kant’s antinomies. The dialectical outlook of the via negativa seeks to combine being with 
nonbeing and necessity with contingency.  
Because number and probability both suffer from a foundational crisis, the mathematical 
conceptions of necessity and contingency remain theoretically obscure. Yet because these 
modalities are opposing species within the genus of modal logic, their combined predicament is a 
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means of progress. There is now hope, precisely because both necessity and contingency are 
involved in equal confusion, and both have affinities with chaos theory. In so far as one of them 
is clarified, then perhaps the other will be too. The discussion below in chapters 4–6 seeks to 
provide a dialectical synthesis of necessity and contingency as expressed within set theory and 
probability. This synthesis rejects the belief that number and probability are absolute and 
autonomous but exist in a relation of contrariety so as to be combined within a unified theory of 
modality. This proposal reflects the understanding of Neoplatonists of the via negativa as 
described above in chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 TRANSFINITE PROBABILITY 
 
In reminiscence of Hilbert’s hotel (an imaginary hotel with an infinite number of rooms), 
consider a similar thought experiment in which a casino has a countably infinite number of 
roulette tables. Consider that the casino management performs the following experiment.  
1. The casino management wishes to calculate the odds for individual gamblers who wager 
not simply on a single roulette outcome but on an entire countably infinite sequence or 
string of roulette outcomes. Accordingly, the casino adopts procedures for selecting, 
recording and placing bets on these infinite target strings prior to spinning the roulette 
wheels. Such target roulette strings might be determined randomly or else in terms of 
decimal expansions of particular irrational numbers, such as the decimal expansion of π, 
the square root of prime numbers, etc.  
2. The infinite number of roulette wheels on the casino floor are spun an infinite number of 
times. Each roulette table generates an infinite string of actual outcomes.  
3. The actual strings of roulette outcomes on the casino floor are compared to one particular 
target string and to the probability space of the entire casino. The casino then calculates 
the odds and establishes the amount of payouts for these infinite wagers.  
The fundamental question arising from this experiment is: what is the probability that the 
infinite number of roulette wheels, each of which produces an infinite string of outcomes, will 
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produce at least one exact match to the infinite target string, beginning with the first result and 
continuing to infinity? This question will be referred to as the casino question.  
The casino question is interesting in that it yields as many as three arguable solutions. Each 
of these solutions will be considered here. As for the first, one which represents a pre-critical or 
layperson’s approach to probability, the casino question can be analyzed by scaling the question 
down from two dimensions of infinity to one; that is, where an infinite number of roulette wheels 
are compared to finite target strings (as opposed to infinite target strings). On this basis, let the 
first target in the target string be 27. Of the infinite roulette wheels, how many will match 27 on 
the first spin? Since the chance of any one roulette wheel producing a 27 is 1 out of 38, the 
answer is one thirty-eighth of infinity, a value equal to infinity. Similarly, there will be an 
infinite number of roulette wheels matching the target string in the second, third and any nth 
position. But if the first, second and third positions of the target string each has an infinite 
number of roulette wheels corresponding to it, how many roulette wheels will correspond to the 
sequence of all three targeted outcomes? As before, the answer is an infinite number. And so the 
generalization seems to follow that for any finite number of targeted outcomes, there will be an 
infinite number of roulette wheels corresponding exactly to the target string. If then the logic of 
finite strings can be extended to strings of infinite length, there should be an infinite number of 
roulette wheels whose outcomes correspond to a target string of infinite length. Thus according 
to this reasoning, the answer to the casino question is probability 1. That is, an infinite number of 
roulette wheels that are spun an infinite number of times will inevitably produce a match with a 
specified target string of infinite length. This view agrees with naive intuition that infinity 
implies totality, that infinite activity exhausts all possibilities.  
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The second solution, given by classical probability
54
 (as developed by Kolmogorov), 
maintains that the answer to the casino question is probability 0. The countably infinite strings of 
actual roulette outcomes on the casino floor relate to the total probability space of the casino in 
the same way as a countably infinite number of isolated real numbers relate to the real number 
interval [0, 1]. Because such a countable infinity of real points has zero measure in the real 
interval [0, 1] (according to the measure theoretic terms of classical probability), classical 
probability treats these isolated points as vanishing magnitudes. In the same way, classical 
probability interprets the countable infinity of roulette outcome strings on the casino floor as 
lacking measure theoretic space and thus, as vanishing magnitudes, having probability 0. Thus if 
an infinite number of countably infinite roulette outcome strings (all having probability 0) are 
compared to a specific target string of countably infinite outcomes, the probability of finding an 
exact match from among such vanishing magnitudes is 0.  
The third solution, non-classical in nature, gives rise to a theory of transfinite probability. 
This demonstration can be accomplished by patterning the casino question after Cantor’s 
diagonalization method of 1891, a method which proves that the real numbers are 
nondenumerable (or uncountable). Because Cantor’s transfinite theory is central to the present 
discussion, it will be described here in some detail. It is interesting to note that Cantor’s original 
diagonal argument did not pertain strictly to the real numbers themselves. Cantor first proved 
that the real numbers are uncountable in 1874, but this proof came under the attack of Leopold 
Kronecker, a finitist mathematician who rejected the view that irrational numbers have decimal 
expansions extending to actual infinity. In response to Kronecker, Cantor sought a proof for the 
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existence of uncountable sets as such, “one which is independent of the consideration of 
irrational numbers,” as Cantor wrote. Nevertheless, Cantor’s diagonal proof easily extends to 
irrational numbers as canonically understood, and thus serves to legitimate Cantor’s earlier 
proof. But it was the diagonalization and related techniques concerning the power set which 
Cantor first articulated in 1891 that provided the original impetus for his development of an 
infinite hierarchy of transfinite numbers. Cantor wrote of his diagonal proof as follows:  
This proof seems remarkable not only because of its great simplicity, but also 
because the principle which it follows can be extended directly to the general 
theorem, that the powers of well-defined sets have no maximum or, what is the 
same, that in place of any given set L another set M can be placed which is of 
greater power than L.
55
   
 
Cantor’s presentation of the diagonalization procedure considers a set in which elements E = 
(x1, x2 , … , xn, …), where each xn = m or w. Cantor then proved that the set of all such elements 
was uncountable. He began by producing a countably infinite table of elements Eμ in terms of the 
following array in which aμ, ν is either m or w:  
 
E1 = (a11, a12, …, a1ν, …) 
E2 = (a21, a22, …, a2ν, …) 
  
Eμ = (aμ1, aμ2, …, aμν, …) 

 
 
Then Cantor defined a new series E0 of b1, b2, … bν, … where E0 was to be defined as a diagonal 
series on the array as having coordinates a11, a22, …, aμν, …. Each value bμν of E0 was to be m or 
w, determined so as not to equal the values of Eμ at aμν. Thus for whatever Eμ might be 
considered, E0 ≠ Eμ at the νth coordinate. As a consequence, the diagonalization series E0 proves 
that the set of all possible series of Eμ is uncountable. After proving this, Cantor immediately 
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extended the proof to apply to real numbers.
56
 (The diagonal proof is typically described as a 
proof by contradiction. According to this description, Cantor assumed (contrary to what was to 
be proved) that the totality of all possible series Eμ could be enumerated in a countable table, an 
assumption that was then proven false by the diagonalization.)  
To apply Cantor’s diagonal proof to the real numbers, it can be seen that every real number 
can be interpreted as an infinite binary sequence of zeroes and ones and then interpreted as a 
point in any real number interval, such as [0, 1). On this basis, the set of real numbers can be 
substituted into the place of the series of Eμ in the preceding discussion. Just as a diagonal series 
was defined there, proving the set to be uncountable, so too a diagonal can be defined across the 
set of real numbers. The diagonalization procedure can also be applied to base 10 or other 
systems. Cantor designated the countable infinity of natural and rational numbers as 0, and then 
demonstrated that the uncountable infinity of real numbers has cardinality 2 0

 (discussed 
below).  
To adapt Cantor’s diagonalization to the casino question, all that is needed is to substitute 
the strings of roulette outcomes into the place of real numbers in the preceding discussion 
(whether in binary or decimal form). Once this is done, a diagonal can be drawn across the 
roulette outcomes, just as Cantor did with the series of Eμ and the real numbers. The countable 
array of Eμ is referred to as the diagonal set, whereas the complete uncountable series is referred 
to as the anti-diagonal set. Cantor’s diagonal set, diagonalization, and anti-diagonal set provide a 
complete modeling of roulette outcome strings, their diagonalization and the anti-diagonal set of 
potential outcome strings. Thus a demonstration is given as to the disparity between the 
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countable infinity of the diagonal set of roulette outcomes on the casino floor and the anti-
diagonal set of the uncountable infinity of their total probability space.  
Note that the expressions “roulette outcomes” or “outcome strings” refer to the actual 
outcomes that result “on the casino floor.” The expression “potential outcome strings” refers to 
the set of all outcome possibilities as expressed mathematically within the probability measure 
space that measures the probabilities of the actual outcomes. The diagonal argument proves that 
there is not a 1-1 mapping between the diagonal set of outcome strings on the casino floor and 
the set of their potential outcomes strings within the anti-diagonal set of the measure space that 
pertains to the casino.  
Because of the finitist-infinitist controversy involving different conceptions of rational and 
irrational numbers, it will be helpful to differentiate these number systems in the most 
straightforward noncontroversial terms possible. Accordingly, rational numbers can be defined 
as having finite decimal expansions, except for those that repeat, and irrationals as having 
infinite decimal expansions. The 0 casino has been developed thus far as isomorphic to all real 
numbers, taking rational and irrational numbers together. In order to allow the casino discussion 
to represent natural, rational and irrational numbers as effectively as possible, the 0 casino can 
be modified to contain not only an infinite number of random devices each of which produces an 
infinite outcome string, but also to contain an infinite number of random devices each of which 
produces finite outcome strings of arbitrary length, including null activity. Diagonals can be 
drawn across finite outcome strings just as with infinite outcome strings. (The effect in either 
case is to point to a greater totality than previously defined.) With this supplementation, the 
probability space of the anti-diagonal set that pertains to the 0 casino is isomorphic to the real 
numbers. This probability space can also allow for partitions that are isomorphic to rational and 
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irrational numbers, whether of the [0, 1) interval or of the entire continuum (depending on the 
metric of the probability space).  
Though the casino question was initially framed in terms of roulette wheels, it can be 
extended to any sort of random event. For instance, the casino question can be restated in terms 
of tossing coins, though this would be a less familiar way to depict an idealized casino. This 
extension is not limited to random events involving replacement (such that the same event can 
occur repeatedly) but also to events involving non-replacement, such as games of cards. Thus by 
further extension, the casino discussion provides a comprehensive model by which random 
phenomena of all sorts can be understood in terms of countably infinite casino outcome strings, 
giving rise in turn to a diagonal procedure. Thus any sort of random phenomena can be treated 
by means of transfinite probability. The infinite construction of the casino question implies that 
there is no ultimate difference as to whether random events within the casino have chances of 1 
out of 38, 1 out of 6, 1 out of 52, etc. Accordingly, casino outcome strings can be normalized to 
binary or decimal expression and modeled within the probability space of the real interval [0, 1). 
The 0 casino designates this first transfinite casino, which is limited to 0 random devices each 
of which produces 0 outcomes.  
Once casino outcome strings are normalized within the probability space of the [0, 1) real 
interval, the question can be addressed as to whether the cardinality of potential outcome strings 
produced by the casino diagonalization is the same as of the cardinality of the real numbers of 
the [0, 1) interval, namely, 2 0

. The isomorphism between the anti-diagonal probability space of 
the 0 casino and the real numbers raises the question as to how exact is the isomorphism 
between the two. This question is particularly pressing in light of the continuum problem, in 
which it has not been determined whether the cardinality of points on the real continuum is the 
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first cardinal number to follow the cardinality of natural numbers or if some other cardinal 
number might intervene. That is, does 2 0
  
(the number of points on the continuum) equal 1 
(the first cardinal number after 0) or some other transfinite number? Because the isomorphism 
here involves extremely distinct species of mathematical entities (numbers vs. probabilities), it 
might be thought that the mere isomorphism of a diagonal on numbers and on probabilities is 
insufficient to guarantee that the resultant cardinalities are the same in each case. The logic of 
indeterminate probabilities might somehow be related to the indeterminacy of the continuum 
problem., implying that the diagonal on probabilistic outcome strings might not lead to any 
particular stable cardinality, or if so, that this cardinality might not be the same as what results 
from an isomorphic diagonal on numbers.  
 In comparing the isomorphism of the diagonals of transfinite numbers and of transfinite 
probability, it is immediately clear that both cases are closely connected to the power set 
function. This commonality owes to the significance this function plays within combinatorial 
analysis. The power set function of a set A is expressed as P(A), which equals 2
n
, where n equals 
the number of elements in A. The base number 2 in this expression represents bivalence (true or 
false, yes or no, 1 or 0), such that the exponent n signifies the number of times the bivalent 
number 2 is multiplied on itself, thereby yielding 2
n
. With respect to the set {a, b, c}, the power 
set function specifies that there are 2
3
 combinatorial selections from this set. The set of these 
selection possibilities is as follows: {∅, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}. Thus the 
power set function is of crucial significance to combinatorial analysis. When Cantor applied this 
combinatorial sense to set theory, he spoke of the power set of a given set A as the set of all 
subsets of A. Additionally, he showed through what is known as Cantor’s theorem (first 
presented in 1891) that the power set function can be extended to infinite sets (assuming infinite 
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sets are well ordered). In applying the power set function to the set N of natural numbers (where 
N has cardinality 0), the resultant 2 0
  
is an arithmetic expression referring to the cardinality of 
all combinatorial permutations of the natural numbers, namely, the set of all subsets of the 
natural numbers.
57
 In this way, Cantor’s diagonal procedure and power set function work 
coordinately with one another. Negatively, the diagonal procedure demonstrates that the set of all 
subsets of the natural numbers cannot be put into a 1-1 mapping with the natural numbers. 
Positively, the power set function shows that the cardinality implied by this diagonal is 2 0

. It is 
obvious that the combinatorial logic that applies to the natural numbers and to the power set of 
the natural numbers also applies to the casino discussion. The casino question considers the set 
of all possible outcomes from an infinite number of random devices in such a way as to imply 
that these possible outcomes do not have the same logical structure as countable infinity but as 
the power set of countable infinity. Thus not only is the probability space of the 0 casino 
isomorphic to Cantor’s discussion of real numbers with respect to diagonalization, but also with 
respect to the combinatorial logic of Cantor’s power set function as applied to infinite sets. Just 
as Cantor showed that the set of real numbers has cardinality 2 0
  
(wherein real numbers 
correspond to all the subsets of natural numbers), so too a casino of 0 randomized devices 
producing finite and 0 outcomes implies through combinatorial analysis a probability space of 
2 0
  
potential outcome strings. These 2 0
  
potential strings correspond to the set of all subsets of 
the natural numbers as pertaining to outcomes of randomized devices within the 0 casino.  
 The isomorphism between real numbers and the probability space of the 0 casino is not 
limited to the diagonal argument and power set function, but extends to an identity relation 
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between real numbers and potential outcome strings of the 0 casino. Not only do real numbers 
and potential outcome strings have the same cardinality of 
 
2 0

, but there exists a 1-1 mapping 
between real numbers of the [0, 1) interval and the anti-diagonal set of potential strings 
pertaining to the 0 casino. This bijection results from the fact that both real numbers and 
potential strings are defined in terms of permutations of the natural numbers – more specifically, 
in terms of the set of all 2 0

 subsets of natural numbers. This condition implies that any 
combinatorial string of natural numbers of either finite or 0 length satisfies the definition of 
being interpreted either as a real number or as a potential outcomes string from the 0 casino. 
The 1-1 mapping between real numbers and potential strings can thus be defined on the identity 
relation of combinatorial strings of natural numbers in which the mapping goes either from real 
numbers to potential outcome strings or from potential outcome strings to real numbers. The 
anti-diagonal set of potential strings pertaining to the diagonal set of the 0 casino produce an 
image of the real numbers of the [0, 1) interval, just as the real numbers of the [0, 1) interval 
produce an image of the anti-diagonal set of potential strings pertaining to the 0 casino.  
With the foregoing discussion in view, it is abundantly clear that the probability space of the 
0 casino does not consist of 0 potential outcome strings but of 2 0

potential outcome strings. 
Because Cantor’s transfinite arithmetic is well suited to retain infinitesimal values, there is no 
need to adopt the measure theoretic interpretation of classical probability with respect to 
vanishing magnitudes. With an acceptance of infinitesimals, Cantor’s transfinite theory answers 
the casino question quite differently from classical probability. According to transfinite terms, if 
0 roulette wheels are spun 0 times, the chance that at least one such roulette wheel will 
correspond exactly to a specified target string of 0 outcomes is equal to 0 out of 2 0

. If only 
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one roulette wheel is spun 0 times, the chance that it will perfectly match the specified target 
string is 1 out of 2 0

. Classical probability treats both of these probabilities as infinitesimals that 
vanish to zero, even though these values differ from one another by an infinite magnitude. Thus, 
regarding the findings of classical probability as imprecise, the present discussion elicits a theory 
of transfinite probability.  
 There are two obvious questions which present themselves at this point. One is to specify a 
measure space for the anti-diagonal set of the 0 casino, and the other is to consider whether 
transfinite probabilities exist with cardinalities beyond the 0 casino and its measure space. This 
presents a problem of the cart and the horse. A measure space as just considered can indeed be 
specified by means of the nonstandard analysis of Abraham Robinson (see below), though these 
resources would not remain sufficient for probabilities of succeeding transfinite casinos. The 
discussion here will thus proceed on an explorative basis, considering the general architectonic 
features of transfinite probability in informal terms. This consideration will encounter an 
escalating series of needs, each of which seeks fulfillment in a subsequent discussion. For 
instance, the measure space for a general theory of transfinite probability seeks expression in the 
theory of hypercomplex-transfinite numbers as presented in the following chapter. The present 
discussion thus does not attempt to finalize technical considerations as it goes along, but rather to 
conduct a study into the feasibility of the general plan. The same is to be said for the discussions 
below in chapters 5 and 6. The study, therefore, is an informal work in progress.  
 Consider now whether transfinite probability is restricted to initial values of 0 and 2 0

, or 
whether it admits of higher transfinite values. (For ease of expression, the continuum hypothesis 
will be adopted here, wherein 2 0

 = 1. The generalized continuum hypothesis will also be 
adopted for the same reason.) It is conceivable that the 0 casino might be followed by an 1 
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casino, and then again by an 2 casino, such that the theory of transfinite probability becomes 
housed within an infinite series of transfinite casinos. The 0 casino is the first casino, defined as 
containing 0 randomized devices, each producing 0 outcomes. The 0 casino also contains 
0 randomized devices that produce outcomes of arbitrary finite length, including null activity. 
It was shown that this 0 casino admits of a diagonalization, indicating that the probability space 
of the 0 casino consists of an anti-diagonal set of 2 0

 potential outcome strings, now referred 
to as 1 potential outcome strings. But according to the rules of casino management, 
probabilities of 1 cannot be wagered in the 0 casino, inasmuch that such a hyper-cardinality 
as 1 is inexpressible within the 0 casino. Thus the casino question itself cannot be wagered in 
the 0 casino but must be referred to the 1 casino, if such a casino can be adequately defined. 
The question thus arises as to whether a general procedure can be found for constructing an 
infinite series of transfinite casinos beyond the 0 casino. Indeed, an 1 casino and its 
subsequent anti-diagonal set can be produced if both the number of potential outcome strings and 
the length of these strings are increased to 1.
58
 Just as with the 0 casino, the 1 casino can be 
represented by two axes, each of which has a unit length of 1. Because the real number interval 
[0, 1) contains 2 0

 points (which by virtue of the continuum hypothesis equal 1), then such a 
representation of the 1 casino can be given by two perpendicular axes of real line segments, 
one axis representing the 1 casino potential outcome strings, and the other representing the 1 
potential outcomes on each string (i.e. the length of each string). The 1 casino as just defined is 
sufficient to express the anti-diagonal set of the 0 casino, but not merely because it contains 1 
strings but also in that it contains the full 1 length of each 1 string. From this perspective, the 
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0 casino is a twice-truncated form of the 1 casino. The 1 casino can thus be viewed as the 
pre-existing potentiality from which the 0 casino is actuated as a proper subset.
59
  
What then of progressing from the 1 casino to the 2 casino? Here a problem arises. 
According to standard analysis of the continuum, the cardinality of points in any line or line 
segment is 2 0

 and no more. As a consequence, the ease of drawing up the 0 and 1 casinos 
comes to an abrupt end with the 2 casino. It might be thought that construction of succeeding 
transfinite casinos can be accomplished only logically or abstractly but not geometrically, owing 
to the essential geometric nature of axes and the diagonalization procedure. The present 
discussion is thus compelled to contemplate abandoning its dependence on geometry. Yet there 
is a caveat here. Surreal number theory as developed by John Conway places the entire system of 
surreal-transfinite cardinal numbers along a single continuum,
60
 thereby allowing the extraction 
of any desired cardinality from within the surreal number continuum. Surreal numbers thus 
provide a basis for constructing the 2 casino and beyond. However, surreal number theory has 
never received appreciable acceptance toward interpreting scientific systems, especially quantum 
mechanics. At least on a preliminary basis, then, transfinite probability can proceed in reliance 
upon surreal number theory until finding support elsewhere. Because the theory of transfinite 
probability is presented here in conjunction with a theory of hypercomplex-transfinite (HT) 
numbers, it is claimed that transfinite probability can ultimately be modeled in terms of HT 
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numbers rather than of surreal numbers. The complete presentation of transfinite probability thus 
cannot be accomplished without the subsequent presentation of HT numbers.  
 With respect then to the 2 casino, surreal number theory provides for a perpendicular 
representation of two 2 axes that provide the basis of the diagonal set of the 2 casino. Surreal 
number theory allows further for drawing a diagonalization across these 2 axes, thus providing 
the anti-diagonal basis for the 3 casino. Note that in each casino, the diagonalization does not 
belong to the diagonal set of the originating casino but to the anti-diagonal set of the succeeding 
casino. In this way, the diagonalization of one casino becomes the baseline on which the 
succeeding casino is constructed. In keeping with this progression, the cardinality of points in the 
diagonalization exceeds the limit of the diagonal casino but is the same as the cardinality of 
points in the axes of the anti-diagonal casino.  
An iterative procedure is now available to construct an infinite series of transfinite casinos. 
Generally, the α casino can be defined as a transfinite casino admitting of two α axes, one of 
which represents the number of randomized devices in the casino, the other representing the 
number of potential outcomes of each device. For any α casino, a diagonalization can be 
produced such that an anti-diagonal set of potential outcome strings is indicated. This anti-
diagonal set contains the cardinality of probabilities pertaining to the α casino, though this 
cardinality cannot itself be expressed within the α casino. Thus the anti-diagonal set of the α 
casino seeks expression in and becomes the basis of the α + 1 casino. For every α casino, the 
α + 1 casino is the anti-diagonal casino (where 2 

 = α + 1). So too the β – 1 casino is a proper 
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subset of the β casino. Thus a procedure has been produced by which an infinite series of 
transfinite casinos can be generated. If GCH is assumed, 2 

 = β , 2 
  = γ, etc.
61
  
 It is important to note that the diagonalization procedures described here have a different 
force from that as employed by Cantor. Cantor’s diagonalization demonstrates simply that there 
is no possible mapping between the natural and real numbers; i.e., that any such supposed 
mapping is a pseudo-mapping. But the diagonalization procedures described here with reference 
to transfinite casinos allow for mappings on a ramified basis, specifying where particular 
mappings can and cannot be accomplished. This extended ramification is possible inasmuch that 
transfinite probability provides for a geometric representation of line segments with points of any 
surreal-transfinite cardinality. The diagonalization procedure can thus be defined in relation to 
the power set function such that the mapping disallowed through diagonalization is made 
possible through the ramified power set function. Cantor demonstrated that the total combinatorial 
possibilities of 0 natural numbers have a cardinality greater than 0, as shown by his diagonalization on the 
natural numbers, and yet this combinatorial set finds expression through the power set function within the real 
numbers, in which it is seen that the set of all subsets of the natural numbers have cardinality  2 0

. In the same 
way, the total combinatorial probability space of the 0 casino has a cardinality greater than the natural numbers, as 
shown by the diagonalization drawn on the 0 casino, and yet also has a cardinality of 2 0

, as specified by the 
power set function. Generally then, the total probability space pertaining to the α casino cannot be 
expressed within the α casino, as demonstrated by the diagonalization drawn on the α casino, but 
can be expressed by the power set function as applied to the α casino and leading to the α + 1 
casino. Cantor’s diagonalization effected a modus tollens; it showed that a 1-1 mapping does not 
exist between the natural and real numbers. But the same procedure in the present discussion 
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leads to a modus ponens, inasmuch that a constructive relation can be defined between the 
diagonalization procedure of geometry and the power set function of algebra. The 
diagonalization drawn in the α casino delimits the totality of that casino (modus tollens) but 
then gives rise to an anti-diagonal set of greater totality in the α + 1 casino (modus ponens). But 
more specifically, the diagonalization drawn on the α casino has α + 1 points, making it an 
appropriate baseline for the α + 1 casino. The geometric diagonalization function and the 
algebraic power set function are precisely coordinated to work in tandem with each other through 
a ramified zigzag
62
 theory in order to transition from the α casino to the α + 1 casino. The two 
functions form an iterative pair in that the α + 1 casino is the complement of the α casino.  
 
Transfinite Probability vs. Classical Probability 
In order to attempt to deal comprehensively with questions of infinity, classical probability 
has been defined in more specific terms than set theory and cardinality. As formulated by A. N. 
Kolmogorov in 1931, classical probability is often presented as if composed of two approaches, 
one of discrete phenomena and the other of continuous phenomena, though these two approaches 
are ultimately integrated under the single rubric of measure theory. Measure theory is defined on 
measure spaces of the real semi-interval [0, 1), and thus measure theory can appeal to the 
canonical ordering of numbers whereas set theory alone cannot. A discrete problem is one such 
as the probability of randomly selecting an even number from the set of all natural numbers. 
Classical probability treats discrete problems such as this in terms of statistical induction. 
Statistical induction shows that as the size of sample sets of random selections from the natural 
numbers becomes arbitrarily large, i.e., approaches infinity, the percentage of even numbers to 
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natural numbers approaches 0.5. (This question can be treated in terms of measure theory once 
the sample space is translated to measure spaces on the real line continuum.) A continuous 
problem asks such questions as: if randomly selecting a real number from the real semi-interval 
[0, 1), what is the probability that the selected number will be taken from the semi-interval [0, 
0.25)? Because the set {[0, .25), [.25, 1)} is both countable and measurable, and because the 
measure of the interval [0, 0.25) is one fourth the measure of [0, 1), it follows that classical 
probability describes the probability of a random selection from the real interval [0, 1) coming 
from the interval [0, 0.25) is 0.25. 
Theoretical problems begin to become evident within classical probability in the thesis of 
vanishing magnitudes, a thesis exemplified in both discrete and continuous contexts. As an 
example of the discrete, consider the probability of randomly selecting a particular natural 
number from the set of all natural numbers. Since there are infinitely many naturals, the 
probability of selecting any particular number would appear to be extremely small. But yet there 
should seemingly be some non-zero probability of selecting any particular natural number, 
inasmuch that no natural number seems an impossible result of a random selection. But such a 
value harkens to infinitesimals, and infinitesimals are not incorporated within the Wierstrass-
Dedekind conception of the real number continuum as adopted by measure theory and classical 
probability. Unlike natural numbers, rational numbers are dense, i.e. between any two rational 
numbers there exists another rational number. Yet although the rational numbers are dense, they 
are not sufficiently dense to form a continuum, as was first discovered to the alarm of the 
Pythagorean community. Unlike natural and rational numbers, irrational numbers aggregate into 
a measure space and are thus collectively measurable. Because natural and rational numbers are 
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not measurable (either individually or more particularly collectively), they fail the fundamental 
criterion of measure theory and are thus interpreted as vanishing magnitudes.  
As for a continuous example of vanishing magnitudes, if considering a random selection 
from the real interval [0, 1), classical probability maintains not only that the probability of 
selecting any particular rational number is zero, but that the probability of any of the infinitely 
many rational numbers being selected is also zero, i.e. that the randomly selected number cannot 
be rational but must be irrational, even though there are an infinite number of rational numbers 
within the interval. This example vividly illustrates the striking nature of the thesis of vanishing 
magnitudes in that the entire infinity of rational numbers within the [0, 1] interval is made to 
vanish from before the inspection of measure theory and classical probability. In the same way, 
classical probability interprets the probability of randomly selecting any particular irrational 
number from the [0,1) interval as a vanishing magnitude with probability zero.
63
  
Because the real line continuum contains the natural, rational and irrational numbers, it 
bridges the gulf between two types of infinity, the countable infinity of natural and rational 
numbers, and the uncountable infinity of irrational numbers.  Inasmuch that the countable 
infinity of natural and rational numbers is dwarfed by the uncountable infinity of the irrationals, 
it is appropriate at least in some sense to regard the irrationals as the most prominent portion of 
the continuum. But, as broadly conceived, this would not seem to justify the conclusion that the 
other constitutive elements of the continuum are to be counted as nothing.  
The existence of competing models of the continuum whereby a point can be interpreted as 
either a nothing or a something has been a prominent feature of mathematical history. Zeno of 
Elea began this chapter of thought by arguing that conceptions of the point are fundamentally 
paradoxical. One view holds that a point is equivalent to a process of infinite division, as if by a 
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transcendent action or supertask, a view that lends itself to a Platonist understanding. Another 
view is that a point is only an abstract entity, the asymptotic conclusion of a process that is 
ongoing but never completed. This view of the limit is found in Aristotle. This something-
nothing controversy has been especially acute in considering whether the continuum is built up 
of points as if built up of somethings or if the continuum is built up of points as if built up of 
nothings. Archimedes was an interesting figure in this debate. He agreed with Aristotle that 
points are only limits but found himself going against this view when he intuitively apprehending 
infinitesimals in solving problems of parabolas.  
 The infinitesimal calculus of Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, introduced during the 
second half of the seventeenth century, allowed for unprecedented achievements in physics, but 
was also met with deep suspicion from such critics as George Berkeley in that it presented 
infinitesimals in a contradictory fashion as both infinitely small and equal to zero. Despite their 
initial unrefined character, Leibniz believed that infinitesimals could be consistently integrated 
into a more general framework, even as imaginary numbers (originally viewed as contradictory) 
had been incorporated into a rigorous theory of complex numbers. His inability to develop such a 
systematic treatment for infinitesimals prompted him to characterize the problem of points and 
real line continuum as a “labyrinth of the mind.” While Leibniz continued to believe that the 
foundations of calculus should rest on infinitesimals, Newton vacillated between defining 
calculus in terms of infinitesimals or in terms of limits.  
 In the nineteenth century, calculus came to be so rigorously and satisfactorily defined in 
terms of limits by Augustin Cauchy and Karl Wierstrass that there seemed little reason to 
countenance infinitesimals, although Cauchy himself continued to accept infinitesimals, not as 
numbers but as variables. With the ascendance of the Wierstrass-Dedekind continuum, 
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infinitesimals were once again effectively banished from mathematics, except that it still 
remained unclear whether a theory of limits was sufficient for all questions of points and the 
continuum. But during the late nineteenth century, Cantor developed his highly celebrated theory 
of transfinite numbers that depicts an infinite hierarchy of increasing orders of infinity, a theory 
whose definitions and assumptions are directly dependent on the concept of actual infinity. 
Inasmuch that Cantor described actual infinity in terms of the very large, it was possible that 
someone else might define actual infinity in terms of the very small. Abraham Robinson 
accomplished this task in 1966, analyzing the continuum in terms of infinitesimals. In doing so, 
Robinson vindicated Leibniz’s aspirations for a general theory that rendered infinitesimals 
intelligible. Though controversies endure as to whether actual infinity should be understood in 
realist terms (as believed by Cantor) or in nominalist terms (as believed by Robinson), it has 
become recognized that there are now two consistent and viable interpretations of the continuum, 
the continuum of limits as per Wierstrass and Dedekind known as standard analysis, and the 
continuum of infinitesimals as per Robinson known as nonstandard analysis.  
 Acceptance of Robinson’s nonstandard analysis has been strangely mixed. It has been 
enthusiastically endorsed by many mathematicians and yet marginalized by the status quo. 
Reference to Robinson’s theory as “nonstandard” does not suggest an ancillary standing to 
standard analysis, but points rather to Robinson’s theoretical indebtedness to Thoralf Skolem’s 
proof of 1934, which describes a nonstandard interpretation of arithmetic. In fact, 
mathematicians familiar with nonstandard analysis generally regard it as superior to standard 
analysis. Speaking after Robinson at the Institute for Advanced Study in 1973, Kurt Gödel 
described Robinson’s theory as “the analysis of the future.” Gödel remarked as follows:  
I would like to point out a fact that was not explicitly mentioned by Professor 
Robinson, but seems quite important to me; namely that non-standard analysis 
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frequently simplifies substantially the proofs, not only of elementary theorems, 
but also of deep results.  This is true, e.g., also for the proof of the existence of 
invariant subspaces for compact operators, disregarding the improvement of the 
result; and it is true in an even higher degree in other cases.  This state of affairs 
should prevent a rather common misinterpretation of non-standard analysis, 
namely the idea that it is some kind of extravagance or fad of mathematical 
logicians.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  Rather there are good reasons 
to believe that non-standard analysis, in some version or other, will be the 
analysis of the future. 
One reason is the just mentioned simplification of proofs, since simplification 
facilitates discovery.  Another, even more convincing reason, is the following: 
Arithmetic starts with the integers and proceeds by successively enlarging the 
number system by rational and negative numbers, irrational numbers, etc.  But the 
next quite natural step after the reals, namely the introduction of infinitesimals, 
has simply been omitted.  I think in coming centuries it will be considered a great 
oddity in the history of mathematics that the first exact theory of infinitesimals 
was developed 300 years after the invention of the differential calculus.
64
  
 
 Contrary, then, to the beliefs of the founders of classical probability (individuals such as A. 
N. Kolmogorov, Émile Borel and Henri Lebesgue, who published their principal works during 
the first third of the twentieth century), there can be no presumption as to the truthfulness of 
standard analysis, and thus the possibility arises from nonstandard analysis that points of the 
continuum are better described as somethings rather than nothings, a possibility that imperils the 
veracity of classical probability. The pivotal issue is that where standard analysis defines points 
as vanishing to nothings, nonstandard analysis defines points as somethings. The focus of the 
present discussion thus becomes a comparison of the nonexistence claims of standard analysis 
and classical probability versus the existence claims of nonstandard analysis and transfinite 
probability.  
 To understand better how the historical development of number systems is inverted by 
classical probability, consider how various species of numbers or points on the continuum have 
been generally understood apart from claims of classical probability. It is the natural numbers, 
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together with their finite complications into rational numbers, that have been viewed as the most 
rudimentary and accessible portion of the continuum. The irrational numbers, because of their 
infinite decimal expansions, have been regarded as more remote and, in some sense, non-
constructive. Insofar then as mathematics has been taken to be a foundationalist endeavor, the 
natural and rational numbers rank among the most fundamental of objects, objects formulated 
within primitive finite intuition, but which come to be surrounded on the continuum by the 
infinitely-based irrational numbers. Thus due to the infinite construction required for each 
irrational number, it is irrational numbers that strain the limits of mathematical existence, and not 
the naturals or rationals. Unlike the vast majority of mathematicians who have no qualms in 
accepting actual infinity, finitists insist that all mathematics must be defined in terms of finite 
construction, and thus they are driven to understand the decimal expansion of irrational numbers 
as only potentially infinite, and the cardinality of all infinite sets as infinite in only an 
indeterminate sense. Thus the finitist seeks to supplant the standing of actual infinity as 
traditionally conceived within the decimal expansions of irrational numbers in favor of what 
must be somehow construed as finite and humanly constructive.
65
 As the leading nineteenth-
century finitist Leopold Kronecker famously declared, “God made the integers; all else is the 
work of man.” Though finitists and infinitists disagree as to the legitimacy of actual infinity, they 
agree that, insofar as numbers are constructed from out of the null set, construction of the 
continuum begins straightforwardly with the naturals, continues in the same way with the 
rationals, but then concludes somewhat mysteriously with the irrationals. That is, despite other 
disagreements, finitists, infinitists and the bulk of mathematical history generally agree that 
natural and rational numbers are more primitive than irrational numbers, are in some sense 
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logically prior to them, and that it is irrational numbers that are not only the most elusive 
ingredients of the continuum, but are chiefly responsible for its controversial nature. As set 
within this context, the disregard of classical probability toward natural and rational numbers via 
the description of vanishing magnitudes comprises what must be considered a radical departure 
from previous thought.  
 In mathematical contexts, then, other than classical probability and measure theory, natural 
and rational numbers constitute such a fundamental and accessible portion of the continuum that 
it would be unthinkable to describe them as at once having an infinite cardinality and also as 
vanishing to nonexistence. Yet because classical probability is defined in terms of a particular 
emphasis on measure theory, it produces this sort of strange equivocation. Whereas the argument 
above stressed that classical probability employs a particular interpretation of measure theory, 
even though current evidence suggests a rival interpretation is superior, the current argument 
asserts that, even if nonstandard analysis is removed from consideration, measure theory as 
based on standard analysis could never be regarded as a sufficient basis for a satisfactory theory 
of probability. The concern here is the advisability of defining probability wholly in terms of a 
single criterion, and whether that criterion is sufficient for appropriate expectations for a science 
of probability. That is, should the fact that natural and rational numbers vanish from the 
continuum in a particular measure theoretic sense be taken as evidence to suggest that they 
vanish from the continuum in a more general sense so as to have a zero probability of random 
selection from within the continuum? The best evidence of mathematical history and current 
understanding suggest not.  
Because of its complicated structure, the continuum has historically demanded a number of 
criteria by which its heterogeneous elements are described. Viewed constructively, the 
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continuum begins with the naturals, proceeds through the rationals, and concludes with the 
irrationals and then infinitesimals. Viewed by cardinality, the continuum is dominated by the 
uncountable infinity of irrationals and infinitesimals, but also populated by the countable infinity 
of naturals and rationals. Viewed by the measure theory of standard analysis, natural and rational 
numbers are totally insubstantial, while only irrational numbers are sufficient to aggregate into 
measurable units. The chief fault of classical probability is that it privileges and gives exclusive 
reliance to a partial criterion as if it were sufficient to take full inventory of the continuum, while 
in fact there are other criteria that offer their own distinct contributions toward development of 
the continuum. Even if the standard analytic interpretation of measure theory were not rivaled by 
nonstandard analysis, it would fail to give a comprehensive description of the continuum. In 
maintaining that any one of the infinity of rational numbers within the [0, 1) interval has no 
greater probability of selection than numbers that do not even exist within the interval, classical 
probability manifests what might be considered not only an imprecision but a significant 
incoherence. If numbers exist within a domain, then it follows that it is possible for them to exist 
within that domain, since existence implies an unimpeded condition of possibility. Yet classical 
probability impedes such possibilities by describing rational numbers within the [0, 1) interval 
with the same zero probability (or impossibility) as numbers that do not exist within the interval, 
the latter numbers being truly impossible to be selected as if from within the interval. 
Classical probability reflects the belief that, if the physical universe is populated only by 
countably many objects, then the probability space of its interrelated possibilities must also be 
countable. Then out of recognition that the abstract entities of real numbers are uncountable, 
classical probability attempts to portray a comprehensive stance toward infinity, first by 
straddling uncountable and countable infinities, then by deflating uncountable infinity by 
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emptying it of its positive significance, and finally by rendering all calculations within finitist 
terms. Classical probability speaks the language of uncountable infinity, but then sloughs off 
implications of uncountable infinity as can be accepted only by finitist philosophy. It is a 
historical oddity that finitists have been so marginalized by mainstream thought with respect to 
number theory but yet achieved such extreme prominence with respect to probability. If the 
finitist program of classical probability is not already discredited for the sake of vanishing 
magnitudes, then it should clearly be so by reason of the casino discussion. Transfinite 
probability implies that classical probability fails to respond satisfactorily to relevant questions 
of infinity. Though the chief analog to the casino discussion is Cantor’s diagonalization 
procedure, it can also be seen that the casino discussion stands in the same relation to classical 
probability as irrational numbers to the Pythagorean doctrine of discrete magnitudes.  
 One additional point should be made by way of differentiating transfinite probability from 
classical probability. Classical probability is predicated on the assumption of unitary total 
probability. This means that the measure spaces of the probability space add up to a total 
probability of 1. This condition is certainly true in many empirical cases, but the assumption fails 
in transfinite probability. It is incorrect to say within transfinite probability that as the sample 
sets become arbitrarily large, the total probability space converges to 1 (where 1 is the totality of 
all probabilities). The diagonalization procedure, as applied within the transfinite casinos, 
demonstrates that there is a hard distinction to be made between empirical activities and the 
totality of all probabilities. Probabilistic activities are observable within the diagonal set but the 
total probability pertaining to that set is expressible only within the anti-diagonal set. Transfinite 
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probability argues that there is a fundamental disconnect between the logic of finite sets and of 
infinite sets.
66
  
 In addition to conforming to the basic parameters of a non-classical probability theory, 
transfinite probability is intended as falling within the bourgeoning class of quantum 
probabilities. One advocate of quantum probability characterizes the relationship of classical 
probability and quantum probability as follows:  
Recent results suggest that quantum mechanical phenomena may be interpreted as 
a failure of standard probability theory and may be described by a Bayesian 
complex probability theory…. So why is there any reason to doubt probability 
theory? Here I think that there is a historical effect: probability theory may 
actually be failing all the time, it's just that the situations where a failure occurs 
are called “quantum mechanical phenomena” and thus appear in physics 
conferences instead of in probability theory conferences. This suggests that 
perhaps there is something wrong with probability theory after all, and that this 
may be where quantum mechanical effects come from.
67
  
 
Karl Popper also argues for a reformulation of probability and quantum mechanics. He writes, 
“The solution of the problem of interpreting probability theory is fundamental for the 
interpretation of quantum theory; for quantum theory is a probabilistic theory.”68 Stanley Gudder 
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agrees that the commonplace view of quantum uncertainty and statistical induction “does more 
harm than good,” and that what is needed is a ramping up of mathematical rigor.69  
 
Transfinite Probability and Geometry 
 Since the time of Descartes, algebra and geometry have been understood as different aspects 
of a single unified system of analytic geometry. Algebraic equations can be expressed 
geometrically, and so also geometrical graphs can be expressed algebraically. In the same vein, 
the algebraic expressions of classical probability are represented geometrically. This is the 
process by which standard analysis of the continuum provides a measure space for classical 
probability. From such a perspective, the potential failure of expressing transfinite probability in 
geometric terms (with scientific rigor) poses a significant shortcoming. But transfinite 
probability is not the first occasion of confronting such an impasse. Cantor himself experienced 
this same failure in regard to his transfinite theory. When Cantor devised his theory of transfinite 
numbers, he sundered the senses of cardinality and ordinality so fundamentally as to produce two 
distinct sets of infinite numbers: the transfinite cardinal numbers (0, 1, 2, etc.) and the 
transfinite ordinal numbers (0, 1, 2, etc.). The frustration experienced by Cantor was that 
after prying apart the tightly-connected senses of cardinality and ordinality, he was unable to 
reintegrate the two in a significant way. In taking the power set of 0, he was faced with 2 0

, 
but exactly what transfinite value is that? As 2
3
 reduces to 8, Cantor wanted to show that 2 0

 
reduces to 1, though he had no means to do so. As far as Cantor knew, 2 0

 might just as well 
equal 2 or 3, or some other transfinite value. The ordering of the cardinal numbers in this 
sense eluded him. This problem was particularly acute in that not only did it reflect a failing of 
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transfinite arithmetic, but it entailed the inability to resolve such a fundamental question as to the 
number of points on the real continuum. The Cartesian unification of algebra and geometry was 
thus falling apart.  
As a result of Cantor’s inability to solve the continuum problem, he advanced the hypothesis 
that 2 0

 (the number of points on the real continuum) equals 1, that is, that the cardinality of 
points on the real continuum is the next cardinal number to follow 0. This claim became known 
as the continuum hypothesis (CH)
70
 It has been a flash point of controversy ever since. Kurt 
Gödel proved in 1938 that, given ZF set theory, it is impossible to disprove CH. Conversely, 
Paul Cohen proved in 1963, again in reference to ZF set theory, that CH can never be proven true 
(it is safe to reject CH without being contradicted by ZF). As a consequence of these opposing 
results, CH has come to be described as undecidable; that is, the truth or falsity of CH is 
independent of the axioms of ZF set theory. So too, the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) 
is undecidable. GCH states the general formula that 2 

 = β, that is, that 2 0

 = 1, 2 1

 = 2, 
etc. But even further, the axiom of choice (AC) has also been shown to be independent of ZF. 
This is particularly troublesome for Cantor, since AC lies at the heart of his theory.
71
 In addition 
to these issues of undecidability, transfinite theory introduces two paradoxes of totality, the 
Burali-Forti paradox relating to the ordinal theory and Cantor’s paradox relating to the cardinal 
theory.
72
 In all then, Cantor’s transfinite theory is widely accepted within mainstream 
mathematics, and yet is made dubious because of theoretical problems extending from its 
founding assumptions to its superstructure.  
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 It may seem initially, then, that the pursuit of transfinite probability is destined to suffer 
certain inevitable difficulties inherited from Cantor’s original theory. The inability to provide a 
geometric model for transfinite probability would entail the inability of providing a model for 
transfinite measure space. But the situation is quite different, due to the fact that the theory of 
transfinite probability as advanced here is presented in tandem with a theory of hypercomplex-
transfinite (HT) numbers. Consequently, the proposal here is that the theory of transfinite 
probability can achieve geometric representation by means of HT number theory. HT numbers 
will be discussed in the following chapter. After that, the ensuing discussion will address issues 
of transfinite probability and HT numbers jointly.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
HYPERCOMPLEX-TRANSFINITE NUMBERS 
 
In considering the progression of number systems from natural numbers to integers, rationals, 
irrationals and then to complex numbers, William Rowan Hamilton wondered whether the 
complex numbers represented the culmination of the development of number systems. If the one-
dimensional real number line could be extended into a two-dimensional complex plane, he 
thought, why could not the complex plane be extended into further dimensions as well? Driven 
by the confidence this ought to be so, he explored the possibility of three-dimensional numbers, 
though without success. But then in 1843, he discovered he could produce an algebra for a four-
dimensional number system. He named these numbers quaternions. This discovery was made 
possible when Hamilton realized he must abrogate the commutative law of multiplication, 
namely, a  b = b  a.73 The development of quaternions made Hamilton the discoverer of 
hypercomplex numbers. The next hypercomplex system to be discovered was the octonions, a 
discovery made independently by John T. Graves and Arthur Cayley. The eight-dimensional 
octonions require the abrogation not only of the commutative law of multiplication but also the 
associative law of addition, namely, a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c. It was then discovered that an 
infinite series of hypercomplex systems can be defined that follow the pattern of dimension 
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doubling, and thus hypercomplex numbers can be found in 4, 8, 16, 32 dimensions, and on to 
infinity. It was also discovered that, subsequent to the octonions, no hypercomplex system offers 
a normed division. Within systems of normed division, the quotient of two non-zero numbers 
cannot equal zero.
74
  
As stand-alone systems, both hypercomplex and transfinite numbers exhibit not only 
structural gaps but brute givens that seem to defy penetrating analysis. But as proposed below, 
when set alongside one another and interconnected in a particular way, these systems dovetail so 
as to fill out what is missing in the other. These systems can be thought of as two tables of 
information, each of which is torn and incomplete, but when put together can be read across as 
one intelligible whole. The project at hand is thus to sketch out a unified hypercomplex-
transfinite (HT) number system and to consider various implications that follow.  
 It is clear that hypercomplex and transfinite numbers can be discussed separately. The 
question here is how they might be discussed jointly. Because both systems originate with 
elementary concepts of number, arising from considerations of natural, rational and irrational 
numbers, such a basis of comparison is possible. Figure 1 offers such a comparison.  
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Figure 1: THE HYPERCOMPLEX-TRANSFINITE ASSUMPTION 
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Notice several features about this table. First, much of the table is incomplete. The data 
shown here is limited to what is commonly recognized as pertaining to both systems, prior to any 
theorizing done here. Second, columns three and four are those that apply directly to 
hypercomplex numbers (including the real and complex numbers as their precursors). The two 
extreme columns on either side (first and second, sixth and seventh) are taken directly from 
Cantor’s work on transfinite numbers. These column headings (Number Class, First Principle of 
Generation, Second Principle of Generation, and Third Principle – Principle of Limitation) are 
Cantor’s own terms.75 The fifth column (Cardinality) is neutral, applying equally well to 
hypercomplex and transfinite numbers. Such is the basic layout of the table.  
Importantly, the commitment to provide information within Figure 1 as corresponding to 
both hypercomplex and transfinite numbers prevents the inclusion of information which might be 
singularly applied to one number system or the other. There is no question, for instance, that 
columns one and two, six and seven, are to be completed according to the ordinal sequence of 
numbers, as per transfinite theory. However, this information is omitted from the table because it 
cannot be put down as corresponding to columns three and four as regarding the standard 
analysis of complex and hypercomplex numbers. Likewise, column five might be thought, by 
relation to column four, to be filled out by the value 2
0
 (which accords with the standard 
analysis of complex and hypercomplex numbers), except that this information would conflict 
with what is omitted in the table from the Cantorian columns. Notice also that the inability to 
offer a final disposition to the second row of the Cardinality column by relating it to any other 
column in the table gives expression to the continuum problem.  
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Figure 2: HYPERCOMPLEX-TRANSFINITE NUMBERS 
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The question arises as to what pattern or sense, if any, might be contained within Figure 1. 
Does the fragmentary data provided here allow the missing information to be supplied in such a 
way as to extend beyond existing theory? That is, does the data provide a basis for combining 
hypercomplex and transfinite numbers synthetically in a way that is not possible analytically 
from within either number system itself? Figure 2 suggests that such unification is possible.  
 Several points can be made concerning the details of Figure 2. First, the HT table should be 
viewed as an electronic spreadsheet wherein each cell is calculated by functions relating to other 
values in the table. Not only should these functions be evaluated by specific results but also in 
terms of the relationships they imply between different columns of the table, and as to whether 
these relations reflect a significant rationale for HT theory. Various columns in the table relate to 
other columns that come before and after. As column three takes input from column two and 
calculates its operation in finite terms, so column five takes input from column two and 
calculates its operation in transfinite terms as specified by column six. More specifically, the 
third column expresses the function 2
n
 = d (where d signifies dimensionality) and where n is read 
from the discriminant in the second column (the first principle of generation). Similarly, the fifth 
column expresses the same 2
n
 function, though within a transfinite context, suggesting that the 
common 2
n
 function be expressed more appropriately as the 2
x
 function. With reference then to 
the fifth column, this column expresses the transfinite function 2
x
 = c (where c signifies 
cardinality) where x is read from the discriminant in the second column (the first principle of 
generation), whereupon the cardinality 2 x

 is calculated by reading x in connection with the 
discriminant in the sixth column (the second principle of generation).  
Second, attention should be directed most critically to the center three columns of the table. 
Here it is that the fundamental proposal for the HT numbers finds beginning. The initial 
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assumption of HT theory is that every number system of column four be defined such that the 
dual conceptions of dimensionality and cardinality are both defined through a unified covariant 
2
x
 function, wherein the parameters of dimensionality and cardinality receive the same input but 
calculate their output on different scales so as to produce different results. Dimensionality is 
calculated through the 2
x
 function in finite terms, and cardinality is calculated through the 2
x
 
function in transfinite terms. As for dimensionality, the 2
x
 function reads the value x from the 
first principle of generation (column two) and produces a finite result that doubles at each level. 
The finite results of column four are 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc. Likewise, the cardinality column reads the 
value x from the first principle of generation (column two), but because this value becomes 
subscripted to a transfinite number 2 x

, the cardinality value is calculated not in finite terms but 
by taking the subscripted value from the second principle of generation (column six). The 
transfinite results of the 2
x
 function as relating to cardinality (column five) are thus 0, 1, 2, 
3, etc. Because the first and second principles of generation are coupled to both dimensionality 
and cardinality through the 2
x
 function, they serve to establish the bounds for each number 
system. The first principle of generation establishes the floor and the second principle the ceiling 
for each domain. (The first principle is one of beginning, the second of delimitation, and the third 
of recursion or ramification.) For example, HT complex numbers are defined by this table as 
two-dimensional numbers whose elements have cardinality 2, quaternions as four-dimensional 
numbers whose elements have cardinality 3, etc. The assertion here is that 2
x
 is a general, 
archetypal function which operates to produce both the dimensionality and cardinality of each 
number system in such a way as to forge a unity between hypercomplex and transfinite numbers. 
To restate in brief, the proposal here is that the 2
x
 function is the generative force which produces 
and unifies number systems with respect to dimensionality and cardinality. This function 
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receives the same input for each of these parameters (taken from the first principle of generation) 
but in applying the same function to different parameters, the 2
x
 function yields diverse results, 
depending on which side of infinity a calculation is made; depending on whether x is finite so as 
to be calculated by elementary algebra under the first principle of generation and thus doubled, 
or infinite so as to be calculated (as defined by the HT table) with reference to the second 
principle of generation, and thus sequenced.  
Third, it can be judged that the HT table is sufficiently textured and nuanced so as to avoid 
the appearance of superficiality. One way to observe this is to notice that the natural, rational and 
real numbers are all designated as one-dimensional number systems, but the real numbers are 
designated not in Cantor’s first number class but the second. Likewise, the distinction between 
the numbers of the first two columns is suggestive of subtleties within the table. Additional 
complications such as these will become apparent as the discussion proceeds. Evidence such as 
this serves to rebut potential criticism that the table is simplistic.  
 Fourth, in reviewing the question of hypercomplex dimension doubling in the light of the 
HT table, the dimensional gaps that previously seemed inexplicable now appear explained by the 
accompanying sequential increases of transfinite cardinality. Thus the HT numbers seem to fill in 
missing data of the hypercomplex numbers. Likewise, insofar as the transfinite numbers have 
never been given geometric interpretation, they have lacked a geometric model by which they 
can either be visualized or connected to the rest of the mathematical superstructure. Their 
connection to the hypercomplex numbers overcomes this shortcoming. Thus the HT numbers 
offer a means by which the hypercomplex and transfinite numbers can be made more intelligible, 
adding support to the claim that they constitute a single, unified system.  
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 Fifth, the HT table does not assume the continuum hypothesis, even though the statement 2
0  = 1 is made in the second row; similarly for GCH. These statements appear in the HT table 
not as assumptions but because they result from within the logical relations within the HT table 
(Figure 2) as described below in relation to the HT power set function. These relations are 
predicated on the HT assumption that the 2
x
 function forges a unification of hypercomplex and 
transfinite numbers with respect to dimensionality and cardinality and other related terms in the 
HT table. The HT assumption is not axiomatic, in the rich sense that it represents a clear and 
distinct idea, but is quasi-empirical, and thus looks to its results for confirmation. The possibility 
of this quasi-empirical assumption presents itself in terms of the dimensionality of the natural, 
rational, real, complex and hypercomplex number systems and in terms of the cardinality of the 
natural, rational and real number systems. These are the details that are included within Figure 1, 
and then it is also within Figure 1 that the HT assumption is made. The data filled in within 
Figure 2 (beyond what is in Figure 1) is what results from having made the HT assumption in 
Figure 1. Therefore, it can be seen that HT theory implies both CH and GCH, but does not 
assume either. Because GCH implies AC, HT implies both GCH and AC. Throughout the 
remainder of this study, the truthfulness of GCH and AC will be affirmed, though not by 
assuming either, but because they are entailed by HT theory.  
 Sixth, as seen from the point of view of standard analysis of the complex and hypercomplex 
numbers, HT theory might seem to advance an enriched claim that runs afoul of existing theory. 
The HT table claims that there are 1 points on the real number line, 2 in the HT complex 
plane, 3 HT quaternions, etc. Standard analysis holds that real, complex and hypercomplex 
systems are all limited to 2
0
 (1) numbers. What is to be made of this disparity? Mathematics 
is full of varying systems whose theorems are incompatible with one another, such as Euclidean 
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vs. non-Euclidean geometries. There is therefore no difficulty in recognizing one complex and 
hypercomplex system for standard analysis and another for HT theory. Standard analysis has 
demonstrated that a 1-1 mapping exists between points of the real continuum and the complex 
plane, thereby implying that real and complex numbers have the same cardinality. HT theory 
offers no challenge to mappings such as this, although it questions whether such a mapping is 
solely determinative as to whether additional criteria might be considered.  
Seventh, as to a more substantive comparison between standard analysis and HT theory as to 
the discrepancy just discussed, what explanation can be given for the extra points supplied by HT 
theory? How are these extra points to be described? The only (visible) access to the HT plane is 
that provided by the x and y axes. Since each axis has points of cardinality 1, then inasmuch as 
the HT plane is understood as a cross-product of these axes, there appears to be only 1 points in 
the HT plane. In fact, insofar as points are held to be accessible to polynomial equations, HT 
theory agrees with standard analysis that there are only 1 accessible points within the HT plane. 
But since a fundamental claim of HT theory is that there can be distinguished two senses by 
which points are said to be in the plane, one by which points are made to populate the plane and 
another by which some or all of these points become accessible to direct inspection, it can be 
thought that more points are put into the plane than what can be treated in terms of a cross-
product of the x and y axes. That is, because HT theory defines numbers by a dual aspect of both 
cardinality and dimensionality, the interpretation is possible that the covariant HT function of 
cardinality and dimensionality puts the materiality of 2 points into the plane, while the 
dimensionality of the system allows only 1 of them to become accessible in polynomial terms. 
With respect to polynomial equations, de re knowledge is possible for 1 points in the HT 
complex plane, though de dicto knowledge of 2 points in the HT complex plane is possible by 
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means of the HT table. HT theory thus advances a theory of inaccessible numbers.
76
 Note that 
the question here is not treated strictly in analytic terms. It may be thought that if the plane is 
simply the cross-product of two 1 axes, then the plane is obviously a closed quadratic field with 
1 points. But HT theory considers the question both synthetically and analytically, and thus 
conceives of the HT complex plane as more than simply a closed quadratic field.  
Eighth, HT theory is highly compatible with surreal number theory. Surreal theory is 
peculiar in that it places the entire series of infinite cardinal numbers on a single continuum. 
Surreal theory is also distinctive in that it defines numbers geometrically in terms of left and 
right. Thus by treating infinite numbers within fundamental terms of dimensionality and 
cardinality, HT and surreal theory speak the same language. The chief difference between the 
two is that HT theory defines each infinite cardinal number system within its own dimensional 
space, whereas surreal theory makes them all cohabit on a single horizontal continuum. For these 
reasons, a synthesis of HT and surreal theory into a unified hypercomplex-transfinite-surreal 
(HTS) number theory can be easily realized, chiefly by relocating surreal cardinalities greater 
than 1 from the surreal continuum so as to be distributed iteratively throughout HT 
dimensions.
77
  
Ninth, it can be seen that novelties introduced within HT theory do more to 
maintain patterns of symmetry with elementary number systems than to break 
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pattern with them. Consider the progression of elementary and HT number systems 
with respect to their decimal expansions as presented below.  
 Numbers  Decimal Expansion 
 Naturals   0 
 Rationals   >0 and 0 (0 if repeating) 
 Irrationals    0 
 HT Complex   1 
HT Quaternions   2 
 
      
 
 
This table shows that HT numbers complete a pattern begun by elementary number systems.
78
 
But what does it mean for HT numbers to have decimal expansions of length 1 and longer? Are 
not HT complex numbers two-dimensional, HT quaternions four-dimensional, etc.? This 
situation seems to reflect a certain freedom of expression wherein HT numbers can be conceived 
of either in linear or multidimensional terms. This freedom of expression is particularly 
convenient in that a synthesis of HT and surreal numbers was just proposed. Whereas HT 
numbers are characteristically expressed in multi-dimensional terms, surreal numbers are 
expressed in linear terms. It is therefore natural to think that a unified HTS system would have 
the freedom to express numbers by either method. This freedom of expression resembles the fact 
that rational numbers can be written either in linear decimal form or as fractions. So too, natural 
numbers can be written whole or as fractions. Thus the freedom of expression wherein HT/HTS 
numbers can be written in linear or in multidimensional terms is not unprecedented. Rather, such 
a linear or sequential ordering is exactly what would be expected if a well-ordering of HT 
numbers is thought to exist, as is true under AC.  
Tenth, the expanded sense of HT numbers as conceived in linear terms offers a constructive 
explanation of why there are more points in the HT complex plane than in the standard complex 
                                                 
78 
 The values here are not to be confused with the cardinality of each number system. The values are different 
in each case. The decimal expansion is smaller than the cardinality for each number system.  
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plane, and so too for succeeding HT systems, as compared to their hypercomplex counterparts. 
Unlike the standard complex plane, the HT complex plane is not a closed quadratic field. HT 
theory holds that surds exist within the HT plane relative to the cross product of real and 
imaginary numbers, just as irrational surds exist within the real number system relative to 
rational numbers. Moreover, just as the real number continuum contains transcendental numbers 
which cannot be captured within algebraic terms, so the HT plane contains transcendental 
numbers which cannot be expressed in polynomial terms. If HT theory be thought deviant or 
contradictory for reason of having 2 points in the HT complex plane, it can be noted that 
surreal theory is even “worse” in that surreal theory constructs all infinite cardinal numbers on a 
single dimension.  
Eleventh, the surds in HT numbers would seem to require that the cardinality of Dedekind 
cuts
79
 be iterated so as to allow 1 cuts in the real line, 2 cuts in the HT complex plane, 3 cuts 
in HT quaternions, etc. However, the literal sense of cut loses its meaning when extended thus 
beyond the real number line, the literal constructive sense of cuts giving way to mathematical 
impenetrability. Borrowing then from surreal number theory (as to “days of creation”), it can be 
said that 1 HT/HTS cuts are made on the 1 day of creation, 2 cuts on the 2 day of creation, 
etc. But insofar as the HT plane consists of both a real and imaginary axis, HT theory in 
particular can define a logical construction as occurring in imaginary time that breaks away from 
the “arrow of time” as canonically modeled by the real number line. HTS cuts can thus be 
understood as constructed in imaginary space-time. HT theory and surreal theory seem then to 
sharpen one another with respect to the idea of mathematical constructions occurring within 
imaginary time.  
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But an alternative understanding of cuts is also possible, one in which HT theory borrows 
less from surreal theory than just mentioned. The 1 cuts of the real line can be construed as 
superintended by the 2 numbers in the HT plane, just as the 2 cuts in the HT plane are 
superintended by the 3 numbers in HT quaternions, etc. This superintendence suggests that the 
higher dimensions are in some sense antecedent to the lower dimensions. Recall that in 
transfinite probability, the 0 casino was said to be subtracted out of the preexisting 1 casino, 
the 1 casino subtracted out of the preexisting 2 casino, etc. This suggestion runs in the 
opposite direction of foundationalist number theory, though such a reversal is in keeping with the 
sense of imaginary space-time. Just as imaginary numbers transcend the law of signs as 
maintained by the real numbers, so too HT imaginary numbers transcend the strict relation of 
antecedent and consequent as suggested by the real number line, at least insofar as the real 
number line is used to model the arrow of time. Indeed, these two considerations are highly 
analogous (the minus and plus of the law of signs represents the past and future of the arrow of 
time). Because HT number theory can interpret the law of signs and the arrow of time jointly, the 
force of this interpretation is such that the prioricity of one HT number system is not fully 
determinate with respect to another. One mathematical construction can be regarded as 
progressing bottom-up while a different construction progresses top-down, the two approaches 
disagreeing as to what is antecedent and what is consequent. HT number systems thus resemble 
Einstein’s theory of relativity in that different observers in different HT frames of reference 
cannot agree on what comes before or after. Because of this disruption in temporality (and 
because temporality is fundamental to the classical concept of causality), HT theory also 
resembles quantum mechanics in that both undermine the classical relationship of cause and 
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effect. These circumstances bring the resources of HT theory to bear on questions of space-time 
and causality.  
Twelfth, and by way of further emphasis on what was just said, HT theory seeks to 
incorporate a conception of imaginary time as an important and even fundamental aspect of the 
theory. Peano claimed that every natural number has a successor, thereby creating the impression 
that mathematical constructions are to be conceived, in some sense, as occurring in real time. 
The possibility of imaginary time is of crucial significance toward constructing fractal geometry 
and other infinite and transfinite supertasks. Beyond mathematics, a proper conceptualization of 
imaginary time would also be of great significance to quantum physics.  
 
The Imaginary Unit, Zigzag Theory and HT Functions  
As typical of elementary number systems, the real numbers give rise to certain formulations 
that cannot be solved from within the real numbers. For example, the polynomial equation (x + 
2)
2
 = −9 has no real solution. This inadequacy owes to the law of signs, wherein the square of a 
real number cannot equal a negative. The complex number system was devised in order to 
overcome this limitation. However, the conceptual transition from the real to the complex 
numbers has been associated with a significant amount of controversy. Central to this 
controversy is the logical import of the imaginary number i, which in some sense contravenes the 
law of signs as understood from within the real number system. As represented by the complex 
plane, complex numbers constitute a closed quadratic field. Not only can complex numbers solve 
all quadratic equations but all polynomial equations in a single variable with real or complex 
coefficients.  
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Complex numbers take the form a + bi where a is real and bi is imaginary. If the imaginary 
part of a complex number is zero, the complex number can be expressed as a real number. If the 
real part of a complex umber is zero, the complex number can be expressed as an imaginary 
number. Thus both real and imaginary numbers can be interpreted as proper subsets of the 
complex number system. Crucially, the imaginary number i is defined as satisfying the 
expression i
2
 = −1. This is the algebraic bridge that unites real and imaginary numbers. The 
complex plane thus defines the x and y axes in terms of a specific algebraic relation, which 
differentiates the complex plane from the Cartesian plane. Based on this algebra, the polynomial 
example stated above can be solved by two different complex numbers: −2 + 3i and −2 + −3i 
(commonly expressed as −2 −3i.  
According to standard definition, a complex number z takes the form a + bi where a and b 
are real numbers, where a is the real part and b is the imaginary part, and where i is the 
imaginary unit. The imaginary unit is defined as satisfying the expression i
2
 = −1. The values b 
and i receive separate algebraic treatment, as is apparent in cases such as 2i, 3i, etc., or in cases 
of exponentiation. For example, the expression bi
2
 equals (bi)
2
, which equals (b
2
)(i
2
). Thus for 
any b, bi
2
 = (b
2
)(−1). This is the algebraic reasoning that brings imaginary numbers from the 
realm of the “absurd” (as some critics have claimed) into a fully integrated complex number 
system. To note an additional feature of imaginary numbers, squaring an imaginary number 
always yields a negative real number. Regardless of whether the imaginary part b is positive or 
negative, b
2
 is positive, and thus (b
2)(−1) is negative.  
According to standard interpretation, complex numbers are treated geometrically as two 
dimensional numbers, combining the x-axis of real numbers with the y-axis of imaginary 
numbers. A complex number a + bi can thus be represented as the point (a, b) in the complex 
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plane. Further, the complex plane allows for the imaginary number i to be treated in terms of a 
polar coordinate system. On this basis, the function of squaring a complex number, such as 
moving from i to i
2
, is interpreted as the rotation of the point i through the plane by 90º 
counterclockwise (this rotation regarded as an extension of vector analysis). This model provides 
direct geometric justification for the algebraic claim that i
2
 = −1. Apart from such a model as 
this, the imaginary unit i has been disparaged as an algebraic figment, as if contrived out of thin 
air. But the logical structure of the polar coordinate system dispels such an objection.  
The historical struggle of coming to terms with the number i has resulted not from any 
intrinsic difficulty of algebra or of the polar coordinate system but from the accidental historical 
circumstance in which the x-axis was initially described as real. If the real number system is 
real, as if in a deep metaphysical sense, then it is all too easy for the opposing y-axis to be 
thought of as imaginary, an apt description for that which opposes reality. As the thinking went, 
the real numbers maintain that a number multiplied by itself cannot produce a negative number, 
and so any number system that contradicts this claim must be imaginary. But if the x and y axes 
had been described merely as horizontal and vertical respectively, much controversy might have 
been avoided. With an appropriate understanding of the imaginary axis, numbers of the complex 
plane can be understood as no more imaginary or less real than other mathematical entities, 
particularly those of the real numbers. This is especially true in that the real number system 
poses certain expressions that it cannot satisfy, though all such expressions can be satisfied by 
the complex number system. For this reason, complex numbers seem to be more real or at least 
more intelligible than real numbers. (Note that Plato’s criterion of reality was in Republic Book 6 
was intelligibility.  
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The property wherein the real number system is able to formulate certain expressions that it 
cannot satisfy is not peculiar to real numbers. Much rather, this property is typical of other 
elementary number systems. Delineating this property through elementary number systems gives 
rise to what can loosely be described as Russell’s zigzag theory. To begin with, consider the 
natural numbers. For any natural numbers m and n, m + n yields a natural number, and so the 
natural numbers are closed under addition. But the same is not true for the inverse operation of 
subtraction. In cases where m > n, n – m cannot be satisfied from within the natural numbers, and 
thus the natural numbers are open under subtraction. By virtue of this inadequacy, natural 
numbers express the need for negative numbers. Accordingly, the integers fulfill what is lacking 
from within the natural numbers by providing both positive and negative numbers. Integers are 
closed under addition and subtraction, and also closed under multiplication, but are open under 
the inverse operation of division. Integers thus require the rational numbers to supply the notion 
of fractional numbers which is missing from within them. Rational numbers are closed under 
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, and also closed under exponentiation, but are 
open under the inverse operation of roots. For instance, the square root of any prime number is 
an irrational number. The rational numbers are thus inadequate unto themselves, thus giving rise 
to the real numbers, which contain both rational and irrational numbers. Like the rationals, the 
real numbers are closed under all familiar algebraic operations, except for roots. For instance, 
real numbers cannot provide square roots for negative real numbers. Although real numbers may 
give the appearance that square roots of negative real numbers are impossible, polynomial 
equations and complex numbers show that such roots are both needed and achievable. Thus, just 
as with other elementary number systems, real numbers give rise to expressions that they cannot 
satisfy, though this inadequacy is fulfilled by a succeeding number system. In all these cases, the 
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succeeding number system contains what is both familiar and alien to the preceding number 
system. Each given system is closed under a particular positive function but open under its 
inverse. The succeeding system is closed under that inverse operation, and thus constitutes the 
complement of the original system. The characteristic feature of Russell’s zigzag theory is that a 
given set is open under a diagonalization argument, for which a complementary set is closed 
under that function, only to have the zigzag repeat itself. On this interpretation, elementary 
number systems can be described in terms of diagonal and anti-diagonal sets.  
The question arises whether complex numbers continue the same dynamic of zigzag as 
exhibited in elementary number systems. They do not, but not because they satisfy all 
expressions within the system. Complex numbers can solve all polynomial equations in a single 
variable with real or complex coefficients but not those with two or more variables. But unlike 
elementary number systems, complex numbers do not introduce a novel positive function under 
which they are closed, only to be made open by the inverse of the function. Thus the zigzag 
pattern exhibited within elementary number systems comes to an end within the complex number 
system. For this reason, complex numbers are often regarded as the culmination of algebraic 
progression, even though they fail to achieve algebraic closure. This is a strange circumstance. 
The complex number system received a great deal of criticism during its historical development 
because of controversy surrounding the number i, yet it seems they might be critiqued more 
appropriately for breaking the zigzag progression and also for failing to provide closure for all 
polynomial expressions. HT theory claims that these two failures are related, and thus seeks to 
remedy both by proposing a common solution.  
 In light of the preceding discussion, a fundamental objective of HT theory is to reconceive 
the standard complex number system in such a way that the zigzag progression exhibited within 
129 
 
elementary numbers continues throughout all HT number systems. In order to accomplish this 
objective, two proposals will be advanced below. The first is to reconceive the imaginary unit i. 
The second is to define an algebraic function with corresponding inverse under which the HT 
complex numbers are first closed, then open, and then to have the zigzag pattern continue 
throughout all HT number systems.  
 Toward reconceiving the imaginary unit i, although i and −i are both square roots of −1, the 
standard definition of the imaginary unit gives i priority over −i. According to the standard 
complex plane, there is only one nodal point that connects the imaginary axis to the real axis 
through exponentiation, and this nodal point is i. The point −i is certainly algebraically available 
to the real axis, though only as derived from i, (i × −1 = −i). This prioritization reflects the desire 
for a unitary fundamentality with respect to the imaginary unit. But because i is only one of two 
square roots of −1, the desire for unitary absolutism in this context might not be desirable within 
HT number theory. Accordingly, HT number theory thus redefines the imaginary unit, not as 
satisfying the expression i
2
 = −1 but as satisfying the expression    √  . The result is that the 
HT complex plane has two equally fundamental imaginary units, i and –i, both of which connect 
the imaginary axis to the real axis. Neither of these imaginary units is derived from the other, but 
they spring together from a common source.
80
 As seen here, HT number theory tightens the 
algebraic relation between the real and imaginary axes as compared to the standard complex 
number system, and in so doing, provides greater flexibility and access in moving from one axis 
to the other.  
                                                 
80
 The larger issue here is the battle between linear and nonlinear logic. The acceptance of two equal and 
opposite imaginary units might be thought to make the interface between the real and imaginary axes unstable, as if 
to make algebraic foundations spin out of control. But the polar coordinate system already involves the notion of 
rotation through the plane, and so, in the first instance, the purpose of defining two opposing imaginary units is to 
facilitate this process of polar rotation. Beyond this, two imaginary units enhance the algebraic underpinnings of 
fractal geometry, as well as providing direct theoretical support for quantum mechanics.  
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Toward defining functions by which HT numbers continue the zigzag feature of elementary 
number systems, such functions can be defined as extensions of the power set function and of the 
diagonalization function. Thus the HT power set function is defined below as a constructive 
(positive) function, and its inverse is defined as the HT diagonal function.  
The HT power set function is the same as Cantor’s power set function, except that the HT 
power set function includes the concept of dimensionality, which is not present within the 
standard power set function. As shown in the HT table, HT theory defines both dimensionality 
and cardinality in terms of the same 2
x
 function, though in relation to different Principles of 
Generation, thus producing different algebraic results. The HT power set function thus operates 
through the 2
x
 function with respect both to dimensionality and cardinality, thereby synthetically 
conjoining these two aspects into a single covariant function. This dual synthesis is the 
fundamental construction giving rise to the HT table. Whereas transfinite theory and the power 
set function are somewhat non-constructive, in that they lack geometric representation, HT 
theory and the HT power set function are highly constructive in that their algebraic operations 
can be modeled geometrically.  
Because the HT power set function is highly constructive, in that it defines a hierarchical 
system of dimensionality by which to support transfinite cardinal and ordinal numbers, it allows 
for a much more constructive understanding of the diagonalization procedure than provided for 
by Cantor. Cantor’s use of the diagonal was a proof by contradiction, showing (in the first 
instance) that a 1-1 mapping does not exist between the natural numbers and the power set of the 
natural numbers. For lack of geometric representation, Cantor could not develop this procedure 
constructively, though he conceived of the diagonalization as iterated within abstract terms 
(lacking any geometric representation). HT theory, however, is able to provide a comprehensive 
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application of the HT diagonal function as modeled in geometric terms for all HT number 
systems. The HT power set function and HT diagonal function can thus be paired as 
complementary functions within a structure of HT ramification and zigzag. As the positive 
function, the HT power set function constructs each HT number system in conjunction with 
Cantor’s first principle of generation (as per the HT table) such that for any a, the 
dimensionality of the number system equals 2
a
 and its cardinality equals 2 

 such that 2 

 = 
a+1, in conjunction with the second principle of generation. Through mathematical induction on 
the HT power set function (in connection with the second principle of generation), it becomes 
clear that the HT table implies GCH, such that 2 

 = β, that is, that 2 0

 = 1, 
12

= 1, etc. 
As the inverse this of function, the HT diagonal function runs through the entire HT number 
system a, bringing it to exhaustion, and thus pointing to the anti-diagonal a+1 (or β) system 
that cannot be contained within the diagonal system a. In this way, the HT diagonal function 
brings about the ramification of the ensuing HT power set function, this ramification and zigzag 
continuing to infinity. In each case, β is the complement of a.  
The HT diagonal function raises the question as to how the diagonalization procedure is to 
be specified in advance for all HT number systems. Is each diagonal to be drawn throughout the 
entirety of each dimensional space or simply through a critical portion of it? The answer is found 
in the identity function for standard complex and hypercomplex numbers. This identity is defined 
in terms of the absolute values of each number system.
81
 This implies, taking the HT complex 
numbers as an example, that the HT diagonal for the HT complex plane is drawn only through 
the first quadrant of the plane, this quadrant containing the absolute values of the x and y axes. 
The diagonal for the HT complex plane is thus drawn from the number 1 on the x-axis to the 
                                                 
81
 Kantor and Solodovnikov, Hypercomplex Numbers, v–vi.  
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number i on the y-axis. In moving to higher dimensions, each diagonal in lower dimensions 
remains valid in higher dimensions. For instance, in moving from HT complex numbers to HT 
quaternions, the transition is made from numbers of the form a + bi to numbers of the form a + 
bi + cj + dk, where a, b, c and d are real numbers and i, j, and k are imaginary. In HT 
quaternions, the diagonal axis already given for HT complex numbers between a and bi remains 
valid, meaning that new axes must be drawn to connect between bi and cj, and then between cj 
and dk. In similar fashion, all the diagonal axes in HT quaternions remain valid for HT 
octonions. The procedure thus begun can be continued in moving from HT quaternions to HT 
octonions, etc. In advancing from a number system of x dimensions to the succeeding system of 
2x dimensions, defining diagonal axes in x dimensions can always be continued in higher 
dimensions by connecting to succeeding imaginary numbers in sequential order. For any HT 
number system with x dimensions, the number of diagonal axes for that number system is x − 1. 
These diagonalization axes intersect the positive imaginary numbers for every HT number 
system, meaning that these axes bisect the absolute values of each HT number system. Thus a 
schema of diagonalization procedures has been defined for all HT number systems.  
However, given that the discussion above allowed for a certain freedom of expression of HT 
numbers in either linear or multi-dimensional terms, it is also valid to express HT/HTS numbers 
and their diagonalization procedures as simple line segments, as provided for by surreal number 
theory. In this case, the length (or decimal expansion) of numbers within each diagonal set 
relates to the length of the diagonalization (and of other numbers in the succeeding anti-diagonal 
set) as follows: 
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Number System Diagonal Anti-Diagonal 
Reals    0   1 
HT Complex  1   2 
HT Quaternions 2   3
HT Octonions  3   4
              
 
 
This table shows that the diagonal for each HT number system is not autological with respect to 
the diagonal set for which it is drawn but is heterological to it. That is, the diagonalization 
produces a number that cannot be expressed in the diagonal set. The diagonal set is thus open 
under the HT diagonal function, though this logical openness becomes closed through the 
ramified zigzag of the HT power set function in the anti-diagonal set. The subsequent HT 
diagonal of this anti-diagonal set repeats the process, and so the iteration continues for infinitely 
many HT number systems.  
 
HT Arithmetic, Measure Theory and Chaos 
Significantly, transfinite arithmetic involves certain vagaries that can be resolved in terms of 
HT number theory. Consider that in transfinite arithmetic, subtracting the set of even integers 
from the set of all integers is expressed in the equation 0 − 0 = 0. But what if the set of all 
integers is subtracted from the set of all integers? Transfinite arithmetic is not equipped to 
differentiate the semantic content of which infinity is subtracted from which infinity, and so is 
unable to answer appropriately for different circumstances. But operations on HT numbers can 
be defined with reference to particular semantic content. For example, HT number theory allows 
for operations of the HT power set function φ such that:  
φ of the natural numbers N = ℝ,  
φ of the real numbers ℝ = the HT complex numbers,  
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φ of the HT complex numbers equals the HT quaternions, etc.  
These basic HT operations are specified within the HT table. But if these operations are valid, 
then HT theory clearly has the power to differentiate whether 0 − 0 is to equal 0 or  as 
based on the semantic content. This algebraic refinement can be expressed in terms of an HT 
measure theory, and then applied to transfinite probability.  
Beyond this consideration of HT algebra and measure theory, since so much has been said 
regarding freedom of expression, it is possible to define the iteration of HT number systems in 
terms of dimension doubling. On this basis,  
ℝ2 = the HT complex numbers,  
HT complex numbers2 = the HT quaternions, etc.  
But there is a possible confusion here. ℝ2 is also a valid operation within standard analysis, 
though it leads to the closed quadratic field of the standard complex plane. This need not be a 
worry; each operation is valid within its respective domain. The point here is simply to state that, 
in HT theory, squaring a number system can be interpreted as squaring the number of dimensions 
so as to produce the subsequent number system, for which the cardinality of that system is 
specified by the HT table.    
Unlike the standard complex and hypercomplex number systems, HT number theory provides an 
adequate basis for modeling transfinite probability. The discussion above in chapter 4 
(concerning transfinite probability) made clear that any possible outcome string within the 
probability space of the 1 casino can be mapped to and modeled by a real number, and so too 
any real number can be mapped to and modeled by a potential outcome string of the 1 casino. 
This 1-1 mapping and co-imaging is valid not only between the real numbers and the 1 casino, 
but between every HT number system and its corresponding transfinite casino. That is, a 1-1 
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mapping and co-imaging also exists between the HT complex numbers and the 2 casino, the 
HT quaternions and the 3 casino, etc. Thus the hierarchy of all HT number systems can 
produce an image of all transfinite probabilities, and so too the entire hierarchy of transfinite 
probabilities can produce an image of all HT number systems. This is a startling outcome. Taken 
together, these isomorphic systems provide a basis for a theory of HT modality, discussed below 
in chapter 6.  
Finally, the 2
x
 function that is fundamental to HT theory is also fundamental to chaos theory and 
fractal geometry. Even more, the logical features of the Mandelbrot fractal are strikingly similar 
to those of the HT table. These logical features are the same in that, in both cases, the 2
x
 function 
combines with Cantor’s three principles in advancing through ordinal and cardinal sequences. 
This shared logical structure can be seen by comparing the HT table of Figure 2 with the 
Mandelbrot fractal of Appendix 1.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
HT THEORY AND THE SET THEORETIC PARADOXES 
 
The modern paradoxes of set theory bear a strong resemblance to paradoxes of similar 
construction which have been known from antiquity. In order to set these modern paradoxes in a 
broad context so as to analyze them better, a few representative paradoxes will be described here.  
Epimenides wrote, “All Cretans are liars.” But because Epimenides was a Cretan, his 
statement makes himself to be a liar. Eubulides was interested in this and other paradoxes. He 
offered a variation of the liar paradox known as the pseudomenon. He wrote, “A man says he is 
lying [pseudomenon]. Is what he says true or false?” These two variations of the Liar share the 
same circular logic. If the statements are true, then they are false; if they are false, then they are 
true.  
The liar paradox is malleable, and has been expressed in a number of variations. The 
following version presents the paradox in a streamlined and tight construction:  
 
     The statement within this box is false. 
 
Another formulation goes in the opposite direction, expanding the paradox into a couplet:  
 Socrates: “What Plato is about to say is true.” 
 Plato: “What Socrates just said is false.”  
Bertrand Russell formulated the Russell paradox in 1901. What is now known as the Russell 
set is defined as the set of all sets, and only those sets, that are not members of themselves. The 
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question arises whether the Russell set is a member of itself. In order to qualify as a member of 
itself, the Russell set must not be a member of itself. So if it is not a member of itself, it is; if it 
is, then it is not.  
In the wake of the Russell paradox, a number of similar paradoxes were formulated which 
share the same logical structure. Two of these paradoxes are particularly similar to each other. 
The barber paradox describes a barber who shaves all those men and only those men of a 
particular village who do not shave themselves. But does the barber shave himself? If he does 
not, then he does; but if he does, then he does not. Similarly, the librarian paradox describes a 
librarian who observes that reference books within the reference room are of two types: those 
that refer to themselves and those that do not. In order that every reference book in the reference 
room should have some reference given to it, the librarian compiles a new reference book that 
refers to all those reference books and only those reference books that do not refer to themselves. 
But does the new reference book refer to itself? Again, if it does not, then it does; but if it does, 
then it does not. The intended reference book must be either incomplete (by reason of omitting 
itself) or contradictory (by reason of including itself).  
Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson published a paradox in 1908, referred to as the Grelling 
or Grelling-Nelson paradox. This paradox defines an adjective as “autological” if and only if it 
describes itself (is true of itself). An adjective is “heterological” if it does not describe itself (is 
not true of self). Adjectives such as “English,” “polysyllabic” and “pronounceable” are 
autological in that they apply to themselves. Adjectives such as “French,” “monosyllabic” and 
“unpronounceable” are heterological in that they do not describe themselves. The question arises 
whether the term “heterological” is autological or heterological. If “heterological” is autological 
(true of itself), then “heterological” is not heterological, and thus not true of itself. But if 
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“heterological” is heterological (not true of itself), then it is autological, and thus true of itself. 
“Heterological” is heterological only if it is not; but if it is not, then it is. (Syntactically, a 
paradoxical effect does not arise in analyzing “autological,” which may be interpreted as either 
autological or heterological without contradiction.) The Grelling-Nelson paradox can be 
transformed into the Russell paradox. This requires substituting “autological” for Russell’s 
“member of itself” and “heterological” for Russell’s “not a member of itself.” The Russell set 
can then be expressed as the set of all sets that are heterological. The contradiction is triggered 
by considering whether the modified Russell set is autological or heterological.  
The Barry paradox was first published by Russell, who attributed it to G. G. Barry. The 
paradox takes different forms, depending on the exact language used in expressing it. One 
characteristic expression is, “the smallest positive integer not definable in fewer than twelve 
words.”82 This expression contemplates the set of positive integers whose elements require 
twelve words or more for their definition. Assuming this set of numbers is well ordered, then 
there is a least such positive integer, and this is the number specified by the Barry formula. But 
yet if the Barry formula succeeds in defining such a least undefinable number, it has thereby 
defined that number with fewer than twelve words, since the Barry formula consists of eleven 
words. Thus the Barry number implies a contradiction. Unlike the other paradoxes described 
here, the Barry paradox can be diagnosed rather easily in that the paradox equivocates as to what 
is meant by “definable.” Yet even so, the paradox exhibits remarkable staying power. George 
Boolos formalized the Barry paradox in in 1989 to produce a simplified version of Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem.  
                                                 
82
 Another formulation of this paradox states, “the least number not definable with less than eighteen 
syllables.”  
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Beyond the paradoxes that resemble the Liar, there are two paradoxes of transfinite number 
theory: Cantor’s paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox. Together with the Russell paradox, these 
three make up the fundamental paradoxes of set theory. Cantor’s paradox refers to the universal 
cardinal set, and the Burali-Forti paradox refers to the universal ordinal set. Transfinite theory 
depends for its development on infinite recursion of the power set function. According to this 
function, for any infinite set A, the power set of A yields a subsequent ordinal set of greater 
cardinality. But in considering the universal sets, for which the universal ordinal set is thought to 
have no successor and the universal cardinal set is thought to have no cardinality greater than 
itself, there is no well-defined principle by which continued application of the power set function 
is to be suspended. As a consequence, the power set function of naive set theory is relentlessly 
applied to the universal cardinal and ordinal sets, thereby implying cardinal and ordinal values 
that contradict what were otherwise presented as universal. Cantor’s power set function thus 
cannot be consistently defined in relation to universal sets.  
The assortment of paradoxes described here might not represent a single general problem. 
The Russell paradox certainly presents a logical problem that concerns mathematical 
foundations, though the same is not obviously true for the pseudomenon in a box. Some 
paradoxes might simply be appreciated as contrivances that resist logical clarification, though 
which also present no threat to the philosophy of logic or set theory. But the range of diversity of 
these paradoxes is certainly interesting. What is the range of the particular paradoxes that is of 
specific interest to mathematical foundations, and what is the cluster of issues within that range 
which are responsible for causing the difficulty? These questions have been debated for more 
than one hundred years.  
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Avoiding the Paradoxes 
There have been a number of proposed solutions to Russell’s paradox specifically and to the 
Liar class of paradoxes generally. Frank Ramsey asserted in 1928 that the paradoxes result 
exclusively from their semantic content but do not demonstrate that logic fails within purely 
syntactic terms. This view is easy to believe with respect to the Barry paradox, but more difficult 
to reconcile with Russell’s paradox, which seems to be much more syntactic. But blaming the 
paradoxes on their semantic content became more difficult after Gödel adapted the liar paradox 
in his famous proofs of 1930 and 1931. Like the librarian paradox, Gödel demonstrated that, 
upon pain of contradiction, the theorems of first-order logic and number theory must remain 
incomplete. Further, Gödel’s proof demonstrates that the syntactic and semantic sides of first-
order logic are much more interconnected than what had been thought, such that it is problematic 
to conceive of first-order logic in purely syntactic terms.
83
 On the same point, if the Barry 
paradox is to be picked out as especially blameworthy for its semantic content, then why could a 
revised version of it produce a simplified version of Gödel’s proof? At any rate, the syntactic-
semantic distinction is highly controversial because of the paradoxes and so has failed to yield 
any consensus opinion.   
For a number of years, Russell’s responses to the paradoxes underwent continual change. 
One of his first responses to the paradoxes was his theory of definite descriptions. Consider the 
sentence, “The present king of France is bald.” The person referred to here is a figment, since 
France is no longer a monarchy. What then of the sentence, “The present king of France is not 
                                                 
83
 Wilfrid Sellars believed that semantic implications penetrated into what might be thought to be purely 
syntactic. For this reason, he described the Russell and similarly derived paradoxes as semantic. He writes, “Notice 
that, although these derivatives parallel the Russell moves, they do so in a way which brings out the essential 
involvement of the semantical concept of truth…. Russell’s paradox is at bottom, a semantical paradox to be 
handled by semantic distinctions.” Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Atascadero, CA: 
Ridgeview, 1967), 110.  
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bald.” This too refers to a figment. But yet the law of the excluded middle implies that one of 
these sentences must be true. Russell’s solution was to analyze these statements by means of the 
existential quantifier, thus yielding the formulation: “There is an x and x has a certain property.” 
It is then clear that both sentences are false in that they fail to satisfy the terms of the existential 
quantifier. And so Russell began the process of analyzing propositions and sentences in terms of 
logical structure, a process which led to his theory of types. A key feature of type theory is that it 
does not allow sets to be members of themselves, a strategy which served to avoid the self-
referential paradoxes. Russell revised his early type theory to allow for finite ramification, and 
then others produced theories of transfinite ramification. Certain versions of ramified type theory 
were inconsistent in that they admitted of Cantorian diagonal arguments. Like Russell’s theory of 
definite descriptions, these approaches seek the primary logical subject that takes on predicates 
but which itself is not predicated of another subject. This general project extends from Aristotle, 
through Kant, Leibniz, Frege, Russell, Ryle, Carnap and perhaps the whole of analytic 
philosophy.   
Another theory pursued by Russell was his zigzag theory. Russell wrote very little on this, 
and so his presentation of it was sketchy. Zigzag theory rejected types, and so returned to 
Russell’s earlier view of the universal scope of logic, except that certain restrictions are to be 
placed on the axiom of comprehension (when the axiom leads to contradictions). But the 
essential nature of the zigzag theory is summed up as follows: “The idea here is that the 
propositional functions which do not determine classes are all derived by a diagonal construction 
so that they have a zigzag form.”84  
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 Alasdair Urkuhart, “Russell’s Zigzag Path to the Ramified Theory of Types,” Russell: The Journal of the 
Bertrand Russell Archives 8 (Summer-Winter 1988): 85–87.   
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The three paradoxes of set theory do not all necessarily seem to stand on the same footing. 
The Cantor and Burali-Forti paradoxes apply to the high mathematics of Cantor’s transfinite 
theory, whereas the Russell paradox strikes directly at the foundations of logic and set theory. 
There is good reason to think, then, that these paradoxes might be unrelated and can be treated 
separately. The critical issue with the Russell paradox might be self-reference, which is not 
readily apparent within the other two. But from another perspective, all three paradoxes involve 
the concept of totality, each one referring to “all sets” in absolute terms. On this basis, it can be 
thought that the concept of totality or universality presents a fundamental problem which exerts 
itself throughout first-order logic, set theory and transfinite number theory. This latter possibility 
suggests that the three paradoxes of set theory are deeply interconnected and in need of a 
common solution.  
 
HT Theory and Cantor’s Theorem 
It is interesting that the logic of Russell’s paradox is embedded within the structure of 
Cantor’s theorem, though the positive force of the theorem is not diminished by it. How is it that 
the logic of the Russell paradox is so negative within set theory, and yet constructive in this 
particular case? Similarly, how is it that the Barry paradox can be adapted in developing a 
simplified version of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem? With these positive utilizations of the 
paradoxes in view, is it possible that a constructive sense of the paradoxes might be discovered 
within these contexts and then adapted to HT theory?  
 Cantor’s theorem demonstrates that for any set L, finite or infinite, the power set of L has 
cardinality greater than the cardinality of L. The critical move of this theorem is to prove that a 
1-1 mapping cannot exist between the set L and its power set P(L). Cantor assumed, contrary to 
143 
 
what was to be proved, that such a mapping does exist; that is, that every element x in L can be 
paired in a 1-1 mapping with its correlate subset x* of P(L) and vice versa. The condition 
therefore arises that particular elements x in L may or may not be members of their correlates x* 
in P(L). Therefore, there exists a set within P(L) consisting of all the elements x in L that satisfy 
the condition of not being members of their correlate x* in P(L). Let this set be identified as r*. 
The set r* is a subset of L and thus a member of P(L). Therefore, in the putative mapping 
between L and P(L), r* is the correlate of r in L. Now consider whether r is a member of its 
correlate r*. With this question, the logic of the Russell paradox is triggered. If r is a member of 
r*, then it violates the defining characteristic of r*, since r* consists only of elements of L which 
are not members of their correlates in P(L). But if r is not an element of r*, then it thereby 
qualifies for membership in r*, since r* consists of all elements of L which are not members of 
their correlates in P(L). Cantor’s theorem thus proves that a 1-1 mapping cannot exist between L 
and P(L), inasmuch that a mapping between r and r* is impossible. Because it is clear that the 
cardinality of P(L) is greater than or equal to that of L, in that for every x in L, {x} is a subset of 
P(L), it becomes clear from the impossibility of mapping between L and P(L) that the cardinality 
of P(L) is strictly greater than L, and thus P(L) can be identified as set M.
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 What can be learned from the logic of the Russell paradox embedded within Cantor’s 
theorem, which may be applicable to HT theory? In answering this question, consider the degree 
of failure within the theorem of mapping set L to P(L). The theorem proves that a 1-1 mapping 
between the two sets is not possible. Yet it can be asked exactly how much of a mapping is and 
is not possible within this context. Cantor’s theorem begins by showing that every x in L can be 
mapped 1-1 to {x} in P(L), so this much of a mapping is possible. Consider that if set L is the set 
of natural numbers, then a 1-1 mapping of 0 numbers between L and P(L) can be accomplished. 
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But now notice that the functionality of the logic of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem 
is synonymous with Cantor’s diagonal argument. In fact, it is commonly accepted that this 
paradoxical logic in Cantor’s theorem is a logical expression equivalent to Cantor’s diagonal. On 
this basis, it is valid to extend the terms “diagonal set” and “anti-diagonal set” from the diagonal 
discussion so as to apply within Cantor’s theorem. It then becomes clear that, with respect to 
Cantor’s theorem, there exists a 1-1 mapping of elements x in the diagonal set L with their 
correlate subsets {x} in the anti-diagonal set P(L), but that no such mapping is possible between 
the diagonal set L and the entire anti-diagonal set P(L). It is clear that a constructive relation 
exists between the paradoxical logic of Cantor’s theorem and the diagonal procedure that can be 
extended throughout infinitely many HT number systems. It follows that the diagonal 
interpretation of the Russell logic within Cantor’s theorem can be subsumed into the HT 
diagonal function, and that the positive force of the power set function within Cantor’s theorem 
can be subsumed by the HT power set function. In mapping values from the diagonal set L to the 
anti-diagonal set P(L), where L has cardinality α and P(L) has cardinality β, it is possible to 
map α numbers between L and P(L) by means of the HT power set function.   
Beyond the isomorphism of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem to the diagonal, is 
there yet a deeper sense in which this occurrence of the Russell paradox has implications for HT 
theory? The discussion of the HT diagonal function and the HT power set function (in chapter 5 
above) defined a relation between these two functions. Is it possible that this same relation is 
discoverable within an adaptation of the Russell paradox of Cantor’s theorem? Recall that the 
Russell paradox can be stated within the autological-heterological terms of the Grelling-Nelson 
paradox. Therefore, just as language of “diagonal set” and “anti-diagonal set” can be extended to 
the Russell paradox of Cantor’s theorem from the diagonal procedure, so too the terms 
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“autological” and “heterological” can be extended to the Russell paradox of Cantor’s theorem 
with the same effect. Note that in defining a 1-1 mapping of elements x in the diagonal set L to 
their correlate sets {x} in the anti-diagonal set P(L), this mapping can be defined as an 
autological mapping; that is, each element x in L is mapped to its autological correlative set {x} 
in P(L) for which x is the singleton in {x}. All other sets in the anti-diagonal set P(L) which are 
not correlate sets of a singleton element x in L are defined as heterological to the diagonal set L. 
Accordingly, elements of set L can be described as both autological and as the diagonal set, and 
so too elements of P(L) can be described as both heterological and as the anti-diagonal set. 
Because of the naturalness with which the Russell paradox of Cantor’s theorem negotiates the 
terms “diagonal,” “anti-diagonal,” “autological,” and “heterological,” it is clear that the logical 
structure of the Russell paradox as adapted within HT number theory gives expression to both 
the HT diagonal function and to the HT power set function.  
Even as the ramification of HT number systems can be defined in terms of diagonal and 
anti-diagonal sets, so too this ramification can be defined in terms of autological and 
heterological sets. In taking these two nomenclatures together, the anti-diagonal set of one 
system becomes the diagonal set of the following system. Within the new diagonal set, the 
previous distinction of autological and heterological is done away with, such that numbers 
formerly heterological to one another within the preceding anti-diagonal set become autological 
with one another in the new diagonal set. For example, the HT complex numbers are the anti-
diagonal set of the real numbers, such that there are 2 numbers in the HT complex plane that 
are heterological to the 1 numbers of the real continuum. But once the HT complex numbers 
are presented as the diagonal set, the heterological distinction between real numbers and HT 
complex numbers is dissolved, such that both of these number systems are autological with one 
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another with respect to the new anti-diagonal set of HT quaternions. HT quaternions are now the 
heterological set to HT complex numbers, including the real numbers contained within them. 
This is so because, in each case that a diagonal set is to be mapped into the succeeding anti-
diagonal set, all the nested number systems within the present diagonal set are mapped in 
autological fashion to their correlates within the anti-diagonal set, regardless as to what 
dimensional number systems are involved. This is to say that each number system is mapped to 
itself within the subsequent number system. The real numbers are mapped to themselves within 
HT complex numbers, the HT complex numbers are mapped to themselves within HT 
quaternions, etc. For any HT number system considered as a diagonal set of x dimensions, there 
is a succeeding anti-diagonal number system of 2x dimensions in which x dimensions are 
autological to the diagonal set and x dimensions are heterological to it. The x dimensions of the 
anti-diagonal set that are autological to the diagonal set are autological because these x 
dimensions of the anti-diagonal set are the same x dimensions as of the diagonal set. Autological 
and heterological relations change from one number system to the next, such that the 
heterological relation toward the anti-diagonal set is overcome in the succeeding diagonal set.  
But although the autological relation increases in cardinality with each number system, the 
succeeding anti-diagonal set presents an even greater cardinality of heterological numbers. The 
heterological relation consists of x heterological dimensions set against x autological dimensions, 
but yet of 2 

 heterological numbers set against α numbers.  
The development of HT theory has presented a number of cases in which freedom of 
expression has allowed different conceptualizations for mathematical operations or entities. One 
such example is that of HT algebra, in which squaring an HT number system can be regarded as 
tantamount to performing the HT power set function on the same system (discussed in chapter 
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5). This algebraic freedom of expression is relevant in the present discussion. It is clear that the 
dimension doubling and cardinal sequencing of the number systems as just described with 
respect to autological and heterological sets is indicative of number systems as described in the 
HT table and treated in terms of the HT power set function. Yet it is also true that the dimension 
doubling of these number systems can be described in shorthand as squaring the number of 
dimensions from one number system to the next, allowing the cardinality to be specified in terms 
of HT theory.  
In reviewing the relation of the logic of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem to the 
reconstruction of its logical structure as advanced within HT theory, the critical difference is that 
Cantor’s theorem considers a possible mapping, but then allows the diverse elements of the 
mapping to butt heads in a paradox of modus tollens. HT theory contemplates a similar mapping, 
but avoids the contradiction by redirecting this mapping through a ramified zigzag, thus allowing 
for a modus ponens. The head-butting of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem results 
from conflating into a single dimension what HT theory separates out into ramified dimensions. 
It is clear that HT theory does not avoid the Russell paradox of Cantor’s theorem, but 
constructively engages and refashions it. Such a refashioning is possible for HT number theory, 
but not for standard complex and hypercomplex numbers, which offer no increase in transfinite 
cardinalities.  
 As stated earlier in the present study, a major objective of HT number theory is to take up 
the zigzag pattern as begun in elementary number systems and continue it throughout HT 
dimensions. The discussion in chapter 5 stated that the zigzag pattern can be implemented within 
HT theory in terms of (1) the HT diagonal function, which brings the diagonal set to a point of 
exhaustion, and (2) the HT power set function, which produces a ramification to the anti-
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diagonal set, which in turn becomes the new diagonal set, suitable for further diagonalization and 
iteration. Because the HT diagonal function can be defined in the HT complex plane as drawn 
from the real number 1 to the imaginary number i, and then because succeeding HT diagonals 
can be defined across imaginary numbers throughout HT dimensions (as described in chapter 5), 
it is apparent that the imaginary numbers assume a prominent position within HT theory. These 
imaginary numbers can be interpreted as nodal points connecting the inner space of HT 
dimensions, demarcating the geometric space in which the HT diagonal function and HT power 
set function operate in tandem with one another. Because the logic of the Russell paradox within 
Cantor’s theorem can be treated constructively within HT theory, it is possible for the autological 
and heterological language of the paradox to be understood as mapped out by the nodal points of 
HT dimensions. This is a remarkable claim, in that it offers a possible basis by which to treat the 
paradoxes of set theoretic foundations. If a ramified zigzag pattern exists within HT dimensions 
as implemented within the logic of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem, then perhaps 
this ramified zigzag can be extended to the Russell paradox itself.  
 What then of the possibility of applying the technique developed here to the Russell paradox 
within set theoretic foundations? In order to consider this, the Russell paradox must be 
considered in terms of universality, and thus discussed in conjunction with the Cantor and 
Burali-Forti paradoxes. The question of universality raises the question as to the extent HT 
numbers can be defined. Do the geometric conditions provided by HT dimensionality impose 
limits on the size of HT numbers beyond what is present in transfinite theory? How large are HT 
numbers and what is their maximum limit? In order to consider these questions, HT numbers 
must be considered in maximal terms.  
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HT Numbers, Totality and Modality  
 The discussion of HT numbers thus far has been limited to considerations of HT number 
systems that have 2
x
 dimensions, wherein x has been spoken of only as finite. Hence the question 
arises as to whether HT number systems admit of a transfinite number of dimensions. It may 
seem that HT numbers have achieved their full range of systems when HT dimensionality is 
specified as 0, and so this critical point might represent the maximal limit of HT numbers 
insofar as they are able to find dimensional support. Indeed, it may be thought that this is the 
juncture at which HT theory incurs the set theoretic paradoxes. But this would be a disappointing 
alternative. HT theory is predicated on infinitist principles, so there is no cause to shrink back 
from the prospects of a transfinite number of dimensions. It seems, then, that HT number 
systems can be conceived of most appropriately as having a finite, infinite and transfinite number 
of dimensions.  
But then another question arises of special significance. If HT number systems admit of 
finite, 0, 1, 2 dimensions, etc., then where are dimensions of 1 and greater located with 
reference to the 0 dimensions? Do the 1 dimensions fit into the interior space between the 
sequence of 0 dimensions (as real numbers fill in the continuum between natural numbers) or 
do they constitute a space over and beyond the 0 dimensions? At issue here is the relation 
between HT and GCH. In the discussion thus far, HT numbers have lent support to GCH in 
claiming that 2 0

 = 1, making 1 the next cardinal number to follow 0. But if HT numbers 
now advance the claim that there are uncountably infinite dimensions between 0 and 1, then 
1 would no longer be the first transfinite cardinal to follow 0, thereby negating GCH, or at 
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least making it more complicated than normally thought.
86
 The continuum problem asks how 
many points are on the real continuum. But the question here is whether transfinite numbers 
themselves constitute a continuum. This latter possibility might seem an appealing alternative. 
Given that the development of HT theory has never been intended as a defense of GCH, it might 
be that HT numbers argue ultimately for the undecidability of GCH, suggesting that the 
difference between the truthfulness and falsity of GCH is aspectual, depending on whether 
transfinite numbers are considered in analogy to the natural numbers or in analogy with the reals.  
So then how evenhanded should HT be with respect to the undecidability of GCH? HT 
numbers can clearly offer support to Gödel’s affirmation of GCH, but what does HT theory owe 
Cohen regarding the negation of GCH? HT theory might be conceived as a house with two 
fronts, one conforming to the specifications of Gödel, the other of Cohen. Yet it is significant to 
note that (with limited focus to the HT table and thus the HT affirmation of GCH), HT entails 
GCH, which in turn entails AC. Like GCH, AC is also undecidable as based on ZF. It seems that 
HT is not undecided on AC but completely affirming of it. And it may be that Cohen’s rejection 
of CH was based on indeterminacy in ZF that owed to the undecidability of AC. Mary Tiles 
writes as follows:  
In ZF the power set of an infinite set is impredicatively defined and its 
membership is thus under-determined relative to the remaining axioms. The 
inclusion of the power set axiom thus leaves an indeterminacy in what is, from the 
point of view of ZF, to count as a set. It is this under-determination which makes 
it possible to produce models of ZF in which CH holds and models in which it 
fails, and also renders the force of AC indeterminate.
87
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It seems then that HT numbers can be interpreted as an inner model of ZF that entails both GCH 
and AC, thus discounting the indeterminacy of ZF that allows for Cohen’s negation of CH. The 
infinity of HT dimensions need not be interpreted as occupying space between 0 and 1 
(thereby lending support to the negation of CH), but can be interpreted as occupying space 
beyond the countable sequence of transfinite dimensions. However, both this question and the 
undecidability of GCH with respect to ZF and HT cannot be resolved here, and thus must be left 
as open questions.  
Defining HT numbers in terms of an infinite and even transfinite number of dimensions 
requires greater abstraction than number systems with finitely many dimensions, though defining 
these systems can be done according to the pattern of preceding number systems. Just as a finite 
number of dimensions can be defined in sequential order wherein the real axis is first, the 
imaginary axis is second, the axes of HT quaternions are third and fourth, etc., so too a 
transfinite number of dimensions can be defined as ω0, ω1, ω2, etc. It seems possible, then, for 
HT numbers to be defined with a transfinite number of dimensions without limit, and thus there 
are no constraints imposed on the development of HT number systems with respect to geometric 
representation. Accordingly, the development of HT number systems is as open-ended and 
limitless as is that of transfinite numbers. The only constraint on the progression of transfinite 
and HT numbers is the consideration of totality as relating to the set theoretic paradoxes.  
 What then of the set theoretic paradoxes? There is clearly an inclination toward 
conceptualization of the universal set, though the paradoxical implications of this 
conceptualization are well known. But because HT number theory has successfully treated the 
logic of the Russell paradox within Cantor’s theorem, it is possible that the same or similar 
techniques might be employed here.   
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 Let the universal set of HT number theory be designated as Ω. Now consider that the present 
study has proposed theories of both HT numbers and transfinite probability. Because HT number 
theory and transfinite probability have been defined in isomorphic terms, there exists a 1-1 
mapping between their corresponding domains. The discussion above in chapter 4 made 
clear that any possible outcome string within the probability space of the 1 casino 
can be mapped to and modeled by a real number, and so too any real number can 
be mapped to and modeled by a potential outcome string of the 1 casino. As 
further developed in chapter 5, this 1-1 mapping and co-imaging is valid not only 
between the real numbers and the 1 casino but between every HT number system 
and its corresponding transfinite casino. That is, a 1-1 mapping and co-imaging 
exists between:  
Real numbers and the 1 casino, 
HT complex numbers and the 2 casino,  
HT quaternions and the 3 casino, etc.   
Based on this isomorphic relation, it is clear that the universal set of HT number theory has a 1-1 
mapping and co-imaging relation with a corresponding universal set of transfinite probability. 
Therefore, let Ω+ now designate the universal set of HT numbers and let Ω– designate the 
universal set of transfinite probability. Two universal sets now exist as polar opposites within a 
structure of HT modality.  
 The existence of two universal sets within HT modality raises the possibility of 
duplicating the paradoxes of set theory. Accordingly, let the Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell 
paradoxes be duplicated so as to apply mutatis mutandis within transfinite probability. HT 
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modality now consists of six theoretic paradoxes. The objective of the present discussion is to 
resolve these paradoxes so as to produce a unified theory of HT modality.  
Next, let the HT diagonal function be applied to both Ω+ and Ω–. Clearly, this operation 
renders the two universal sets extremely unstable. But even further, this move seems especially 
hazardous, in that the HT diagonal function has been defined in tandem with the HT power set 
function. But notice what follows. An iterated application of the HT power set function is 
impossible with respect to an algebraic operation between Ω+ and Ω–. This function implies an 
increase in both dimensionality and cardinality, yet Ω+ and Ω– are isomorphic with each other, 
having the same dimensionality and cardinality. Consequently, these two universal sets cannot 
relate algebraically to one another as input or output through the HT power set function. The HT 
power set function has been zeroed out. As delimited within HT modality, justification has now 
been given for suspending the HT power set function. Because no such suspension for the power 
set function can be given within set theory, the present circumstance seems to provide a much 
needed refinement on the set theoretic paradoxes. The HT diagonal function has rendered Ω+ and 
Ω– unstable, yet this instability has not fallen into contradiction with the HT power set function.  
 
 
 How then can Ω+ and Ω– relate to one another algebraically? A start on this question has 
been made in having performed HT diagonal functions on both. But what are the implications of 
this function in the present context? How are these diagonals to be conceived? A transfinite 
number of instances of HT diagonals are available for comparison. It has been a universal 
property of HT diagonals to transcend the diagonal sets to which they pertain. That is, an HT 
diagonal is never constructed within its diagonal set but within its anti-diagonal set. Put another 
154 
 
way, every HT diagonal is heterological to its diagonal set but autological to the anti-diagonal 
set. Therefore, if this rule is to remain consistent in the present case, the diagonals within Ω+ and 
Ω– are not produced from within themselves but from a heterological source. Number and 
probability are of course heterological to one another as modal opposites. What then is the 
significance of the diagonals on Ω+ and Ω–? Based on the logic of the HT diagonal function, the 
two universal sets have each marked its heterological opposite with its own autological sign. 
Number theory, conceived as its own diagonal set, has been marked by its anti-diagonal set of 
probability, and so too probability, conceived as its own diagonal set, has been marked by its 
anti-diagonal set of number theory. The two heterological species of mathematical objects have 
squared off with one another in advance of a modal synthesis. But where is the algebra by which 
to effect such a synthesis?   
The present situation is peculiar in that two HT diagonals have been defined, but yet no 
increase in dimensionality or cardinality is applicable. Also, the HT diagonals present a 
horizontal relation rather than vertical. So what algebraic operation is suitable for two bilateral 
universal sets, Ω+ and Ω–? Consider the possibility of addition, such that Ω+ + Ω– = 2 Ω, or 
perhaps even that Ω+ + Ω– = 0. Addition and multiplication are applicable for elements of the 
same species of mathematical objects, and so the present objects certainly do not qualify for 
these operations. Exponentiation is the most likely candidate, inasmuch that exponentiation and 
roots are the most powerful algebraic means of advancing from one number system to another, 
indeed, the only operations capable of doing so for systems greater than the real numbers. But 
the HT power set function has already been excluded. However, the preceding discussion in 
chapter 5 described a near equivalence between the HT power set function and that of squaring. 
These two functions have been described as shorthand equivalents, and thus interchangeable in 
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advancing from one HT system to another. Perhaps now is a critical juncture at which the near 
equivalence between them is teased apart. Consider then that, within the context of HT modality, 
the universal sets Ω+ and Ω– yield the expression Ω
2
. What does this mean? This question may be 
treated in analogy with the continuum problem, wherein it is asked what 2 0

 reduces to. In the 
same way, the present question considers what Ω2 reduces to. Again, the possibility of a 
contradiction presents itself. But is a contradiction here inevitable?  
 One of the many controversial issues touched on in the present study is the syntactic-
semantic distinction. What then are the syntactic and semantic implications of Ω2, and is there an 
interpretation in which they can be taken together? Syntactically, the present objective is to treat 
both the diagonal and anti-diagonal distinction and the autological-heterological distinction in 
such a way as to continue the ramified zigzag pattern as explicated within the Russell logic of 
Cantor’s theorem. If done correctly, this logical progression should be able to engage and resolve 
the set theoretic paradoxes of HT modality. Because an HT diagonal can be defined for both Ω+ 
and Ω–, the interpretation follows that the opposing universal sets are squaring off as if to 
negotiate their autological and heterological distinctions. The logic of this encounter is nothing 
unprecedented for either number or probability. Each system has negotiated autological and 
heterological conditions throughout all of their dimensional progressions. The key difference 
here is that, rather than negotiating these conditions in a vertical progression, each system is now 
negotiating autological and heterological conditions within a horizontal bilateral embrace. 
Semantically, number can be described as the metric of what is. Probability can be described as 
the metric between what is not, but what might come to be. One is a science of being, the other 
of nonbeing. The two universal sets are alien to each other, and yet each one can produce an 
exact image of the other. In terms of both syntax and semantics, the polar opposites are 
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recognizing one another as dialectical opposites. This is the syntactic and semantic significance 
of the expression Ω2 within the present context.   
 The essential force of the Russell logic of Cantor’s theorem as described in HT theory is to 
map the totality of autological and heterological terms between the diagonal and anti-diagonal 
sets. Within the present context, there are two diagonal sets, two diagonals and two anti-diagonal 
sets. The presence of an HT diagonal on Ω+ and on Ω– indicates that these two sets are both 
mapping all their sets on to the other. Each universal set is acting simultaneously on the other, 
making each universal set both subject and object. Therefore, as signified by Ω2, all the sets of 
Ω+ are mapped to their autological syntactical correlate sets within Ω–, and so too all the sets  in 
Ω– are mapped to their autological syntactical correlate sets in Ω+. That is, the syntactic force of 
Ω2 maps every set of Ω+ to its autological place within its heterological universal set, and every 
set of Ω– to its autological place within its heterological universal set. This mapping perfectly 
maps every set of Ω+ and Ω– without remainder. Every set has been mapped according to a 
perfect dovetailing of autological and heterological conditions. This bilateral mapping abolishes 
the syntactic distinction between number and probability.  
On the semantic side, the nature of number is determinate being. The nature of probability is 
indeterminate nonbeing. Within their heterological encounter, number seeks to enumerate the 
totality of all probabilities, thereby giving its own mark of determinacy and being to probability. 
In the same encounter, probability places its mark of indeterminacy and nonbeing on number, 
thereby eroding the determinate character of number. In this bilateral exchange and blurring of 
properties, the semantic distinction between number and probability is abolished. Thus as to 
syntax and semantics, the modal distinctions of number and probability are lost. Put more 
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constructively, a transcendental synthesis of being and nonbeing in mathematical terms is hereby 
made possible.  
On the basis of the syntactic and semantic conditions described here, what is the only 
numeric outcome of Ω2 that is logically and algebraically consistent?  The claim of HT modality 
as advanced here is that, where Ω2 involves Ω+ and Ω–, Ω
2
 = 0. This claim is in keeping with the 
account of the via negativa offered above in chapter 1 in which being and nonbeing are described 
as contraries. For Neoplatonists of the via negativa, the fusion of being and nonbeing is the basis 
of becoming. In HT modality, the origin of mathematical becoming is the null set. HT modality 
thus offers the analogy that numbers erupt out of the null set as if emerging from a mathematical 
big bang of being and nonbeing. The fusion of being and nonbeing is regarded as analogous to 
the fusion of matter and antimatter. HT modality thus yields the algebraic result that the square 
root of 0 equals Ω.  
 The present discussion engages the Russell paradox in a clear manner. The ramified zigzag 
treats the Russell paradox in the same way as in Cantor’s theorem, placing emphasis on (1) 
diagonal and anti-diagonal sets, and (2) the semantics of autological and heterological. Two 
details were changed here in the treatment of the Russell paradox from that of the Russell logic 
of Cantor’s theorem. First, the function of squaring was used here as a near equivalent to the HT 
power set function (this near equivalence was discussed in chapter 5). Second, the ramified 
zigzag made a U-turn in returning to its origin at the null set rather than continuing to make a 
vertical ascent. This extreme zigzag is necessitated by Cantor’s paradox, but also in keeping with 
the proposed synthesis of being and nonbeing. The HT ramified zigzag described here thus 
resolves the Cantor and Russell paradoxes. The HT ramified zigzag pattern progresses from 
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totality through modality to the null set. (Describing the HT treatment of the Burali-Forti 
paradox is a bit more complicated, and so will be discussed a bit later.)  
HT theory produces a grand circuit of ramified zigzag, which begins with the null set, 
continues through the natural numbers, integers, rationals, irrationals, HT complex numbers, all 
HT number systems, HT totality, HT modality, and then returns to the null set, the point at which 
it began. Each one of these zigzags has been construed at some point as violating that which was 
regarded as absolute. If the dialectical synthesis of being and nonbeing proposed here seems 
disquieting, consider that this zigzag simply fills out the pattern as exhibited elsewhere. The two 
crucial innovations of the present study have been: (1) to define the zigzag from real to 
imaginary numbers as involving an iterative increase in cardinality, and (2)  to define a synthesis 
of number and probability within HT modality so as to engage and finesse the set theoretic 
paradoxes. The zigzag insight involved in navigating these two junctures is to recognize that the 
number i is to the law of signs what the Russell paradox is to modality. These logical 
progressions are the same in that the same ramified zigzag moves through both. Rejecting the 
zigzag in moving from totality to the null set because of an absolutist conception of modality is 
like rejecting the zigzag in moving from real to imaginary numbers because of a commitment to 
the law of signs.  The HT ramified zigzag transcends the distinction of being and nonbeing just 
as imaginary numbers transcend the distinction of plus and minus.  
The most crucial point at which criticism of the present discussion might be directed is the 
algebraic claim that Ω2 = 0. This claim is satisfactory in terms of its semantic interpretation, and 
also because of the critical role it plays within the grand ramified zigzag pattern. But insofar as 
the algebra is considered in analytic terms, it seems rather ad hoc and unjustified. The algebraic 
operation considered here is singular, whereas algebra tends to deal with operations that are valid 
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in infinitely many cases, at least insofar as exponentiation is concerned. This, then, seems to be 
the weakest link of the discussion. To make up for this shortcoming, attention will be directed to 
Gaussian integers and the class number problem.   
 In 1796, Gauss proved the quadratic reciprocity law, using what are now referred to as 
Gaussian integers. These numbers take the form of complex numbers, except that they are 
limited to integers on the real and imaginary axes. Gauss showed that these integers obey their 
own version of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, reducing to their peculiar system of prime 
numbers or “irreducibles.” Gauss proved this in the “unique factorization theorem.” The 
Gaussian integers proved to be of significant interest, and then it turned out that they can be 
modified so as to be expressed as half integers. Subsequently, it became clear that the imaginary 
unit can be redefined for these numbers, such that each substituted value of i gives rise to its own 
number system. It is then meaningful to ask for which of these substituted values a reasonable 
number system results. In Gauss’ lifetime, it was known that there were nine values for which a 
unique factorization theorem exists, including 1, 2, 3, 7, 11, 19, 43, 67 and 163. It has been 
proved that a tenth such number does not exist. It is then possible to consider the margin by 
which other numbers substituted for i fall short of unique factorization. Depending on this 
margin of failure, the substituted values of i are put into different classes. Class number 1 is for 
numbers that produce unique factorization, class number 2 for numbers that barely fail, class 
number 3 for numbers that fail a bit more, etc. Since the time of Gauss, mathematicians have 
been interested in deep and complicated properties relating to the class number system. One 
interesting consideration is to determine the largest number for each number class. In 1983, 
Zagier and Gross produced a large equation that determined the greatest number for each number 
class, thereby solving Gauss’ class number problem. As Keith Devlin writes, “What is 
160 
 
remarkable is the fact that a single curve somehow controls the behavior of an infinite family of 
number systems.”88  
It is interesting that both the class number problem and HT theory give special emphasis to 
the number i. The HT diagonal function is defined in terms of imaginary numbers, and 
consequently the HT power set function and Cantor’s theorem were interpreted in the same way. 
The class number problem suggests that the underlying value of i can be reset or rejigged for 
infinitely many number systems. It is of great interest for the present study, then, that the grand 
HT ramified zigzag can be interpreted as providing a mechanism for resetting the value of i for 
the class number problem. In putting these two considerations together, the synthetic claim can 
be made that each iteration of the grand HT ramified zigzag is responsible for resetting the value 
of i in the subsequent HT number system. Consider now that a synthesis has already been 
proposed between HT and surreal numbers. Surreal number theory defines the null set a 
consisting of two sets, null set left and null set right. HTS theory seeks to define the HTS null set 
in terms of a vertical dimension, top set 0 and bottom set –i. HTS number theory diverges from 
the standard definition of the null set by adding a negative imaginary number. HT theory 
redefined the imaginary unit in chapter 5 so as to be expressed as    √  . The claim was 
made then that this definition provides greater access and flexibility in moving 
between the real and imaginary axes. The present discussion provides a critical 
example of such flexibility. This provides the very basis by which the value of i is 
reset within the ensuing number system. The plan thus emerges for a unified 
hypercomplex-transfinite-surreal-Gaussian (HTSG) number system.  
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To refine the algebraic claim made above, Ω2 = 0 within HT modality theory, where 
Ω and 0 are in the same HT number system. But from the perspective of HTSG, this is a crude 
understanding, both in terms of algebra and in that HT modality does not offer an adequate 
understanding of the Burali-Forti paradox. Thus for HTSG, Ω2 = 0, where Ω and 0 are not in the 
same HT number system but rather, 0 is in the succeeding HTSG number system. In saying that 
the square root of 0 equals Ω, the force of Ω2 is in the HTSG number system prior to the null set 
under consideration. This refinement of HTSG relative to HT provides a basis for solving the 
Burali-Forti paradox.  
Like Cantor’s paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox is triggered if a next ordinal number is 
produced. But within HTSG theory, there is not a next ordinal number with respect to the 
universal set of a particular HTSG number system, for the ramified zigzag returns to the null set 
of the succeeding HTSG number system. Accordingly, the concept of totality must be delimited 
to a particular HTSG number system. Thus for any HTSGα number system, the ordinal following 
the universal ordinal for that system is not a greater ordinal of HTSGα but the first ordinal (the 
null set) of HTSGβ. The logic here is the same as what Russell reluctantly accepted in turning to 
a ramified theory of types, having first rejected the axiom of comprehension. It is also similar to 
Cantor’s response to the same paradox. Cantor concluded that the ordinal numbers are well 
ordered but do not form a set. In adapting Cantor’s claim here to NBG set theory, the transfinite 
ordinals form a class but not a set. The ramified HT zigzag theory thus emerges from HT number 
theory to HT modality, and then through all HTSG systems of number and modality.  
Before Cantor developed his transfinite theory, infinity was regarded as an undifferentiated 
totality. Cantor showed that is not the case, and that infinity can be described on a scale of 
increasing orders which stretch infinitely beyond simple infinity. The present study makes the 
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same claim with respect to totality. There is not a single totality, as grasped by the first mention 
of a universal set, but a vast spectrum of HTSG totalities which dwarf our own “universal” set 
theory by a margin infinitely larger than that by which all the galaxies of the universe dwarf our 
own Milky Way. It is this totality of totalities, if the expression may be allowed, which shows the 
need for rejecting an absolutist understanding of the axiom of comprehension.  
 Gödel’s incompleteness theorem made a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics that 
is overcome in HT theory. This is because the HT ramified zigzag can preserve the semantic 
content that is lost from a diagonal number system by retrieving it from the anti-diagonal system. 
Accordingly, HT theory ramifies the Gödel statements just as with the Russell logic of Cantor’s 
theorem and the universal statements of set theory. Within any HTSG number system, all 
statements of universality are to be qualified as to which HT number system or HTSG universal 
sets are under consideration. Gödelian truths that cannot be expressed within a particular HT 
diagonal number system can be expressed within the succeeding anti-diagonal system.    
 In considering again the algebraic validity of the expression Ω2 = 0, the claim was made 
above that this algebraic claim was a weak link in the theory, due to this operation having so 
little analytic support. But a great deal more analytic support has now been given. It has become 
clear that HTSG makes this claim for every HTSG modal system. The discussion in chapter 5 
states that HT algebra can be defined in measure theoretic terms, based on the semantic 
inspection of the particular numbers involved in the algebraic operation. To recall an example, 
the meaning of 0 – 0 cannot be treated in purely syntactic terms, but must distinguish, for 
example, between (1) subtracting the set of even integers from the set of integers, and (2) 
subtracting the set of integers from the set of integers. This is a fundamental difference between 
HT theory and Cantor’s transfinite theory. The additional semantic power attributed to HT theory 
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here is due to the close connection the theory maintains between algebra and geometry. Such 
direct semantic interpretation is not available for transfinite probability within itself, but is made 
available to it through a synthesis with HT/HTSG number theory. Transfinite probability can 
thus be interpreted in terms of HTSG measure theory, providing a basis for HTSG probability 
and HTSG modality. Because of the close association shown here between algebra and 
geometry, and the ability of HTSG theory to inspect semantic values, the algebraic operation Ω2 
= 0 is valid for all HTSG modal operations. The syntactic and semantic context of this operation 
is always such that the autological and heterological aspects of Ω+ and Ω– coalesce in such a way 
as to recognize each other as their dialectical opposites.
89
  
 What now of the status of the grand HT ramified zigzag? Where does it go from here? This 
question will be discussed in chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF HT MODALITY 
 
HT modality has significant implications for a variety of considerations, including contemporary 
physics, traditional metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, information theory and beyond. Some of 
these implications are discussed below.  
 
HT Modality, Quantum Physics and Quantum Computing 
Paul Dirac developed a mathematical quantum system in which square roots on the x-axis 
were interpreted through relativity theory as implying the existence of negative particles. These 
anti-matter particles were discovered shortly afterward by Carl Anderson, earning Dirac and 
Anderson the Nobel Prize in Physics. The same sort of reconceptualization through square roots 
is possible for the y-axis. The number i is a fundamental component of quantum equations. The 
proposal was made in chapter 5 above that the HT imaginary unit be defined as  √  , 
making both i and –i satisfy this expression in equally fundamental fashion. When applied to 
quantum equations, one result of this renormalization is to allow for imaginary time. 
Accordingly, time can be interpreted as positive and negative on the x-axis, and imaginary on the 
y-axis. The most immediate application for this claim is to resolve problems of “spooky action at 
a distance” as concerning the EPR paradox. Within this quantum context, a single instant of 
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imaginary time can be calibrated as equal to one Planck unit of time.
90
 Once this understanding 
of imaginary time is provided for within quantum mechanics, a similar conceptualization can 
allow for an HT number generator that operates in imaginary time. A number generator 
operating in imaginary time contrasts sharply with Peano arithmetic, wherein each number has a 
“successor,” as if algebraic constructions are limited to linear time. HT number theory thus 
obtains license to construct algebraic operations in imaginary time (most particularly those 
involving supertasks).  
The quantum renormalization stated here counters Hawking’s no boundary condition in 
which the quantum singularity of the big bang is set in imaginary time, such that it is 
ungrammatical to ask what happened prior to time, as if asking what is north of the North Pole.
91
 
The renormalization claim advanced here critically treats i and imaginary time in a way that 
Hawking does not. But what else must be supplied from HT theory toward addressing the 
quantum context? The HT diagonal function can be extended to quantum theory so as to be 
logically and algebraically equivalent to the function of collapsing the quantum wave packet. 
Collapsing the quantum wave is of course what leads to the uncertainty principle within the 
Copenhagen interpretation. The Copenhagen collapsed wave results in voiding possibilities 
within the sine wave on the standard complex plane. However, collapsing the same sine wave on 
the HT complex plane (as adapting the quantum equations appropriately in HT theory) would 
void only 1 possibilities, while leaving 2 possibilities within the anti-diagonal HT wave 
function as found in higher dimensions. Quantum results from HT theory would thereby vary 
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dramatically from Copenhagen positivism. (Of course, this claim is merely hypothetical at this 
point, pending further development of HT theory.)  
Hawking proposed in his Information paradox that information is lost from the universe 
through the singularity at the center of a black hole. Leonard Susskind and others counter that the 
information is smeared along the event horizon, so as never to be lost inside the core. Hawking 
has changed his position to claim information is not lost in a singularity because it is preserved in 
parallel universes. Both Hawking and Susskind agree that information cannot be processed 
through a singularity. HT theory proposes a more powerful number theory such that what has 
hitherto been interpreted as singularities might now be interpreted as polarities (again, pending 
further development of the theory). From the point of view of HT theory, information is not lost 
from within a black hole but is lost from within the standard complex plane. This information 
should be retained within the HT complex plane or higher HT number systems.  
But there is a surprising implication here. The HT wave function seemingly allows for 
hidden variables as hypothesized by Einstein. This is odd in that HT theory advocates the same 
sort of determinate-indeterminate uncertainty as commonly interpreted within quantum 
mechanics. Is HT theory now arguing against its own modal outlook? Not ultimately, because 
any determinacy provided by HT number theory would collapse within the dialectical synthesis 
of HT modality.  
 Inasmuch that the discussion here is concerned with processing quantum information, it can 
be noted the universal Turing machine can be adapted within the HT quantum context. The 
universal Turing machine can be analyzed in terms of an infinite array of universal Turing 
machines and then subjected to a diagonal argument, thus producing a theory of HT computing. 
Then, because Turing’s halting problem was defined in analogy with Gödel’s incompleteness 
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theorem, the same HT ramified zigzag that applies to Cantor’s theorem, set theoretic paradoxes 
and Gödelian truths can also be used to solve the halting problem. Note that an HTSG quantum 
computer operates in imaginary time, as described above. This computing model should be 
sufficient to prevent information from escaping from a black hole, and thus would be of a power 
to solve Hawking’s information paradox.  The HT ramified zigzag pattern can thus be taken as 
extending through mathematics, computer science, and quantum physics (including black holes 
and the big bang).  
 
HT Modality and Metaphysics 
Laplace was a strict determinist, and yet he was one of the pioneering developers of 
probability theory. This was because Laplace sought to understand determinism systematically, 
and so interpreted contingency as the attenuated limits of determinism. Leibniz’ modal outlook 
was quite different. He understood both necessity and contingency as having distinct modal 
avenues to God. For Leibniz, the ontological argument is an a priori proof for the necessary 
existence of God. Conversely, the cosmological argument is an a posteriori proof for cosmic 
contingencies and possibilities receiving ultimate grounding in God’s necessary existence.  For 
Laplace, contingency is a mere privation. For Leibniz, contingency possesses a distinct 
metaphysical quality from determinism and its privation. And because Leibniz believed that 
efficient and final causes also terminate with God, he conceived of all modal realities within a 
theological context. For Leibniz, God is the God of necessary being, causal being, appetitive 
becoming and contingent becoming.
92
 But even so, Leibniz’ view of contingency in itself is not 
that different from Laplace’s; Leibniz simply thought that contingency in itself was inadequate 
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unto itself apart from a metaphysical grounding. Others, such as Hume, give a more robust 
understanding of contingency as perhaps ungrounded in ontology.  
With Laplace, Leibniz and Hume serving as exemplars of traditional modal thought, what 
sort of construction is envisioned by HT modality? HT theory clearly agrees with Hume against 
Leibniz and Laplace that contingency offers a distinct modal nature than what is a mere privation 
of necessity and determinism. In terms of cosmological thermodynamics, Laplace and Leibniz 
would have regarded infinite entropy as the heat death of the universe. But Hume would have 
regarded this as an open empirical question. The discovery of Bose-Einstein condensation shows, 
in fact, that the continued “privation” of order and determinism leads to an “opposite” state 
which, as Plato wrote in Sophist, has its own (positive) nature. On this view, entropy, lack of 
order and contingency are more than mere privations, thus contradicting the views of Laplace 
and Leibniz.  
 HT modality rejects the claim that necessity or contingency can be conceptualized 
appropriately in isolation from one another. HT modality asserts rather than modal categories are 
to conceived as within a quantum blur of imaginary time. The discussion in chapter 6 claimed 
that number and probability operate on one another simultaneously such that each is subject and 
object with respect to the other. The same claim is advanced here with respect to the quantum 
context of cause and effect. If quantum mechanics is subject to imaginary time, as claimed above 
with respect to the EPR paradox, then imaginary time would have major consequences for 
classical linear conceptions of cause and effect.  
Discussions of quantum mechanics, imaginary time and quantum computing raise the 
question of the millennium problem concerning the equality of P and NP. There are two crucial 
considerations of this problem. First is the qualitative or metaphysical consideration, and second 
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is the quantitative or computational consideration. If it should turn out that P ≠ NP, then the 
qualitative or metaphysical implications would not be very interesting, since they would conform 
to mainstream expectation. But if it should turn out that P = NP (as asserted here), then the 
metaphysical implications would be stunning. When computer science entertains the possibility 
of supplementing a deterministic computing machine with a black box, as if computational input 
should be provided by an oracle, the black box is taken to be as nondeterministic as if operating 
by pure chance, even though the black box or oracle can be stipulated as guessing correctly 
100% of the time. The metaphysics of this deterministic computer on the one hand as juxtaposed 
with a random black box on the other is the same metaphysical juxtaposition contemplated 
within HT modality. Put another way, Neoplatonists of the via negativa have contemplated the 
metaphysical juxtaposition described here for more than two thousand years. Even more, they 
have understood the metaphysical question in such a way as to argue for the equality of P and 
NP, except that the quantitative and computational aspect of the question has been unknown to 
them. But if it should turn out that the metaphysical vision of the via negativa is correct, then 
what would be the computational implications? Engaging in metaphysical speculation with the 
via negativa would perhaps not interest most computer scientists. However, if quantum 
computing provides real world circumstances that agree with the metaphysics of the via negativa, 
then the present discussion would be much more than a metaphysical abstraction. The discussion 
above concerning an HTSG quantum computer operating in imaginary time is the sort of 
quantum reality by which such a result would be possible. Such a quantum computer would be 
able to solve NP problems efficiently in polynomial time, just as easily as imaginary time can 
communicate signals involving spooky action at a distance. However, it is not clear that this 
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information could always be accessed from within our Newtonian frame of reference. The de re 
results might remain inaccessible within a black hole, for instance.  
 The consideration just given to P and NP was expressed in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. Significantly, these are the same terms of the present broader discussion. Chapter 6 
considered HT modality in quantitative (algebraic) terms and now chapter 7 is considering the 
theory in qualitative (philosophical) terms. The purpose for this comparison has been to 
determine whether the two accounts are congruent. The qualitative descriptions of HT modality 
are entirely consistent with the algebraic operations of the theory. Additionally, the quantitative 
and qualitative conditions of the present theory overlap perfectly with real world considerations 
of quantum physics and the question of P vs. NP. This is a remarkable convergence.  
What then is the claim here as per necessity, determinism and contingency? In chapter 6 
above, a modal synthesis was proposed between the universal set Ω+ of HT number theory and 
the universal set Ω– of transfinite probability. The synthesis proposed there was a quantitative 
synthesis expressed algebraically. The objective here is to describe the same synthesis 
qualitatively through concepts. The claim here is that necessity and contingency are each the 
modal ground of the other. This is the metaphysical basis for the equality of P and NP. This 
metaphysical synthesis pertains to quantum physics and to cause and effect just as the modal 
synthesis in chapter 6 pertains to mathematics.  
The discussion here harkens back to the discussion in chapter 1 dealing with the classical 
conception of being and the alternative conception as advanced by the via negativa. The 
discussion there was cast in terms of Plato and the Neoplatonist tradition. The discussion here 
can be expressed in terms of one of the most prominent members of that tradition, namely, 
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Hegel. Hegel spoke vividly of the synthesis of Being and Nonbeing in his Science of Logic, but 
also developed the dialectical logic for this synthesis in his Phenomenology of Spirit.  
Consider now that, within a Hegelian context, the synthesis of being and nonbeing as 
discussed quantitatively in chapter 6 can be given a deeper and more natural analysis because of 
the specific dialectical features of Hegel’s syntax and concepts. In the quantitative discussion, Ω+ 
and Ω– were said to be dialectical opposites in which each had marked its heterological opposite 
with its own autological sign  by means of the HT diagonal function. In Hegel, opposing subjects 
engaging one another as heterological predicates is the ideal syntactical construction. Hegel 
describes being and nonbeing as opposing subject and object of the other. Within this synthesis, 
Being and Nonbeing are autological as subject but heterological as object. For classical thought, 
this construction reflects a deviant logic. For traditional thought, this sort of dialectical 
construction amounts to syntactical paradox. From Aristotle to Descartes to Kant to Frege-
Russell, the received tradition seeks to retain the strict subject-object relation in which the 
subject (as ontologically primary) receives predicates (as ontologically secondary). The chief 
exception here is for a subject to receive itself as predicate, as in Aristotle’s “nous nousing 
nous.” This is an example of the magisterial autonomous subject, Aristotle’s version of a 
Platonic form, “itself by itself with itself.” But in either case, the Parmenidean tradition construes 
a primary substance as the subject that receives predicates. 
93
   
 More deeply, the Parmenidean grammar of subject-object conveys the stable semantic 
content of a concept. But in Hegel, the syntax does not produce a static concept, but a synthesis 
of opposing concepts into a dynamic notion. Neither of the concepts “understands itself” until 
united with its opposite. That is, the concepts are unstable when autonomous and autological, but 
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are rendered intelligible in a heterological synthesis. The  semantic contents or identities within 
the opposing concepts are blended so as to lose their individual distinctiveness within the notion.  
 Hegel describes the master-slave relationship as a failed dialectic on the part of the master 
but a successful one on the part of the slave. The master fails to recognize the slave as other, that 
is, as someone in the same image as himself. In his estimation, the slave is nothing but a means 
to the master’s ends. But the slave is led to a greater self-consciousness because of his 
oppression, and thus gains insight that is hidden from the master. To generalize on this example 
in a manner differently from Hegel, the Parmenidean tradition routinely fails to recognize 
dialectical opposites. From the Parmenidean point of view, such positive force should not be 
exerted from the negative. Yet this is precisely the claim made by Hegel. Hegel describes the 
negative as having the same sort of constructive power as described above in chapters 5 and 6 
with respect to the HT ramified zigzag theory. The HT zigzag as proposed herein is offered as an 
instantiation of Hegel’s commitment to the negative. Because of this commitment on Hegel’s 
part, he criticized Kant for failing to recognize the constructive power expressed within Kant’s 
antinomies. Anselm’s ontological argument describes God as perfectly composed of the positive 
attribute of necessary being, though without any acknowledgement of the negative corollary of 
nonbeing. Descartes made the same presumption in the Fifth Meditation. All of these claims are 
Eleatic errors as viewed from the via negativa.  
 The power of the negative presents a profound metaphysical problem. Hegel conceived of it 
as having power to construct, but yet it also deconstructs. The via negativa and apophatic 
traditions are quite often spoken of in synonymous terms. However, there is a sense in which 
they may be teased apart. Those who call themselves apophatic might tend to be committed to 
the mandate of always saying no, as if the sole metaphysical task is always to deconstruct. But 
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the via negativa can be construed very differently. Rather than being committed to a negative 
method, one can follow Hegel and HT ramified zigzag in producing positive constructions.  
 Is it possible to reconcile the opposing views of classical thought and the via negativa? In 
fact, the critical logical structure described above in which Ω+ and Ω– acted on one another 
simultaneously as opposing subject and object can be construed by means of the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem. Whereas Ω+ may be construed as subject in the standard interpretation acting 
on Ω–, a nonstandard interpretation is also possible in which Ω– is the subject that acts on  Ω+. To 
refine this dialectical relation further, these mutual actions can be construed as occurring in 
imaginary time, whether in a physical system (in terms of a Plank unit) or in a logical-
mathematical context (described above in chapter 1 in relation to Plato’s Parmenides). This 
convergence demonstrates that the present discussion of HTSG modality and quantum 
computing has yet not succeeded in working beyond the via negativa parameters upon which this 
study has been based. Further, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is seen here to be fundamental in 
bridging between standard logic and HTSG quantum weirdness.  
 Within the via negativa, the status of Plato’s form of the Good and the Summum bonum are 
quite problematic. In Republic, Plato is explicit that the form of the Good was at the apex of the 
Analogy of the Divided Line. Within that analogy, Plato regarded all other forms as permitting 
some degree of contrariety and heteronomy. But this is not true of the form of the Good in 
Republic, and it seems that the form of Beauty in Symposium and Phaedo was to be understood 
in the same Parmenidean fashion. Plato never identified the Good with Being, as was done by 
Augustine and other medieval philosophers and theologians. Plato seems to have conceived of 
the supreme task of philosophy to construct a dialectical system in which at least the forms of 
Good and Beauty are kept above the tumult of contrariety. But it also seems that Plato was a 
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rational mystic, and his mysticism and critical awareness were such as to suggest that he may 
have thought this an impossible task. In medieval philosophy, the apophatic tradition reached 
such a high pitch that any predication of God whatsoever was subjected to negation.  
 The plight of the via negativa is sufficiently worrisome as to make it advisable to consider 
all manner of critical issues. Nietzsche wrote:  
In fact, nothing up to now has been more naively persuasive than the error of 
being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics, for instance: after all, it has on its side 
every word, every sentence we speak! Even the opponents of the Eleatics fell prey 
to the seduction of their concept of being – among others, Democritus did so in 
inventing his atom.  “Reason” in language: oh, what a tricky old woman she is! 
I’m afraid we’re not rid of God because we still believe in grammar.94  
 
But strangely, Plato expressed this worry before Nietzsche did. In his Seventh Letter, Plato 
expressed the worry that grammar and language are inadequate expressions for metaphysical 
truth.
95
 In light of a rare agreement between Plato and Nietzsche, and the apophatic predilection 
to negate everything, what is to be made of this predicament? The mystic and the skeptic make 
strange bedfellows. Hegel’s power of the negative is a long way from Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics. Is Hegel’s deviant use of language (as measured from Parmenides) moving in the 
right direction? Does grammar remain valid when pushed to its dialectical limits, or should it be 
pushed beyond its limits so as to be negated?  
 
HT Modality and Epistemology 
 The ability of HT number theory to interpret the logic of the Russell paradox within 
Cantor’s theorem, and then the similar ability of HT modality to interpret the set theoretic 
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paradoxes in meaningful fashion suggests that the theory is still on its feet in difficult territory. 
Perhaps attention can be given then to important considerations of the characteristics and further 
development of HT theory.  
 HT theory is remarkably similar to Kant’s philosophy in that both are synthetic a priori. But 
there are major differences. Kant intends his theory to be a priori in absolute terms. HT theory is 
a priori only in relative terms. More specifically, HT theory is a quasi-empirical synthetic a priori 
theory. Kant’s a priori deductions seek to progress apodictically from positive to positive. HT 
theory progresses quasi-empirically from negative to negative through HT ramification and 
zigzag. Kant seeks absolute autonomy. HT theory seeks a dialectical blend of autonomy and 
heteronomy.   
 The axiom of comprehension is a particularly worrisome source of intellectual error. This 
axiom has prompted many individuals to believe they can grasp an absolute totality by a simple 
extension of a predicate across an unqualified universe of thought. Russell struggled to maintain 
this axiom in the face of the foundational crisis, believing that the battle for reason was 
tantamount to the battle for this very axiom. This axiom is fundamental to the quest for 
universality, which in turn is fundamental to logical certainty. What is more, the Parmenidean 
application of this axiom precludes the possibility of the dialectical method of such vital interest 
to the present study. The axiom of comprehension puts analysis and autonomy in the places 
where HT theory puts synthesis and heteronomy.
96
 In fact, the objective of replacing this axiom 
with respect to the axiom of unitary total probability was the motivation that prompted the 
development of transfinite probability.  
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The axiom of comprehension has been relentlessly applied to both number theory and 
probability theory. Consider a particularly striking case. Based on the axiom of comprehension 
as applied not only universally but trans-universally, many contemporary physicists and 
cosmologists believe in a multiverse of parallel universes. Such extrapolation of probabilistic 
principles is made without the least hint of logical contrariety. But conversely, another group of 
physicists are struggling with the negative implications of quantum probability and are 
publishing articles in which they are attempting to come to terms with the concept of negative 
probability. These physicists have faced up to the threat of negation and are not falling 
uncritically into the axiom of comprehension.
97
 The present study would seem to have relevance 
for their interests. This study suggests that the attempt for a negative probability is perhaps a 
defective dialectic, but what should be sought instead is a theory of imaginary probability as 
expressed on the y-axis. Imaginary probability and imaginary space-time would, if true, preclude 
the validity of the multiverse as deduced in association with the axiom of comprehension.  
The preceding discussion should make clear why HT theory is characterized by 
philosophical restraint, and therefore reflects a philosophy of humility. This claim might seem to 
clash with the tremendous hierarchical structure of the theory, except that the theory was 
produced through the activity of the negative which continually negates itself through HT 
ramified zigzag. This theory has rejected the axiom of comprehension at every turn, and has 
grown large only through the power of negation. But the present theory also reflects a philosophy 
of humility by insisting on the distinction between de dicto and de re. As Knuth writes of surreal 
numbers, “Only God can finish the calculations, but we can finish the proofs.”98  
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HT Modality and Ethics 
What conditions must be presupposed as a sufficient basis for the self? The self that is 
completely determined by others is entirely passive, so as to lack autonomy and agency. The 
equality of P and NP brackets the world of necessity and determinism such that the autonomy of 
the self is not diminished by external forces of nature. This provides a basis for personal agency 
though not for extreme libertarianism. A self that is relentlessly committed to its own autonomy 
and liberty cares too much for self and too little for others. Absolute autonomy in either a 
Platonic form or in interpersonal relations allows one to recognize oneself in others, thus leading 
to alienation and a reduced self.  
The development of HT numbers in chapter 5 could not have proceeded apart from the 
autological-heterological distinction, as is also true of the synthesis of HT modality in chapter 6. 
Yet this logical syntax reduces to the relation of self and other. The logical development of the 
theory depicts an infinite amount of heterology and difference that is overcome by and subsumed 
within autology and sameness, while preserving individual distinctiveness. The progression 
reflects the upward movement of the psyche in Plato’s Symposium. As Plato writes, the soul “is 
led by another into the mystery of Love.” Love is predicated on alterity and heteronomy, both of 
which can be described as heterological. Thus in addition to reflecting a logical structure of 
humility, HT theory expresses a philosophy of alterity, mutual dependence and love.  
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APPENDIX  1 
 
Mandelbrot Set Chaos 
J. C. Sprott  
Department of Physics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA  
July 3, 1997 
The Mandelbrot set is the set of points in the complex c-plane that do not go to infinity when 
iterating zn+1 = zn
2
 + c starting with z = 0.  One can avoid the use of complex numbers by using z 
= x + iy and c = a + ib, and computing the orbits in the ab-plane for the 2-D mapping  
xn+1 = xn
2
 - yn
2
 + a  
yn+1 = 2xnyn + b 
with initial conditions x = y = 0 (or equivalently x = a and y = b).   It can be proved that the orbits 
are unbounded if |z| > 2 (i.e.,  x
2
 + y
2
 > 4).  The boundary of the Mandelbrot set is a very 
complicated fractal with a Hausdorff dimension of 2.  Bounded orbits may attract to a fixed 
point, a periodic cycle, or they may be chaotic.  More details and references for the Mandelbrot 
set are included in the sci.fractals FAQ.  
There are also various ways to express the Mandelbrot set in terms of a single time-delayed 
scalar variable.  One such representation is  
yn+1 = 2yn[(yn - b)
2
/4yn-1
2
 - yn-1
2
 + a] + b 
with initial conditions y0 = b, y-1 = 0.  
An interesting question is to ask for what values of (a, b) are the orbits chaotic.  This question 
was addressed numerically using a BASIC program MANCHAOS.BAS which has been 
compiled with PowerBASIC.  The program does period-checking for periods up to 16,000 and 
considers the orbit to be chaotic if it is bounded but not periodic up to the limit checked.  The 
following figure shows the output of that program.  
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In this figure, white represents unbounded orbits, black represents chaotic orbits, dark blue 
represents fixed points, and other periodic cycles are plotted modulo the remaining 13 
colors.  The chaotic regions appear to be restricted to the boundary of the set and to a portion of 
the real (x) axis toward the left.  Along the x-axis, the dynamics are governed by the 1-D map, 
xn+1 = xn
2
 + a, which is known to have chaotic solutions over most of the range -2 < a < -
1.4011.  The number of apparently chaotic orbits off the real axis shrinks as period-checking is 
extended to higher periods, seemingly tending to zero.  
If chaotic orbits are limited to the boundary of the Mandelbrot set, as appears to be the case, then 
they occur with a probability less than or equal to the probability that a point falls on the 
boundary of the set.  Apparently it has not been proved whether the boundary of the Mandelbrot 
set has non-zero area.  Similarly, it is not known whether a point in any finite region of the ab-
plane has a non-zero probability of exhibiting chaos.  It appears that the probability is extremely 
small and very likely zero.  
The few black points off the x-axis may just be examples of transient chaos; they may eventually 
go to infinity or settle into a periodic cycle, although some of these cases have been followed for 
over 10
10
 iterations.  Some of these aperiodic points can be shown to have a Lyapunov exponent 
of exactly zero (see note by Jay Hill below).  For these points, the orbits are aperiodic and 
fractal, and the separation of orbits with two nearby initial conditions fluctuates, but it doesn't 
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grow, exponentially or otherwise.  These points seemingly fail to satisfy the sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions that is usually the defining characteristic of chaos.  This is in 
contrast to most orbits in the range -2 < a < -1.4011, b = 0, which are truly chaotic.  Thus the 
Mandelbrot set, with all its complexity, apparently admits a negligibly small number of truly 
chaotic orbits.  
 
Several interesting responses to the above observations were posted on the newsgroup 
sci.fractals:  
On 26 June 1997, Bob Beland (bg570@FreeNet.Carleton.CA) wrote:  
"Points in the Mandelbrot plane come in several types:  
 Outside set, nowhere near it: Orbit diverges to infinity 
 Inside set, not on boundary: Orbit converges to a finite attracting point or cycle 
 Edge of set, tip or branch of filament: Orbit converges on finite repelling cycle 
 Edge of set, other filament points, with irrational external angle: Chaotic orbit 
 Edge of set, cusp of a cardioid or bud attachment point (One or more rational external 
angles): parabolic, orbit goes to weakly attracting cycle or point. 
 Edge of set component, not on a cusp, perhaps at the limit of an alternating series of buds, 
with irrational external angle: Orbit chaotic. (Julia set has Siegel disks.)" 
 
On 26 June 1997, Jay R. Hill (Jay.R.Hill@cpmx.saic.com) wrote:  
"There are special values of c with convergent behavior at 'rational' points on the boundary of a 
component.  And there are 'irrational' points on the boundary that are chaotic.  But even these are 
at the edge of chaos, with a Lyapunov exponent equal to zero.  On 16 Feb 1994 I posted a list of 
these chaotic points.  Four of them are c = 0.33 + 0.06i, 0.37 + 0.16i, -0.23 + 0.64i, -0.47 + 
0.54i.  As for these being only transiently chaotic, I have followed them for more than 10
7
 
iterations. They are still going, forever, in their chaotic path.  Their paths are fractal, by the way, 
and fun to plot."  
 
On 3 July 1997, Jay R. Hill (Jay.R.Hill@cpmx.saic.com)  added:  
"The value of c [0.33 + 0.06i) is exactly on the edge of the cardioid with theta related to the 3-4-
5 triangle. For the Mandelbrot Set the Lyapunov exponent is When lambda = 0, this implies If 
the cycle ever becomes periodic, the product will go to zero violating [2].  There is a path normal 
the component for which inside the component lambda is negative and outside positive. On the 
edge it must be zero and cannot ever be a cycle.  
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c = 0.5 * exp (i*theta) - 0.25 * exp (2*i*theta). 
lambda = lim (1/N) sum{ log2 | 2*z[n] | }         [1] 
lim prod (2*z[n]) = 1.                            [2] 
The iteration orbit follows a fractal path always finding a new spot between earlier ones.  If that 
means asymptotic to a cycle, the cycle has infinite length. I wouldn't call that a cycle.  The 
lambda=0 orbits are very different from the periodic orbits located at the touch points between 
components. When lambda=0, we get a fractal path. The others have star patterns which develop 
as the iterations converge to the limit cycle. The number of star 'spikes', the period of the orbit, is 
the same as the period of the 'outer' attached component."  
 
On August 5, 1997, Paul Derbyshire (ao950@FreeNet.Carleton.CA) wrote:  
"The book The Beauty Of Fractals calls these hypothetical objects "queer components". It is 
strongly suspected the ordinary z
n 
+ c Mandelbrots do not have these. Other Mandelbrots for 
more complex (non polynomial) formulas likely can have them. They would be associated, I 
guess, with Siegel disk and Herman ring attractors. (Say, what is a Herman ring? They are 
mentioned briefly anywhere Siegel disks are, but Siegel disks are described in detail and Herman 
rings are not. It is mentioned that Herman rings do not occur in z
2 
+ c though.)"  
 
On August 6, 1997, Peter T. Wang (peterw@cco.caltech.edu) wrote:  
"Yes, the boundary of the m-set contains points which correspond to j-sets of Siegel disk type; in 
a sense, the orbit of the iteration is quasiperiodic.  Instead of being attracted to some n-cycle, an 
iterated point in the basin of attraction orbits an "invariant circle" about some fixed point in the 
plane (we're talking about the function space, not the parameter space of the m-set).  Anyway, 
what this basically amounts to is that the "period," if you say it has one, is effectively infinite.  It 
is bounded behavior but no periodicity occurs.  However, I wouldn't say the behavior is chaotic." 
http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/chaos/manchaos.htm  
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